This resolution on combatting “ideological sabotage” lumps Chinese ideological propaganda, Western propaganda operations, international human rights and humanitarian relief activities, and religious radio broadcasts and religious missionary activities all together with the spreading influence of Western culture and music in Vietnam as part of a vast, insidious effort by Vietnam’s enemies designed to corrupt Vietnam’s society and to weaken its “revolutionary” spirit in order to cause the overthrow or collapse of the Vietnamese Communist Party and government. 

The over-the-top rhetoric used in this resolution illustrates the widespread paranoia that infected the upper ranks of Vietnam’s Party and security apparatus during this period of the Cold War.  It was not until six years later, in December 1986, that the pressures of growing internal dissension (even within the Party), the country’s desperate economic situation, and reductions in Soviet military and economic to Vietnam resulted in the decision by the Communist Party’s 6th Party Congress to shift to a policy of reforms, called “Renovation” [Đổi Mới] reforms and to new Vietnamese efforts to normalize relations with China and the United States.

Propaganda guidance for Chinese officials to rely upon when discussing the Sino-Vietnamese conflict with foreign nationals.

Socialist bloc diplomats analyze the latest developments in China's foreign and domestic policies.

In this telegram Zhou Enlai informs Wei Guoqing and the CCP Central Committee that the Western countries have raised the question of sick and wounded soldiers at Dien Bien Phu and are criticizing the Soviet Union. Enlai wants to counter the enemy plots with propaganda, but in the meantime thinks it would be better if some captured senior officers issued statements concerning the "humanist measures" being taken by their captors - but not by force.

This East German report, issued after the Interkit meeting in Prague, addresses the domestic and foreign policies of China. It makes reference to internal conflicts destabilizing the Chinese leadership. China is said to be enhancing its military potential, especially in the area of missiles and nuclear weapons. Its aims in foreign policy are to acquire a leadership position in the so-called "Third World", to expand its relations with capitalist countries, to damage the unity of the Socialist bloc, and to obstruct the foreign relations of the Soviet Union. Considering the increase of influence of China on North Korea, Romania, and Vietnam, as well as on the Communist parties in Spain and Italy, the Socialist countries must improve their anti-Maoist propaganda efforts.

Conversation with First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Sverev, describing the Vietnamese attitude toward China as becoming colder. At the same time, printing of China's anti-Soviet propaganda has become more limited and the Vietnamese appear grateful for Soviet aid. Sverev also estimates that there are over 200,000 Chinese troops stationed in North Vietnam.

Unnamed Soviet specialists claim that the USSR's aid to Vietnam is worth 1 million rubles per day. They also argue that because of the amount of aid, the Chinese propaganda claiming a lack of Soviet aid is losing ground among the population in North Vietnam, although the rumor still persists in the South.

An unnamed Soviet official explains that Chinese officers and advisors in Vietnam are discouraging the use of Soviet weapons, despite the fact that they are the most modern and effective.

Soviet Ambassador Ilya Shcherbakov informs a meeting of Socialist Ambassadors of Soviet-Vietnamese talks in Moscow. He notes that the United States realizes it does not have the international support for Vietnam that it had expected, and that the Soviet Union will continue to support Vietnam in the struggle. He argues that there is still much anti-Soviet propaganda in Vietnam, which comes from the Chinese, and points out three positions of the Chinese that he does not understand.