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October 2, 2020

Interview with Daniel Poneman

Daniel Poneman was director of Defense Policy and Arms Control at the National Security Council. He served as a member of the US delegation to ACRS.

July 3, 1991

Memorandum from William F. Sittmann, 'Deputies Committee Meeting on Middle East Arms Control' [with attachments]

Attachments include: "Deputies Committee Meeting, July 5, 1991: Middle East Arms Control: Agenda" and "Scope Paper for the Suppliers' Meeting: Paris, 8-9 July 1991"

1976

Korea: Uneasy Truce in the Land of the Morning Calm (New York: American-Korean Friendship and Information Center, 1976)

The AFKIC introduces its mission, the history of Korea, and the current situation on the Peninsula.

1971

Operation War Shift: Position Paper, Second (Revised) Edition

A position paper of the American-Korean Friendship and Information Center, describing the organization's objectives in the context of the Vietnam War.

September 23, 1977

State Department telegram 229507 to U.S. Embassy London et al., 'Nuclear Suppliers Meeting – Assessment'

This document describes the progress made up to that point and the various concerns of countries within the group regarding the scale of safeguards, particularly from the French and Germans. The NSG also agreed to make the guidelines available to the IAEA so that it could publish them. The State Department had been reluctant to publish them, not least because they did not include full scope safeguards, but overriding that was an interest in dispelling Third World concerns about a “secret cartel.”

September 15, 1977

State Department telegram 222114 to U.S. Embassy Paris, 'Nuclear Suppliers Meeting'

This document reflects that while full-scope safeguards had wide support in the group, both the French and the West German remained opposed. The Carter administration tried to persuade the French but they were worried about being "isolated" in the group and talked about withdrawing or opposing further meetings because the NSG had “fully achieved” its objectives. Washington persuaded Paris not to withdraw, but the group’s future was plainly uncertain.

May 3, 1977

State Department telegram to U.S. Embassy London et al., 'Nuclear Suppliers Meeting, April 28-29, 1977'

This document describes the meeting of 15 nuclear supplier states in London where issues were discussed such as full-scope safeguards, including sanctions in the guidelines, purpose of supplier consent, moratoriums, enlargement of membership, and various countries' individual concerns were voiced and addressed.

November 12, 1976

London Embassy telegram 18324 to State Department, 'London Nuclear Suppliers’ Meeting, November 11 – 12'

This telegram describes what the nuclear suppliers' countries accomplished during their November 11-12 meeting. Continued discussions of safeguards and enlarging the group, and agreed that they would wait on publishing results until after their next meeting, which was scheduled to be the following March in London.

June 11, 1976

George Vest to the Secretary of State, 'London Nuclear Suppliers Meeting'

This document provides an overview of the London Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting which included the addition of the five newest countries to the original seven. Most old and new members were receptive when Washington lobbied them to support a “long term and stable regime of restraint” on the export of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology. While the French were supportive of the moratorium proposal, the Germans were uncomfortable with it, not least because of the implications for their deal with Brazil.

January 27, 1976

George Vest to the Secretary, 'Nuclear Suppliers Status Report'

In this document regarding the final agreement, George Vest wrote Kissinger that it “served to close many of the loopholes and inadequacies of previous nuclear cooperation agreements between suppliers and recipients.” It also put the French and West Germans on record to restrict access to sensitive nuclear technologies. Nevertheless, as Vest noted, the guidelines would not prevent “indigenous” development of nuclear capabilities and “unsafeguarded developments” or the acquisition of sensitive technology.

Pagination