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December 1, 2020

Interview with Anna George

Anna George is a former Australian diplomat. She served as a member of the Australian delegation to ACRS.

June 6, 1958

File Note of Consul General Andrzej Szewiński in Sydney to Department III Dep. Director B. Lewandowski

Szewiński meets with Cutler and McMillan to discuss Australian opinions on the Rapacki Plan and Australian-Polish relations. Cutler acknowledges the value of the Plan but the necessity of modifications, as well as Australia's tendency not to publicly adopt positions contrary to those of the US and Great Britain.

September 13, 2018

Oral History Interview with Richard Butler

Australian diplomat and expert involved in the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference.

January 16, 1974

Digest of Despatches: PEKING, The Prime Minister's Visit to China

Summary of Australian Prime Minister's visit to China that assesses Australia's relations with China and relations with other nations in the Pacific.

November 3, 1973

Cablegram from the Australian Embassy Peking, 'Prime Minister's Call on Chairman Mao'

A "slow but articulate" Mao discuss nuclear weapons testing, Taiwan, and the Lin Biao affair with E.G. Whitlam.

May 5, 1975

Political Report for the Month of April 1975, L. N. Ray, High Commissioner, 'ANZUS Meeting in 1975 after the victory by the Communist forces in Indo-China'

Australia and New Zealand stress the importance of closer consultation with them on matters concerning their security and the US strategy in the entire region.

January 20, 1966

National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-66, 'The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation'

This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.

November 4, 1978

'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' Department of State cable 281962 to US Embassy United Kingdom et al.

U.S. demarche and "non-paper" on Pakistan's attempts to complete the plutonium reprocessing plant and develop nuclear weapons. Sent to 12 countries to ensure that they "exercise vigilance and appropriate control to deter Pakistan from acquiring sensitive facilities."

November 6, 1978

'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' US Embassy Australia cable 9140 to State Department

Australian response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate fully.