An evaluation of information sharing between the DPRK military intelligence service and Directorate II of the General Staff of the Polish Army on US and NATO troops.

Paek Hak-rim suggests stepping up cooperation between North Korea and Poland in the fields of science, technology, and firefighting, as well as continuing exchange visits to share experiences in maintaining public order and combating crime. Kim Yong-ryong also suggests that information exchanges and technical cooperation be enhanced.

Krzysztof Kozłowski, Paul Redmond, and others from the Polish and American intelligence services discuss bilateral cooperation, particularly in the area of counterterrorism.

Paul Redmond (CIA) and Henryk Jasik (UOP) continue discussions on the intelligence apparatuses in their respective countries and the potential for US-Poland intelligence cooperation, particularly in the area of counterterrorism.

Krzysztof Kozłowski (UOP) and Paul Redmond (CIA) discuss the intelligence services in Poland and the United States and the possibilities for cooperation.

A copy of the Polish side's presentation at a meeting with the CIA concerning US-Polish cooperation in the area of counterterrorism.

The head of Poland's Ministry of Internal Affairs briefs the Polish President and Prime Minister on a recent meeting with CIA representatives and asks for direction on how to proceed in future talks and proposals for intelligence cooperation.

A summary of a meeting between representatives of the Intelligence Service of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Central Intelligence Agency. The two sides discussed cooperation in the fight against international terrorism, the establishment of a FBIS office in Poland, and further exchanges on intelligence sharing and cooperation.

This is a transcript of a lecture delivered by Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, to the Polish General Staff about Soviet military doctrine in early 1988. The document defines what the Soviets meant by military doctrine, differentiating between the doctrine of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact by stressing the former’s wider range objectives, especially concerning the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, it identifies contemporary issues facing Soviet doctrine and analyzes topics such as nuclear non-proliferation, reduction of nuclear stockpiles and refutes the idea that nuclear weapons should be used in a counter-offensive operation. It stresses the importance of defense, negating offensive military preparedness in lieu of purely defensive Warsaw Pact capabilities (albeit altogether sufficient to successfully deter a NATO attack from the West). It also discusses the results of the March 2-3 1988 NATO talks and concludes that the West is not willing to stop the arms race and is increasing its offensive capabilities. The Warsaw Pact’s response should include increased military research, better vigilance to capture signals of a possible attack and more tactical and technical training for the military command. It asserts that even though a war is less likely than in the past, quoting Gorbachev, “the nature of capitalism itself can be the cause of war.”

This document outlines the politico-military situation in advance of a 17-25 March 1975 operational command staff exercise. The exercise scenario begins with a conventional offensive initiated by the 'Westerners' at 0600 on 17 March which escalated to a theater nuclear war by 19 March. This briefing document for exercise participants describes the military situation as of the morning of 19 March, including the tactical information on the geographic disposition, activities, and status of Warsaw Pact and 'Western' forces, air defense, communications, electronic warfare, and the situation in the rear. Appendices (included as a .pdf) contain detailed information on: The order of battle of the troops of the 4th Army, The availability of nuclear warheads and surface-to-air missiles [SAMs] in the 4th Army, Information about the nuclear strikes of the "Westerners," Information about the nuclear strikes by the "Easterners" on troops and objectives in the "Westerners" rear, Information about the engineer troops of the 4th Army, Information about the chemical troops of the 4th Army, Information about the signal troops of the 4th Army, Information about the rear of the 4th Army, The order of battle and the identified numbering of the formations and units of the "Westerners."