Unofficial translation of correspondence between PM Craxi and President Reagan regarding strategic arms limitations and deterrence. Reagan outlines the planned US measures given lack of effort and willingness by the USSR to arrive to a binding agreement.

South African Minister of Foreign Affairs "Pik" Botha and President Reagan meet in Washington, DC. South African Ambassador Sole, the note taker, interprets Reagan's friendly opening comments as "the inference clearly being that he had no illusions about democratic rule in Africa." They discuss the situation in Namibia and Angola, and their shared opposition to Soviet and communist influence in the region. Botha also asks Reagan to help South Africa's souring relations with France regarding nuclear cooperation. Botha states that "South Africa was not preparing or intending to explode a nuclear device, but[...] could not afford publicly to surrender this option."

South African Ambassador Donald Sole reports on the possible effect of Reagan non-proliferation policy on South African/US nuclear relations.

James Malone writes to US Secretary of Energy designate James Edwards with recommendations from the Non-Prolifreation Coordinating Committee for the Reagan administration representing the views of nuclear industry groups.

A letter from the United States Control and Disarmament Agency assessing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and US security assistance. Three main issues and possible courses of actions are discussed; they include President Reagan’s “red lines,” certification of Pakistani nuclear activity and convincing Congress to continue aid to Pakistan after September 1987.

(Excerpts) discussion between Marshal Vasilii Kuznetsov and SED Politburoi members on the issues of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, US plans for the MLF, and Warsaw Pact military and political cooperation.