The final instructions for the Czechoslovak delegation en route to Geneva for the ENDC in November 1967.  The treaty was mostly finished by this time; only the final details remained. Denunciation of US foreign policy and prevention of West Germany’s nuclear weapon acquisition reappear in these instructions.

An undated memorandum, produced most likely in the late spring of 1963 (most likely in May) that outlines Soviet thinking on the most recent discussions with US representatives on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The memorandum is crystal clear that the key goal for Soviet negotiators was to avoid West German control over nuclear weapons. This is why Moscow opposed the idea of a Multilateral Nuclear Force. However, Soviet officials also admitted that it was better to agree to a treaty that did not explicitly prohibit a multilateral nuclear force as long as their US counterparts committed not to let West German authorities have an authoritative role in authorizing nuclear-weapon use

A record of the conclusions of the 186th meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which met on March 6, 1962.  The attachment includes the initial instructions for the Czechoslovak delegations to the first meeting of ENDC. The document testifies to the strong preoccupation with West Germany’s re-armament, and the possibility of West Germany nuclear-weapon acquisition. Czechoslovakia travelled to Geneva with a goal of avoiding this outcome at any cost. Although the document offers a broad overview of the “lay of the land” ahead of the first meeting of ENDC, it is the focus on West Germany that is the most obvious here

Extensive account of CSSR-Chinese relations, including controversy surrounding the Cultural Revolution and Chinese extremism, anti-Soviet proclivities within the Chinese leadership, and the Chinese hydrogen bomb test on June 17th.

The memorandum includes topics discussed between CPCz Secretary Vladimír Koucký and Cuban government official Carlos Rafael Rodríguez. Rodríguez lists points of misunderstanding between Cuba and other socialist countries. Discussion topics include Chinese publications in Cuba, Cuba's unique approach to socialist revolution, the proposed nuclear-free zone in Latin America, and building socialism under various conditions (e.g. Islam's role in Algeria), among others. Rodríguez encourages more communication among socialist nations to prevent misunderstanding.

In this conversation between Khrushchev and Novotny, Khrushchev used exceptionally candid language to defend his handling of the superpower confrontation, what he described as “six days which shook the world.” While well aware that many fellow communists (including the Chinese and Cubans) regarded his agreement under pressure from US President John F. Kennedy to remove the missiles as a surrender to the imperialists, Khrushchev stoutly defended his action as not only a necessary measure to avoid a catastrophic nuclear war, but actually a victory. Khrushchev bluntly criticized Fidel Castro for failing to comprehend the true nature of war in the thermonuclear age and, that at the height of the crisis, he had suggested in a letter to Khrushchev that the Soviets should be the first to use nuclear weapons, striking the United States should it attack Cuba, even though this would lead promptly to a global war.