Kohl and Mitterrand debate essential issues of European security and the emergence of potential new security structures after the end of the Cold War such as a European pillar of NATO and the French-German brigade as the nucleus of a European security and defense policy.

Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

This lengthy report was State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research's contribution to the first National Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear proliferation, NIE 100-6-57. Written at a time when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were the only nuclear weapons states, the “Fourth Country” problem referred to the probability that some unspecified country, whether France or China, was likely to be the next nuclear weapons state. Enclosed with letter from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Division of Research for USSR and Western Europe, to Roger Mateson, 4 June 1957, Secret

This memorandum describes Henry Kissinger's response to French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues who requested a 27 member group to meet on issues similar to the previous nuclear suppliers' group meeting. Kissinger lists the complications that could arise from this and suggests not doing so. Document also includes another letter from Kissinger to Sauvagnargues regarding the important of nuclear export issues, as well as Kissinger's advisers suggestions to not send the letters to France just yet.

Kissinger met with the French ambassador and provided the necessary assurances. Agreements would be based on consensus, decisions would not be retroactive, and the suppliers meetings would be “informal and confidential.” This arrangement assured that the suppliers’ group would operate on a lowest-common-denominator basis, but there was no choice because French participation was vital.

This memo describes the details of the nuclear suppliers' conference, specifically the details of French participation. Cites the need for common understanding regarding nuclear exports is needed and therefore invites Great Britain, the Soviet Union, West Germany, Japan, and France to participate in the conference. Also details the process of trying to persuade France to participate and dissuading their reluctancy.

This memo includes a response from the French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues regarding the nuclear suppliers' meeting. The French said that they will participate based on certain conditions. The memo also includes the U.S.'s reactions to these various conditions, which the U.S. believes it can fulfill.

This telegram lists the complications that would arise if France does not agree to participate in the nuclear suppliers' meeting or if it delays its decision. Also lists ideas of how to overcome the challenges of the bilateral talks between the U.S. and France, and sends these various options to Paris.

This memo outlines the process that the French said they would take in order to reach a decision regarding their participation in the nuclear suppliers' group conference. These steps include France presenting a paper on their position, the U.S. responding, and then more bilateral talks before a final decision is reached.

Memo of suggested issues to be discussed at meeting regarding nuclear suppliers' conference, specifically what to say to other suppliers regarding recent bilateral talks between France and the U.S. and further instructions for the French-U.S. bilateral talks regarding France's participation in the nuclear suppliers' conference.