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April 16, 1979

Stenographic Notes of the Session of the Current Affairs Subcommittee of the SIV Nuclear Energy Commission [Excerpt]

This excerpt is a part of the lengthy document from the Yugoslav Nuclear Energy Commission meeting held on April 16, 1979. The discussion included cooperation with different countries in the development of peaceful nuclear technology, exploration of options to acquire and sell uranium (yellowcake) on the global market without any restrictions, and joint programs in developing or exporting nuclear technology (Romania, Indonesia, and Iraq). 

The focus here is on investigating the possibility of constructing a nuclear reactor in Iraq in cooperation with France. The details are fuzzy, although it is undoubtedly the Osiraq nuclear reactor. Important for understanding the context is the fact that Yugoslavia and Iraq had already established lucrative barter arrangements on the principle “armaments for oil.” More importantly, the general undertone throughout this and other meetings of the Commission in a previous couple of years is the attempt of the Yugoslavs to find loopholes in the existing safeguards and other restrictions related to selling sensitive nuclear technology to other countries based on a belief that the NPT did not function and that the ‘nuclear haves’ were once again trying to reestablish much stricter monopoly on nuclear technology than before. 

April 4, 1962

Letter, Eng. Predrag Anastasijević to Comrade Secretary of the SKNE, 'Meeting with Comrade Djura Ničić, April 2, 1962'

Throughout the 1950s, Yugoslav nuclear policy was designed by President Tito and a small circle of his closest associates. Very few official documents from that time remain or indeed ever existed. Things began to change after the establishment of the UN Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in December 1961, followed by the committee’s first meeting in March 1962, which marked the beginning of global negotiations that eventually led to the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963. This initiative forced the Yugoslav political leadership to approach the problem more systematically. 

The short document presented here comes from the first meeting during which the Yugoslav nuclear policy started to be officially formulated. The meeting was organized by the Yugoslav State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs [Državni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove — DSIP] and included representatives of the Yugoslav People’s Army [Jugoslovenska narodna armija — JNA], the Institute for International Politics [Institut za međunarodnu politiku] and the Federal Nuclear Energy Commission [Savezna komisija za nuklearnu energiju — SKNE]. The main goal was to initiate the coordination of activities and permanent consultations between these institutions in order to provide expert support to the DSIP and better comprehension of the ongoing negotiations in the ENDC.

November 2, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, to Yugoslav Embassies in Havana and Washington and the Yugoslav Mission to the United Nations, New York

The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry relays to its embassies a summary of the Brazilian proposal on the Cuban Missile Crisis which, they say, mainly includes: the denuclearization of Latin America with inspections, Cuba's commitment to not "export" revolutionary operations, and guarantees to Cuba for sovereignty and independence. Allegedly, Castro welcomed the idea of the above plan. Brazil thinks that the USA could accept it after negotiations.

October 29, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Foreign Ministry to Yugoslav Embassies in Havana and Washington and Yugoslav Mission to the United Nations

Brazilian President João Goulart emphasizes that the possibility of an adequate solution (to the Cuban Missile Crisis) could be increased if there were measures to suspend the quarantine (blockade) immediately, followed by corresponding and effective stoppage of weapons shipment to Cuba as well as determining obligations to prevent the spreading of nuclear weapons and the installation of bases. In his opinion the danger of war could increase significantly and worries of Brazil would grow as far as its own security was concerned, if such bases were installed in Cuba or any other part of LA. He also brought to the attention the proposal of Brazil in the UN for the denuclearization of Latin America.

October 27, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry about a meeting with Brazilian President João Goulart. Barišić says Goulart considers that everything must be done to prevent the beginning of war, because war would bring unpredictable catastrophe and it would be hard to extinguish it if war operations start. Goulart also shares his opinion that negotiations are necessary, and that Cuba must be prevented from becoming an atomic base for it could be the constant cause of war dangers.

October 24, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry relaying a message from "Brazilian Ambassador in Washington [Roberto de Oliveira Campos] says that the USA is getting ready for military intervention in Cuba. The approximate plan is that US planes will start bombing Cuba in the places where there are alleged bases with nuclear weapons and that will be as soon as Cuba refuses to accept the UN Commission for disarmament."

October 17, 1963

Report on the conversation between Koca Popovic and Dean Rusk at the State Department

Memorandum of conversation between Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koca Popovic and Secretary of State Dean Rusk at the State Department. The discussion concentrates on US foreign policy - US-Soviet Relations, US policy toward West Germany, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, force reduction in Europe, and the presence of Soviet forces in Cuba.