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Documents

November 16, 1962

Letter, P.V. Akindinov to the Chief of General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the USSR

A cover letter from the Chief of Headquarters in Cuba indicating that he is submitting photos of the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the destruction of Soviet launchpads in Cuba.

August 1962

Instructions from Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Grechko to the Commanding General of the Soviet Troops on the Island of Cuba

Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Grechko provides strict guidance on the personal and professional conduct of Soviet troops stationed in Cuba.

1962

Report, S. Biryuzov to Marshal of the Soviet Union Cde. R. Ya. Malinovsky on Some Conclusions and Suggestions concerning the Operations of the Missile Troops in Operation 'Anadyr''

April 2, 1963

Report from General-Lieutenant of Aviation Lovkov to Marshal of the Soviet Union Cde. N.I. Krylov

General-Lieutenant of Aviation Lovkov reflects on Operation Anadyr’, including what lessons the Soviet military can draw from the episode and how the personnel involved in the shipment of missiles to Cuba should now be treated.

August 23, 1963

Report from General-Lieutenant of Aviation Lovkov to the Chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff

General-Lieutenant of Aviation Lovkov writes that the "experience of the shipments of the Missile Forces by sea in the summer of 1962" to Cuba will be useful in completing a new manual on transporting missiles over water.

December 1962

Report of the Commander of the 51st Missile Division concerning the Operations of the Division during the Period from 12 July through 1 December 1962

Commander of the 51st Missile Division General-Major Igor Demyanovich Statsenko's detailed postmortem on the deployment of Soviet missiles to Cuba in mid-1962 and their removal later that year following the nuclear confrontation with the United States. The report includes an attachment titled: "Some Questions of Operational and Tactical Concealment during the Operation of the Division on the Island of Cuba."

December 18, 1962

Letter, General-Major Igor Demyanovich Statsenko, Commander of the 51st Missile Division, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Missile Forces, Moscow

A cover letter from Statsenko indicating that he is submitting copies of his detailed reports on the deployment of Soviet missiles to Cuba in mid-1962 and their removal later that year.

February 18, 1963

American Embassy Ankara Telegram 970 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

A number of issues raised by Defense Minister Sancar about the Jupiter agreement were unresolved. While some in the Turkish government wanted to withdraw Sancar’s letter to McNamara, President İnönü was reluctant to do that, wanting it understood that what Sancar had written “were not conditions but rather expression of Turkish needs and desires.” During a meeting, Foreign Minister Erkin told Hare that he was trying to clear the proposed memorandum to the NAC in time for its meeting on February 20. On the sentence about Polaris submarines operating in the Mediterranean, Erkin suggested this wording: Polaris was being “especially assigned” to Italy and Turkey. That would speak to the “Turkish feeling” that “Polaris has remoteness which lessens its appeal.”

Later that day, Hare wrote that the Turkish government was apparently willing to sign on to the statement to NATO. That Turkey had already made the “political decision” to dismantle the Jupiters made it necessary for the U.S. to address Sancar’s concerns, such as the nuclear weapons for the F-100s, the delivery of a third F-104 squadron, access to the facilities at Cigli, and Turkey’s role in the Polaris submarines. Hare also favored a positive response to Sancar’s proposal for negotiations between U.S. and Turkish representatives.

February 1, 1963

OSD [Office of Secretary of Defense] Telegram 020123Z to Department of State

By late January, the negotiations with Turkey were bogged down, with Defense Minister Sancar asking for a Turkish military presence on the Polaris submarines as well as delivery of nuclear weapons for the F-100 Super Sabres before the Jupiters were replaced. Without a formal agreement on the Jupiters, the U.S. government held back from a decision on another matter: the delivery of F-104G fighter-bombers. Nevertheless, Defense Department officials approved a decision to “provide first available aircraft” in April 1963, which was necessary to authorize the Air Force’s “preliminary preparatory actions.” The U.S. would preserve its “bargaining position” by informing Turkey in writing that an “accelerated delivery date will become firm upon satisfactory conclusion of current US/Turkey negotiations.”

January 18, 1963

JCS Telegram 8283 to USCINCEUR and CINCLANT

This message conveyed several decisions that McNamara had detailed in a memorandum on “The Replacement of Jupiter and Related Matters.” One Sergeant missile battalion would be deployed in Italy to replace Corporal missiles. The U.S. would not transfer to Italy “operational responsibilities” for nuclear weapons currently deployed to the Southern European Task Force [SETAF]. The U.S. would not deploy Pershing missiles to Italy. Planning would begin for the assignment of three Polaris submarines to the Mediterranean beginning April 1, 1963. Finally, plans would be made to deliver 14 104-G’s to Turkey during April 1963.

Pagination