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January 17, 1963

American Embassy Rome Telegram 1411 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

In mid-January 1963 Harvard University professor Henry Kissinger met in Rome  with senior Italian political leaders, all the way up to Fanfani and President Antonio Segni, to discuss U.S.-Italian relations, including the Jupiters.  At that point Kissinger had no official role in government, although during 1961-1962, he had been a White House consultant. According to his report to the Embassy, the Italian leadership understood “intellectually” why the U.S. wanted to remove the missiles but it was sorry that Italy was losing its “one-up” position among non-nuclear members of NATO.  (No one mentioned that Italy retained special status as a country that the U.S. had to consult before it  used nuclear weapons based there.) Segni felt some “pique” that the Jupiter decision had been made during the missile crisis and that three months had passed before his government learned of it.  “Almost everyone” believed, Kissinger told the U.S. Embassy, that there had been a U.S.-Soviet “agreement” on the Jupiter withdrawal, with the 1 April deadline seen as an important clue.

The U.S. embassy report on Kissinger’s findings arrived at the State Department the morning of 17 January 1963, with instructions for the Executive Secretariat to limit its distribution. Apparently the report, with its comments linking the Jupiters to the Cuban crisis negotiations, touched a nerve with Dean Rusk.  He instructed Assistant Secretary Tyler to inform U.S. Embassies in Europe that Kissinger had no official role, they should not help him meet high-level officials, that he did not represent the “Adm’s views,” and that “we want to discourage him,” although as a “distinguished professor” he should be “treated with courtesy and friendliness.”  Consequently Tyler drafted and sent that same day an “eyes only” telegram to U.S. ambassadors reminding them of Kissinger’s non-official status.  Rusk did not explain what Kissinger had done that irritated him, but with his interest in dispelling rumors of a secret deal, he was probably irked not only by the thinking of Italian officials but by the fact that other State Department officials, including code clerks, would see the Embassy telegram, as limited its distribution was.

June 13, 1960

Report on SHAPE meeting

Analysis by the Head of the Italian Delegation to the North Atlantic Council (Alessandrini) of SHAPE meeting chaired by Gen. Norstad to examine Western/Soviet missile balance.

February 20, 1966

Report by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Nuclear Planning Working Group of the "Special Committee" (Washington, 17th-18th February, 1966),
with a letter from Andrea Cagiati'

Cagiati sends Andreotti a report about the meeting in Washington, which concluded Giulio Andreotti's period as Minister of Defense. Cagiati thanks Andreotti for his work, that made sure that "in this period the relationship between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense has been strong and efficient like never before". The report describes the meeting (the first meeting of this working group) and the viewpoints of the participants, with special attention payed to the US nuclear policy. The document describes also the fields which require further investigations by the Working Group. There are Cagiati's personal reflections too.

April 26, 1965

Report by Permanent Representative to NATO to Minister of Defense, 'Defense Planning'

The document is part of a broad series of "Informative Reports" drafted by RICA and sent by Alessandrini to Andreotti (Minister of Defense), concerning the forthcoming meeting in London of the Atlantic Council at a ministerial level.
With regards to the Defense Planning, Italy claims (together with Germany) that it is absolutely indispensable to have available a well-balanced both conventional and nuclear arsenal, to preserve the SACEUR's credibility, on a political level too.

May 10, 1963

Report by Permanent Representative to NATO Alessandrini to Minister of Defense Andreotti

Alessandrini's report to PM Piccioni and Minister of Defense Andreotti discusses current questions of defense that will be brought up in the upcoming Ottawa session. According to him, NATO should focus on its internal organization and in particular, developing a common nuclear force, despite the technical and political challenges of such project.

December 4, 1962

Report by Permanent Representative to NATO Alessandrini to Minister of Defense Andreotti

Italy's permanent representative to NATO Alessandrini writes to PM Andreotti in preparation for the upcoming Paris summit. He shares general remarks about the state of the alliance and current issues in international relations focusing on the German question, Cuba, and Sino-Soviet relations.

May 19, 1962

Memorandum by Chief of Defense Staff Aldo Ross to Minister of Defense Andreotti

Discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of accepting the terms of nuclear warfare proposed at a NATO meeting in Athens. Whether or not to respond to a Soviet nuclear attack with an atomic weapon of equal strength was debated at the meeting, as well as the role that conventional weapons would play in such a conflict.

April 28, 1961

Memorandum by General Staff of Defense (SMD) for Minister of Defense Andreotti, 'Chief of staff's visit to the US'

Report of the head of the Italian defense department’s recent trip to the United States. Of importance was the discussion of NATO’s long-term plan (ten to fifteen years), the strategic defense of the Balkans, the maintenance of the United States’ NATO forces in Europe, and the need to push development of conventional weapons to avoid having to employ nuclear weapons.

May 28, 1960

Ministry of Defense Memorandum to the Minister of Defense Andreotti, 'Tripartite Military Agreement'

A collection of progress reports from the sub-commissions of the Accordo Military Tripartito F-I-G of 1957, a military alliance between Italy, France, and Germany, summarizing achievements and future objectives regarding development of co-owned nuclear weapons.

May 24, 1985

Report by Ambassador Petrignani to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Andreotti

A detailed account of a meeting between Ambassador Petrignani and General Abrahamson, Director of SDI. Petrignani discloses the different elements of the SDI discussed, including the importance of SDI in modern deterrence, Soviet progress in strategic derfense, existing challenges with the SDI, and potential European participation.