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October 22, 1968	Letter from Dr. Baumann to Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Gen. Dr. Kiesewetter In a confidential letter to Deputy Minister Dr. Kiesewetter, Dr. Baumann discusses Cuba’s evolving relationship with socialist countries following Fidel Castro’s August 23, 1968, speech, which supported the USSR's actions in Czechoslovakia. While Cuba's stance brought it tactically closer to the Soviet bloc, ideological differences persist. Internal pressures, economic challenges, and pragmatic needs have led the Communist Party of Cuba (CPC) to adopt a more flexible approach in relations with socialist nations, signaling an interest in strengthening state and party ties. Baumann notes this shift as an opportunity for fostering mutual understanding and cooperation, although fundamental disagreements remain unchanged. The CPC's evolving conduct reflects both external influences and internal necessities, marking a cautious yet significant recalibration of its foreign policy. This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.
June 19, 1968	Letter, Charge d'Affaires Kulitzka to Ministry of Foreign Affairs Comrade Dr. Butzke, Head of the Latin America Department The letter from the GDR Embassy in Cuba outlines the outcomes of the Second Meeting of the Economic Committee, emphasizing progress in bilateral relations despite previous tensions. Significant agreements were reached for long-term economic cooperation, marking a turning point in restoring trust and fostering mutual benefit, which Cuba had previously resisted. The GDR positioned itself as a model for socialist collaboration by balancing international solidarity with pragmatic economic planning. These achievements are seen as laying the groundwork for strengthening Cuba's socialist development while improving its alignment with broader socialist bloc policies. The letter also highlights the need for careful follow-up and coordination with Berlin to sustain this momentum. This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.
February 3, 1968	Embassy of the GDR in the Republic of Cuba, 'Draft of a Concept for the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba from 24 to 26 January 1968' This document provides an analysis of the ideological and political developments in Cuba during the late 1960s, highlighting tensions within the Communist Party of Cuba (CPC) and its strained relations with other socialist countries. It emphasizes that Cuba, under Fidel Castro, was unwavering in its revolutionary agenda despite setbacks such as Che Guevara's death, seeking to export its revolution while distancing itself from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. Domestically, the Cuban leadership prioritized economic stabilization and internal political consolidation, using military-like methods to address supply issues and promote agricultural output. The document also critiques the CPC's suppression of dissent, exemplified by its handling of the so-called "micro-fraction," and warns of worsening relations between Cuba and its socialist allies, particularly the USSR and the GDR, as the Cuban leadership pursued an independent, "Fidelist" ideological line. This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.
September 16, 1968	Otto Hauber, 'Note requested by the Federal Chancellor regarding the consequences of a potential German non-signing of the NP [Non-Proliferation] Treaty' At Ruete’s request, an additional assessment of what could happen if West Germany did not sign the NPT was prepared by a specialist from the Commissioner’s subdivision in the Foreign Office, Otto Hauber, who coordinated it with other officials in the ministry. As Hauber told Ruete, his “political evaluation” differed from those of the three Ambassadors and it was impossible to find a “common denominator”
September 6, 1968	Report No. 597 from Swidbert Schnippenkötter, Geneva In a telex he sent Geneva, Schnippenkötter estimated that “negative consequences” of not signing the NPT would be “objectively low, but stronger in the atmospheric”. For the Soviets, the NPT was “no condition sine qua non” for commencing negotiations on strategic nuclear arms; in the United States, there would be “a certain annoyance” among Democrats but that would be all.
September 5, 1968	Wilhelm Grewe, 'Consequences of a potential German non-signing of the NP Treaty' Chancellor Kiesinger asked the Foreign Office after the ‘Czech crisis’ of late August 1968 to examine the “political consequences” of a “hypothetical case of a German non-signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.” The request was forwarded by Director-General Hans Ruete to Wilhelm Grewe, Helmut Allardt, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Schnippenkötter who attended the UN Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in Geneva. In Grewe’s judgment, it would be a “benefit” for the NATO alliance, “likely even a condition of her future viability,” if the NPT were to fail. And “if it was the missing German signature which brought the NPT down,” that would lead to “a severe stress test.” But as a NATO member state Germany could “get through” it if the government was determined to “operate with effective arguments” and showed “strength”
July 25, 1968	Letter, Minister Willy Brandt to Franz J. Strauß, with Attachment 'Comments on a French Note sent by the Federal Minister of Finances to the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs by Letter of July 2, 1968' Brandt answered Strauß by forwarding a memorandum from the Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, Ambassador Swidbert Schnippenkötter, who clarified that the ambiguity in wording reflected “a quite conscious dissent” between the United States and the Soviet Union. Concerns about this point of legal ambiguity remained central to the lines of argument taken by NPT opponents and many NPT skeptics in Bonn through late 1969 and, to a lesser extent, though 1973 and 1974 when NPT ratification was debated.
July 2, 1968	Letter, Minister Franz J. Strauß to Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Willy Brandt Strauß asked the Foreign Minister to comment on a translated “note on problems” of the NPT which he claimed to have received from “French friends”. The note argued that the ambiguous wording of NPT articles I and II concerning indirect transfer of control of nuclear weapons would pose problems. The Soviet Union might politically exploit it over time to “put Germany on a path towards neutrality.” The document also alluded to a concern that the Soviet Union might later argue that non-nuclear weapon states’ (NNWS) participation in “nuclear NATO” (such as allowing nuclear weapons deployments in their territories) violated their NPT commitments.
July 15, 1968	Letter, Minister Willy Brandt to Chancellor Kurt G. Kiesinger After 1 July 1968, when the NPT had been opened for signature, Brandt brought up the accession question in a letter to the Chancellor, arguing that the “credibility of our détente policy” depended on Germany’s stance toward the NPT, which in his review it should sign by “early autumn." Brandt’s letter mirrored arguments made previously by Georg-F. Duckwitz, who was State Secretary in the Foreign Office.
October 20, 1972	Embassy of the GDR in the PR China, 'Note about a Cocktail of Ambassador Hertzfeldt and his Wife at the Occasion of the 23rd Anniversary of the GDR on 6 October 1972 between 17:00 and 18:00 hours in the Embassy of the GDR in the PR China'