Skip to content

Results:

1 - 10 of 30

Documents

December 13, 1984

Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Ministerial session of the Atlantic Council (Bruxelles, 13th-14th December, 1984). Security problems'

Overview of the key security issues facing the Alliance in preparation for the December 1984 meeting in Brussels. The document discusses the state of Alliance, conventional and nuclear weapons, and the installment of INF in Europe, focusing on the potential for continuing East-West dialogue around disarmament.

October 11, 1980

Report by Permanent Representative to NATO Vincenzo Tornetta to Ministry of Foreign Affairs Colombo, 'US strategic doctrine's update and consequences for the defense of Europe'

Report from the Italian permanent representative to NATO Tornetta to Foreign Minister Colombo regarding the new directive of President Carter (PD-59) on the use of strategic nuclear systems. According to Tornetta PD-59 represents a significant change in the balance between the superpowers and the allied defense posture in Europe.

February 27, 1986

Brussels to Department of External Affairs (Canada), 'Zero Option and the Europeans'

Canadian officials warned of disagreement to come between the Europeans and the Americans over the “zero option,” the longstanding proposal to reduce both US and Soviet INF to zero. This dispatch from Brussels reported “substantial unhappiness” amongst the Europeans that the United States and the Soviet Union would discuss disarmament “even if neither of them believed in it.” Nuclear deterrence had prevented war in Europe for the preceding four decades, and US-Soviet discussions of disarmament only made it even more difficult to convince public opinion of deterrence’s continued importance

February 19, 1986

Brussels–NATO (BNATO) to Department of External Affairs (Canada), 'Alliance Problems Over INF'

In a flurry of cables from February 1986, Canadian assessments focused on a chronic issue within NATO: consultation within the alliance. As this dispatch from Brussels concluded, paraphrasing Winston Churchill, “NATO nuclear collective consultation is the worst form, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

February 17, 1986

Washington, DC to Department of External Affairs (Canada), 'Alliance Problems Over INF'

In a flurry of cables from February 1986, Canadian assessments focused on a chronic issue within NATO: in consultation within the alliance. The Special Consultative Group was used as a forum to “air views of allies,” hold briefings on the current state of negotiations, and to share a new negotiating position right before it was tabled. Canadian officials also warned of disagreement to come between the Europeans and the Americans over the “zero option,” the longstanding proposal to reduce both US and Soviet INF to zero.

October 14, 1983

Telex from the East German Embassy in Romania to Bucharest, 14 October 1983

Summary of Romanian position on the Euromissiles Crisis presented at October 1983 summit and also shared with the United States via a letter from Nicolae Ceauşescu to President Ronald Reagan.The Ceauşescu – Reagan letter underscored that: (1) Romania did not approve of the Soviet missile deployments; (2) noted that Romania would only participate in defense operations, and specified that it would carefully consider the nature of the call for assistance by fellow alliance members before sending its troops outside of Romanian territory; (3) stressed that the Romanian Armed Forces were fully under national control, giving several specific details on how this was guaranteed; and (4) explicitly noted that Romania did not and would not ever host nuclear missiles on its territory, whether from the Soviet Union or the United States.

May 31, 1983

Meeting Minutes of the Politburo of the CC CPSU, Regarding Western Plans for Deployment of New Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Politburo discussion, presided over by Andropov, on how to respond to the Western decision to deploy new nuclear weapons in Europe.

October 2, 1979

Summary of Dutch Position on TNF Modernization for a Meeting Between US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Dutch Defense Minister Willem Scholten

An outline of the Dutch position on the modernization of Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) in Europe as of late 1979. It includes extensive discussion of Dutch domestic political challenges associated with supporting TNF modernization, the proposed connection between TNF modernization and the fate of SALT II as well as an enumeration of military/technical conditions under which TNF modernization would be viewed as more palatable by the Dutch government.

December 7, 1979

Draft conclusions from the discussions in Washington on December 7, 1979

A summary of points made during U.S.-Dutch discussions related to TNF. The Dutch will not oppose NATO’s plans, but only postpone its own decision. However, the Dutch will continue to register their reservations regarding the scope of modernization. The U.S. disagrees with a Dutch proposal to link TNF modernization with SALT II ratification and states that the Dutch should refrain from critiquing TNF modernization since it is postponing its own decision on the issue.

December 10, 1979

Major points from the discussions in Brussels, Rome, London, Washington, Bonn

An outline of key points made in each of several meetings over a one week period. Includes the following: the Netherlands and Belgium will try to decide as late and as simultaneously as possible on TNF modernization; Italy will try to help the Dutch influence FRG and U.S. positions; U.K. is committed to helping Dutch cabinet remain intact; FRG does not oppose the Dutch move to delay their decision but also believes Netherlands should not try to block NATO decision-making.

Pagination