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November 9, 1962

Memorandum from William R. Tyler to the Secretary [Dean Rusk] through U. Alexis Johnson, 'Turkish and Italian IRBM's'

Seymour Weiss would push back against any efforts to remove the Jupiters, but he and others realized that President Kennedy had a “keen interest” in the matter and that Secretary of Defense McNamara had ordered that action be taken (assigning his General Counsel John McNaughton to take the lead). Nevertheless Weiss and Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler presented Secretary of State Rusk with a memorandum making the case against action on the Jupiters or at least postponing their removal until a “later time.” Paralleling arguments made during the crisis by Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt, Tyler pointed to the “symbolic and psychological importance” of the Jupiter deployments. While Tyler noted parenthetically that the Italians had “given indications of a disposition to work toward the eventual removal of the Jupiters,” the U.S. could not phase them out “without general Alliance agreement,” including Italy and Turkey’s consent, “unless we are prepared to lay ourselves open to the charge of abrogation of specific or implied agreements.” Rusk was in the know on the secret deal, but his reference to a “later time” was consistent with it and signing the memo would have placated Tyler and Weiss.

October 10, 1963

Memorandum of Conversation between President Kennedy and Foreign Minister Gromyko, 'Non-Dissemination and the MLF'

In this conversation, President Kennedy and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko discussed the Soviet attitude toward the MLF. Gromyko argued that it would be a barrier to a nonproliferation agreement. Kennedy made the standard argument that “one of the reasons for an MLF was to make it less possible for the Germans to press for nuclear weapons of their own.”

July 5, 1963

Secretary of State Rusk to the President, 'Interim Reply to Your Memorandum of May 30, 1963, for Holders of NSAM 241'

In this memorandum, Secretary of State Rusk noted Minister Lenz’s denials of any German connection with Pierrelatte or any interest in supporting the French weapons program. He declared that the agencies would continue “reviewing allied attitudes toward the Pierrelatte project and possible measures for inhibiting bilateral cooperation.”

May 30, 1963

Memorandum from President Kennedy to Holders of NSAM 241

In this memorandum, President Kennedy questioned whether Washington should make “representations” to the Germans or Italians because that could have an adverse impact on U.S. relations with those countries in regards to attitudes towards Pierrelatte. He also expresses opposition to European nuclear cooperation overall.

May 25, 1963

Under Secretary of State George Ball to President Kennedy, 'Policy Recommendations: NSAM 241 - French Gaseous Diffusion Plant'

In this memorandum, Under Secretary Ball recommended making a greater effort to find more information about German or Italian interest in financial and other kinds of support for the Pierrelatte plant. Ball also suggested that Washington minimize German interest in acquiring nuclear fuel from non-US sources by making “assurances of a long-term supply of cheap nuclear fuel for peaceful uses."

May 13, 1963

Director of Central Intelligence John McCone and AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg to President Kennedy, with Attachment 'Report on French Gaseous Diffusion Project'

In this report, the CIA and the AEC found that because the French underestimated the cost of the Pierrelatte plant, they had a reason to consider West German financial aid.They conclude that the West Germans had relevant technical skill and the French may have regarded cooperation as a tactic to dodge Adenauer’s 1954 commitment and also as a “way for German industry to improve its position in the nuclear technological race.”

May 7, 1963

National Security Action Memorandum 241, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy to Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence and Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Report on French Gaseous Diffusion Plant' with Attachment 'France'

A report about an alleged French request to West Germany for financial support for their Pierrelatte gaseous diffusion plant raised White House hackles, despite German and French disavowals. In this memorandum, McGeorge Bundy asked the CIA and the Atomic Energy Commission [AEC] to investigate the report and the State Department to develop policy recommendations in light of the findings.

December 19, 1962

Memorandum of Conversation, 'Skybolt'

This memorandum details an extensive conversation between representatives from the U.S. and Great Britain about President Kennedy's decision to cancel work on "Skybolt," or a surface-to-air missile that the British were invested in. The meeting was an attempt to placate a "looming crisis" in Anglo-American relations.

April 5, 1963

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Talbot and the President's Deputy Special Counsel Feldman

President Kennedy and Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres discussed the possibility of UAR intervention in Jordan. Peres stated that "the UAR is the only Arab country that Israel really fears."

February 8, 1961

Memorandum, Secretary of State Rusk for the President, 'Israeli Reactor'

Rusk informs President Kennedy about the outcome of Assistant Secretary of State G. Lewis Jones's meeting with Israeli Ambassador Harman.