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Documents

February 1987

Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in February 1987 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

January 1987

Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in January 1987 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

December 1986

Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in December 1986 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

October 1986

Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in October 1986 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

September 1986

Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in September 1986 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

August 1986

Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in August 1986 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

November 12, 1976

London Embassy telegram 18324 to State Department, 'London Nuclear Suppliersā€™ Meeting, November 11 ā€“ 12'

This telegram describes what the nuclear suppliers' countries accomplished during their November 11-12 meeting. Continued discussions of safeguards and enlarging the group, and agreed that they would wait on publishing results until after their next meeting, which was scheduled to be the following March in London.

June 11, 1976

George Vest to the Secretary of State, 'London Nuclear Suppliers Meeting'

This document provides an overview of the London Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting which included the addition of the five newest countries to the original seven. Most old and new members were receptive when Washington lobbied them to support a ā€œlong term and stable regime of restraintā€ on the export of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology. While the French were supportive of the moratorium proposal, the Germans were uncomfortable with it, not least because of the implications for their deal with Brazil.

January 27, 1976

George Vest to the Secretary, 'Nuclear Suppliers Status Report'

In this document regarding the final agreement, George Vest wrote Kissinger that it ā€œserved to close many of the loopholes and inadequacies of previous nuclear cooperation agreements between suppliers and recipients.ā€ It also put the French and West Germans on record to restrict access to sensitive nuclear technologies. Nevertheless, as Vest noted, the guidelines would not prevent ā€œindigenousā€ development of nuclear capabilities and ā€œunsafeguarded developmentsā€ or the acquisition of sensitive technology.

December 31, 1975

Memorandum from George S. Springsteen, Executive Secretary, to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, 'Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines'

This document comprises the instructions which the White House approved for the September 1975 suppliersā€™ meeting. At the November meeting, the suppliers completed negotiations on guidelines. Basic provisions included agreement to seek assurances by recipients of supplies not to produce nuclear explosive devices, physical security for installations and materials, transfer of trigger list items only under IAEA safeguards, restraint in transfer of sensitive technologies, facilities and materials, and the encouragement of supplier involvement in, and multinational controls over, sensitive installations. Appended to the guidelines was a two page ā€œtrigger listā€ based on the Zangger Committeeā€™s list.

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