This memo informs the Central Committee of the USSR of the Communist Party of India's decision to oppose signing the NPT due to perceived infringements on Indian sovereignty and a mistrust in the concept of security guarantees to India by the US. The recommended course of action is to forward comprehensive information to the CPI about the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons along the lines of a March 29 CPSU CC decree of that year in the hopes that the CPI's opinion on the NPT will change.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for Monday, 29 January 1990 describes the latest developments in USSR, Azerbaijan, Romania, India, Ethiopia and Namibia.

In this letter, Shevardnadze, Yazov, and Kamentsev discuss the Soviet Union's obligations to provide military assistance to their treaty partners, and the differences between treaties.

This document considers the political consequences of carrying through with the Soviet Union's promise to provide India with an Atomic submarine for scientific purposes.

Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Shevardnadze, Minister of Defense D. Yazov, and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers V. Kamentsev discuss Soviet military committments in the Warsaw Pact and various bilateral agreements on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance in a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev.

Not altogether sure whether the Soviets were really committed to the NPT, the fact that the Soviets had been discussing security assurances with the Indians was seen as evidence that Moscow was interested in having a treaty. India was one of the countries that was especially resistant to the NPT and the Soviets were only one of a number of governments, e.g. Canada, which vainly tried to persuade Indira Gandhi to sign on.

This lengthy report was State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research's contribution to the first National Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear proliferation, NIE 100-6-57. Written at a time when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were the only nuclear weapons states, the “Fourth Country” problem referred to the probability that some unspecified country, whether France or China, was likely to be the next nuclear weapons state. Enclosed with letter from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Division of Research for USSR and Western Europe, to Roger Mateson, 4 June 1957, Secret

The Peoples Republic of China supports disarmament and a nuclear-free zone in the Asian and Pacific Regions strictly for tactical reasons

This document reports on the visit by the Soviet premier, Alexsei Kosygin, to India in March 1979. The Indian leadership once again confirms its intention to retain close relations with Moscow irrespective of the future relationship with the US and China. During the visit a number of trade and scientific agreements are signed. The USSR expresses its readiness to cooperate in the nuclear field on the basis of peaceful use as laid down in the Indian-Soviet agreement of January 1979. Reacting to the Chinese threat and its perceived objective to gain a hegemonic position in Asia, India wishes to talk about the delivery of more sophisticated military equipment. The Soviet officials interpret Indian foreign policy as moving closer to the Socialist Bloc and joining Vietnam and Cuba in the formation of a ‘leftist wing’ in the Non-Aligned Movement.

This Soviet report on the results of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko’s April 1977 visit to India encapsulates Moscow’s first impressions of the new Indian Government. The main issue of the Soviet-Indian talks was the maintenance of the close relations between the two countries. The Desai government promises strict adherence to the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The new Indian leadership also renewed the commitment not to weaponize its nuclear programme. With respect to China, Desai opposes any new initiatives to improve relations with Beijing.