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January 30, 1963

Airgram from the American Embassy Ankara to the Department of State, 'Milliyet Quotes Foreign Minister on Nuclear Missiles'

A report by the newspaper Milliyet cited Foreign Minister Erkin on the Jupiter missiles. According to the Embassy’s translation, Erkin said that the Jupiter missile bases would be “dismantled,” and that Turkey and the United States were discussing their replacement with Polaris missile launching submarines. When Erkin was asked whether Polaris submarines would be provided, he replied that, “These are details. Talks are continuing.” Negotiations were indeed continuing, but it would take six weeks to reach an agreement.

January 29, 1963

Department of State Telegram 1416 to the American Embassy Rome

Responding to Finletter’s request, the State Department provides a statement on the Jupiters for the NAC meeting on January 30, 1963. It explained that the U.S. cannot bring up the matter unilaterally until consultations with Italy and Turkey have progressed. Finletter should coordinate delivery of the statement with Italian and Turkish representatives while Reinhard and Hare work with the Italians and Turks in preparing a written statement that can be presented to the NAC at a later stage. While the Italians were willing to join the statement, it is not clear whether Turkey did or whether the statement was made to the NAC on January 30.

January 25, 1963

American Embassy Paris Telegram POLTO 879 to the Seceretary of State, Washington, DC

Kennedy’s press statements and announcements by Italy and Turkey of agreements with the U.S. on the Jupiters put the U.S. Mission to NATO in an awkward position because “most NAC members learned of withdrawal of Jupiters from press.” Moreover, an internal memo to NATO’s Secretary General complained about the U.S. failure to consult with the Alliance. Ambassador Finletter here asked the Department to provide a statement that he could make to the NAC at its January 30 meeting.

January 24, 1963

Department of State Telegram 634 to American Embassy Ankara

The early delivery of F-104G’s was a crucial element in the negotiations with Turkey over the Jupiters, and the U.S. planning on the deliveries was moving forward. The State Department, however, wanted Turkish authorities to understand that the timing of the deliveries “will depend on such progress in negotiations that it is clear GOT [Government of Turkey] will agree to dismantle JUPITERS.”

January 24, 1963

American Embassy Rome Telegram 1469 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

The Embassy reported on the Council of Ministers decisions and the related communique. The latter made only general references to “modernization of arms of alliance” without mentioning Jupiters or Polaris, which was probably Fanfani’s preference. According to Reinhardt, Fanfani told him that the Council had “unanimously approved” the agreement that he and Kennedy had reached.

January 24, 1963

Diary Entry of Amintore Fanfani for 24 January 1963 [Excerpt]

In his diary, Fanfani recorded that the Council of Ministers has approved his report on the talks with President Kennedy and the recommendation to withdraw the Jupiters on April 1, 1963. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense would have a “mandate” to implement the withdrawal. As agreed, the Jupiters would be replaced by Polaris, and the latter would not be based in Italy. Italy would support a NATO multilateral force, without the tripartite directorate that De Gaulle had espoused.

January 19, 1963

Joint Chiefs of Staff Message to U.S. CINCEUR [Commander in Chief European Command], 'Rationale of the JUPITER Decision'

That the Commander of U.S. European Command (CINCEUR), Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, was a critic of the Jupiter removals may have informed a Joint Chiefs of Staff decision to send him a background paper explaining U.S. decisions that could also be used for discussions within NATO.   The backgrounder provided information comparing the reliability, vulnerability, and survivability, among other features, of the Jupiter and Polaris missiles. While the withdrawal of Thor and Jupiter missiles reduced Western “nuclear potential,” those reductions would be offset by an increase from 350 to about 800 U.S. strategic ballistic missiles, “some of which will be assigned to NATO targets.” Further, it “may be assumed that there will be no reduction in the present expectation of timely damage to the ACE [Allied Command Europe] targets presently covered by the Jupiters.”

January 18, 1963

Department of State Telegram 1250 to the American Embassy Rome

This message, intended “only” for Ambassador Reinhardt, included information for use in backgrounders for officials and journalists, but only with the Department’s consent. It included comparisons of the Jupiter and Polaris missiles, a brief discussion of possible targeting arrangements for Polaris, and the possible timing of the introduction of Polaris and the phase out of Jupiter missiles.  One point concerned “Equating of Italy and Turkey with Cuba.” U.S. officials were advised to make no comment on the matter, but if raised, officials should observe that when the Soviets equated missiles in Cuba with Jupiters in Italy and Turkey “we absolutely refused accept any such comparison or deal.” A version of these points would soon go to Fanfani’s foreign policy adviser, Carlo Marchiori.

January 16, 1963

Memorandum of Conversation between Aminitore Fanfani, Prime Minister of the Italian Republic, and the President [John F. Kenndy], 'Modernization of Nuclear Missiles in Italy and the Miditerranean'

Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani’s visit to the U.S. was an opportunity for he and President Kennedy to reach “a meeting of the minds” on the Jupiter-Polaris problem. The two had several conversations during the next two days on East-West relations, NATO nuclear issues, and the developing world, among other topics.  During this conversation, with only the U.S. translator present, Kennedy explained to Fanfani that Polaris/Sergeant missiles as a replacement for Jupiter/Corporals, along with Italian participation in an eventual MLF, should be announced as “whole package” rather than to have “the different points of decision simply leak out, without coherence and possibly at the wrong moment.” He believed that the main elements of the agreement would find “general approval” among most political groupings in Italy. When Fanfani brought up the possibility of announcing the U.S. request on Jupiters and Polaris and then taking it to his government, Kennedy emphasized the need for quick action, adding that it would “not be desirable to allow for prolonged discussion” of the package.

At Fanfani’s request, Kennedy explained the arrangements for Polaris missions in the Mediterranean, which operated out of a base in the Iberian Peninsula (Rota, Spain), and the various options for an MLF, either surface or submarine ships. Such an approach, Kennedy believed, was a way to improve the “position of the West.” Accepting Kennedy’s assertions about the dangers of the Jupiter missiles, Fanfani nevertheless saw a “psychological” problem involving the “prestige and strength” of Italy’s armed forces. Kennedy “indicated lively interest” in Fanfani’s question as to whether the Jupiter bases could be used for “cooperative peaceful space efforts.”

At the meeting’s conclusion, Kennedy “stressed that by the following morning they should be able to combine four or five points into a proposal that would strengthen the Italian and American position within the framework of the Alliance, thus making this meeting a gain in its cohesiveness and hence political strength.”

January 14, 1963

American Embassy Rome Telegram 1367 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

When Reinhardt met with President Antonio Segni, a Christian Democrat, the latter accepted the reasons for replacing Jupiters with Polaris, but nevertheless emphasized the “grave psychological and political implications” because the Jupiters had been a “symbol of Italian determination” to take part in the defense of the West. Worried that there was “too much neutralism” in Italy, Segni was concerned about the electoral impact of the Jupiter decision and believe that the “operation should be carried out in such a fashion as to leave no inference of a lessening of Italian participation in nuclear defense.”

Pagination