This undated 63‐minute audio file highlights a meeting between Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Cabinet discussing the relations between Saddam and Kuwait. Saddam Hussein asked the ministers to give their views on the process of merging Kuwait with Iraq. The ministers in turn gave their opinions and encouraged Saddam on his courageous step, namely invading Kuwait. They also mentioned information about the Kuwaiti people and their conditions and that Kuwait was a part of Iraq.

The following undated audio tape details a meeting between Saddam Hussein and High‐ranking officers. 00‐54 minutes contain the following subjects: Saddam spoke regarding Iraq's past difficult situations, the Iraq‐Iran war, and the Iraqi use of helicopters. The transfer of Lieutenant General Hamid, who was in the Air force and now in the General Command. An unknown officer reported to Saddam the army's status in the battlefield (Translator Comment: Probably Iran‐Iraq War). " Saddam asked a person called Ahmad about his opinion regarding Al‐Faw and Ahmad reported to Saddam what happened there. " Lieutenant General Nizar spoke about the Liberation War, Tawklna 'Ala Allah war, and the Iranian Army. " Concerns from the Iraqi Army and the Military Intelligence to conceal plans and intentions from the United States.   Discussions on Saddam's orders regarding retaking the Al‐Faw.

This file contains a meeting between Saddam Hussein and some of his officials who discuss the international attitudes concerining Iraq.

This undated audio file is of a meeting chaired by Saddam Hussein. It contains information on the United States and its efforts to shape international public opinion, U.S. and Iraqi military capabilities, Husayn Kamil, the run-up to the Gulf War in 1990-91, U.S. and coalition air raids, the Republican Guard, logistical issues, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Hosni Mubarak and other Arab leaders, and the Soviet Union.

This file contains the record of a meeting between Saddam and his military commanders on efforts to defend Iraq from any coalition attacks following the Gulf War. They discuss the UN inspection regime, the diplomatic panorama, the prospects for Russian support, and other issues. They argue that Iraq was stronger after the Gulf War than before.

This file contains memos on plans to assassinate Saddam Hussein by American and Zionist (Israeli) forces. Includes memos and telegrams dated between 15 August 1990 and 25 February 1991 between the Military Intelligence of the Special Republican Guard (SRG), Special Security Organization (SS), Gemeral Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID) and Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) concerning reports about American and Zionist (Israeli) plans to assassinate Saddam Hussein. Also includes a memo dated 1 August 1989 within the GMID concerning the surveillance of the telephone belonging to a person suspected of collaborating to commit acts against the regime.

Letter to Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah Bin Abdul Aziz from Saddam Hussein Asking for Help and Admitting a Mistake; Letter from Izzat Ibrahim to the Same Prince

This audio file from a meeting dated 1 May 1991 between Saddam Hussein and the General Command of the Army regarding the enlargement of the Army, the political changes which affect the Army and its training. Saddam Hussein admired the forming of the Republican Guards groups, soldeirs who participated in Qadissyah Saddam (Iran-Iraq War). In addition, this file includes a discussion regarding the invasion of Kuwait and the low morale of Iraqi soldiers, the American request to cease-fire because of the Iraqi soldiers' brevity, the gradual erosion of Iraqi morale on the front, and the increase of Divisions' numbers within the Army. Major General Sultan discussed the use of high-technology weapons by the American forces in the First Gulf War.

This audio file contains a meeting between Saddam Hussein and Iraqi high-ranking officials in which they discuss different issues. Tarqi Aziz discusses the technical negotiations in New York, and the Security Council Resolution 687 of 1991. He asks whether the sanctions will be lifted after the end of the special commission. He recommends hurrying with the commission to shorten the period of inspection and to let them use the cameras they requested in order to claim Iraq had not imposed any obstacles during the inspection process. Saddam states the special target group is concerned with future observation rather than what they have already done so far. He adds that the attempts of overthrowing the regime have failed, thus they insist on using cameras to guarantee future observation. One of the speakers advises to let the team work in a technical and a professional mechanism away from means of media which always exaggerate things and make matters worse. Saddam shifts to another subject, saying that Iraq has unmasked western democracy. They discuss European political affairs, ruling parties, socialism, and what Arabs and Asians face from offering those hard jobs and low positions requiring only physical effort. Finally, they agree to send a message to the commission saying that when you believe in an appropriate way towards Iraq, you will have positive results. 

The audio tape is comprised of an assembly held in the presence of President Saddam Hussein and his cabinet. They discussed various subjects related to Iraqi internal and external affairs.