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April 26, 1966

Directive, CPSU CC Politburo to Cde. Roshchin, Soviet Representative in Geneva

Soviets contact the ambassador in Geneva about possible discussions with the Swedes and the Polish about the "detection club".

April 26, 1966

Extract from Decisions of the Politburo of the CPSU CC of 23 April-4 May 1966, 'Point 21. On Steps in connection with the Proposal to Create a "Detection Club" with the Goals of Solving the Problem of Banning Underground Tests of Nuclear Weapons'

USSR sending regards to the Polish ambassador about Poland joining the international "detection club" for underground nuclear tests.

August 28, 1963

Research Memorandum REU-56 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Sweden Still Faces Question of Acquiring Nuclear Weapons'

Based on the evidence, mainly various statements made by leading politicians, diplomats, and policymakers, INR experts concluded that most of the countries surveyed (Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Greece) were “relatively satisfied,” while only West Germany was “restive” to the extent that some of its officials were interested in a NATO or European nuclear force

October 28, 1958

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union, 'Gromyko Discussed the Issue of Stopping Nuclear Weapons Tests'

Gromyko informs Liu Xiao of the Soviet position and strategy in its negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom for halting nuclear tests.

December 1979

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, NI IIM 79-10028, 'The 22 September 1979 Event' [2004 Release]

This study begins, as the National Security Council requested, by assuming that the September 22, 1979 Vela event was a nuclear detonation. It discusses the possibility that the detonation could have occurred due to an accident, and noted the Defense Intelligence Agency’s suggestion that the Soviet Union might have had reasons to conduct a covert test in violation of its treaty commitments. But most of the study is concerned with other possibilities to explain the incident – a secret test by South Africa or Israel, or India, or Pakistan, or a secret joint test by South Africa and Israel. The 2004 version, in some instances, contains more information through page 10 than the 2013 version.

December 1979

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, NI IIM 79-10028, 'The 22 September 1979 Event' [2013 Release]

This study begins, as the National Security Council requested, by assuming that the September 22, 1979 Vela event was a nuclear detonation. It discusses the possibility that the detonation could have occurred due to an accident, and noted the Defense Intelligence Agency’s suggestion that the Soviet Union might have had reasons to conduct a covert test in violation of its treaty commitments. But most of the study is concerned with other possibilities to explain the incident – a secret test by South Africa or Israel, or India, or Pakistan, or a secret joint test by South Africa and Israel. The 2013 release (which is currently under appeal) includes some information from a “Secret Test by Others” (Pakistan, India) and the map on page 12 that had not been released before.

June 1978

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Special Projects Division, 'Proliferation Group Quarterly Report, January – March 1978'

This issue includes an extract from a recent study on Pakistan and two highly technical articles relating to on-going research to identify the signatures of high explosives used for the implosion method of nuclear detonation. It also includes a report that utilized open literature and classified intelligence, including two satellite photographs, the purpose of the article is to illuminate how the South African Government intended to use the site, down to the depth and thickness of the bore holes.

November 1, 1996

Email, Caroline Russell to Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Staff, 'Priority: India Nuclear Debate – Comments from Raja'

Caroline Russell emails her staff at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency regarding Raja Ramanna's recent statements regarding the state of India's nuclear program. Ramanna was the Director of the Defence Research and Development Organisation and was quoted in the Times of India stating that India already had a capability which did not need to be tested.

August 12, 1996

US Embassy in New Delhi Telegram 9250 to State Department, 'Ambassador’s Meeting with Opposition Leader'

Report on US Ambassador to India Frank Wisner's meeting with Indian Opposition Leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and halting any nuclear test. The Ambassador found the meeting unproductive. The CTBT was central to the discussion but it was evident that Vajpayee was not interested and his “body language” indicated that he was inclined to favor a nuclear test. During one point in the discussion, Vajpayee asked, “What if we start underground tests?” According to the embassy’s message, “we interpret his question about testing as indicating that [he] and the BJP would favor a test” and would not be persuaded by U.S. arguments—“reason”—to forego one.

July 8, 1996

Email, Caroline Russell, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to Lawrence Schein, Robert Rochlin, et al

Caroline Russell of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) discusses how the Indian program is not yet ready for a test and that pressure for one is more politically than technically motivated.

Pagination