Kohl and Major review ideas about the establishment of a European pillar in NATO and French plans for new security structures in Europe.

Over two days of meetings, Bush and Mazowiecki discuss German reunification, the future of relations with the Soviet Union/Russia, and NATO.

The report assesses German unity in three parts. The first regards internal factors of integration such as integrating monetary systems and elections. The next portion regards external factors, focusing mainly on the USSR's parameters for reunification regarding NATO and Poland's western border. Finally, the report assesses German reunification and predicts the process will be complete by the end of the year (1990). In addition, it discusses the positive prospects for European Unity and emphasizes Austria's role in binding a newly united Germany to Western Europe.

The document contains a conversation between Chancellor Franz Vranitzky and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher begins with the state of internal affairs in Great Britain then relates its position to the European Union and role in German Unification. The conversation then turns to the role of Austria and its effort to join the European Commission. In the wake of problems in Eastern Europe, Thatcher stresses her preference for Western Europe to avoid involving itself in the counter movements.

The document entails interviews with several Austrian and German officials and recounts their views on various issues surrounding German reunification. The first is an interview with State Minister Adam-Schwater where the primary focus is monetary unification and budgetary restrictions for integration. The second interview is with State Secretary Sudhoff revolves around European issues such as the CSCE, security, border issues, and the time frame for reunification. The notes from State Secretary Lautenschlager reiterate the need for monetary integration in addition to expressing Austria's desire for a European Coalition. The fourth section are notes from both Chancellor Kohl and Ministerial Director Teltschik. In it they reiterate East Germany's desire for reintegration and outline four pressing needs - decisions from the 2+4 agreements, a new security structure, disarmament, and economic development. Finally there are notes from the CSCE Summit, where Austria is asked to evaluate other Eastern European countries (specifically Yugoslavia) and evaluate neutrality in a changing European order.

The document is an updated assessment of German reunification from the Austrian foreign ministry. The assessment begins with addressing three areas which include integrating economic and monetary systems, unifying under current legal framework, and the drop in GDR emigration after the 1990 elections. The next portion focuses on external relations including the new Four Power responsibilities, European political-military affairs, Poland's Western Border, the eradication of the Berlin agreement, and Western European countries influence specifically on intelligence activities. The final part solely concerns Western Germany's projected timeline for total reunification.

In a conversation recorded by Chernyaev, Gorbachev candidly discusses the political situation in East and West Germany, the weakness of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), and the Soviet strategy for managing German reunification.