This letter details the logistics of the conference in London. The US is likely to submit an application to stop the delivery of so-called sensitive technologies. Delivery and transportation of materials is discussed. 

Polish ambassador and chairman of the Drafting Committee at the 1995 NPT review conference.

Chairperson of the subcommittee for "Disarmament, Arms Control, and Nonproliferation" of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag.

Expert Advisor to Canada’s delegation to the 1995 review conference.

This document describes the progress made up to that point and the various concerns of countries within the group regarding the scale of safeguards, particularly from the French and Germans. The NSG also agreed to make the guidelines available to the IAEA so that it could publish them. The State Department had been reluctant to publish them, not least because they did not include full scope safeguards, but overriding that was an interest in dispelling Third World concerns about a “secret cartel.”

This document reflects that while full-scope safeguards had wide support in the group, both the French and the West German remained opposed. The Carter administration tried to persuade the French but they were worried about being "isolated" in the group and talked about withdrawing or opposing further meetings because the NSG had “fully achieved” its objectives. Washington persuaded Paris not to withdraw, but the group’s future was plainly uncertain.