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Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Jan Nowak-Jeziorański broadcasting for Radio Free Europe, 3 May 1952

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Pyongyang photographed in March 20212

East Asia

North Korea

Emir Farid Chehab

Emir Farid Chehab Collection

Sino-Soviet Relations

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Eastern Europe

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Eastern Europe

Romania

Sino-Soviet Split, 1960-1984

Aerial photograph of CIA headquarters

United States. Central Intelligence Agency

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Kim Il Sung, 1978

Kim, Il Sung

1912- 1994

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Journalist informer

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Moldova. Communist Party. Central Committee (MCP CC)

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Interkit, 1966-1987

East German Uprising

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Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich

1914- 1984

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Dulles, Allen

1893- 1969

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October 4, 1995	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Iran’s President Rafsanjani on 2 October 1995 at 16.25 hours Kohl and Rafsanjani discuss the relevance of Bosnia and Hercegovina as a key issue for the Muslim world. In addition, they talk about a new major German credit for Iran.
October 17, 1958	Press Release containing a Speech by Minister of External Affairs Frank Aiken and Draft Resolutions on Nuclear Disarmament Aiken’s first step was a modest paragraph calling for the formation of a UN commission to recommend measures to the next session. However, global attentions were focused on nuclear tests and their health effects, so Aiken linked his initiative with the American-led seventeen-power resolution requesting all states to suspend testing voluntarily. Aiken proposed an amendment to that motion that included the notion of brokering an understanding between nuclear weapons powers and non-nuclear powers. He submitted that the former voluntarily desist from supplying nuclear weapons to other countries, while non-nuclear powers reciprocated and volunteered not to develop such weapons during a test suspension. This proposed quid pro quo became a staple in the Irish resolutions subsequently and eventually be inscribed into the NPT. Aiken’s speech invoked recognizable tropes such as a ‘geometric’ increase in nuclear powers, creating an urgent need to halt the spread. His speech was seminal in identifying themes he and international opinion would rehearse in future years. He conjured up fears about small states and revolutionary groups with a bomb acting as ‘the detonator for world-wide thermonuclear war’. Aiken was perceptive – he expected criticisms about institutionalized equality between states (nuclear “haves” and “have nots”), harms to alliances, the sufficiency of test bans, and the absence of monitoring. He sought to disprove the validity of such critiques, and these issues were worked through gradually, eventually leading to the finalization of the NPT ten years later.
September 19, 1958	Address by Mr. Frank Aiken to the United Nations General Assembly Official, 23th Session, 751st Plenary Meeting Aiken’s landmark address to the plenary of the UN General Assembly on 19 September 1958 launched his non-proliferation campaign. It is the first time he publicly identified stopping the spread of nuclear weapons as a concrete step in the collective interest to unblock the disarmament impasse, preventing a runaway arms race among the powers of the Earth. It was clearly framed as part of his wider campaign for global governance based on the rule of law rather than the threat of force. For Aiken, the challenge was stabilizing the arms race and generating trust to construct a world order based on justice and law – “to preserve a Pax Atomica while we build a Pax Mundi.” This speech was a critical departure. The widespread positive reception encouraged Aiken, persuading him to draft a formal resolution.
October 2, 1957	Memorandum by Frank Aiken [on an Interview with Scott McCleod and the Taoiseach] Aiken made an immediate impression on his arrival in the Twelfth Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1957. He adopted an impartial posture of assessing each issue on its merits and campaigning to remodel international politics around self-determination, humanitarianism, and peace. His exhortation was that only the UN had the moral authority and political legitimacy to put forward global solutions. While he did not propose nuclear disarmament measures specifically, his intent was signaled by his recommendation for a mutual drawback of foreign forces (including their nuclear weapons) in central Europe and his endorsement of a proposal to discuss the representation of China in the United Nations. The Eisenhower administration was hostile to Aiken’s course as outlined in the U.S. ambassador’s audience with Taoiseach Eamon de Valera and Aiken in Dublin on 2 October. The record underlines the Irish concerns about accidental nuclear war due to the proximity of opposing U.S. and Soviet forces in central Europe.
July 5, 1994	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China, Li Peng, on 4 July 1994 from 9.55 to 11.05 a.m. at the Federal Chancellery Kohl and Li Peng discuss human rights in China and the Chinese interpretation of the Tiananmen Square protests and massacre of 1989. Moreover, they review the relationship between the Vatican and China, German policy on Taiwan, China and GATT, China and the USA as well as EC trade restrictions vis-à-vis China.
March 2, 1993	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Korean President Kim Young-Sam on Tuesday, 2 March 1993 in Seoul Kohl argues that the purpose of his journey to Asia was to show Germany’s continued interest in the world beyond German and European issues. Kohl and Kim discuss North Korea's nuclear program and the need for confidence building measures between South and North Korea as a precondition for the start of a meaningful dialogue.
October 18, 1979	Note regarding the Meeting between Minister of State Wischnewski with the Deputy Iranian Minister and Government Spokesman Dr. Sadegh Tabatabai on 19 October 1979 from 12:50 to 14:20 Hours in the Federal Chancellery Tabatabai conveyed his government's regret over the assassination attempt on the German Merck administrative director Leib in Tehran that was organized an anti-government, anti-foreigner terrorist gang. The new revolutionary group and it's new laws and demands are described. Tabatabai continues to say that all negative rumors about the new regime, such as persecution against women and minority religions, is Zionist propaganda. The revolution has greatly damaged business. The fate of the Kurds are discussed.
June 3, 1992	State Minister Schmidbauer’s Meeting with Iranian President Rafsanjani in Teheran, 2 June 1992 Kohl and Rafsanjani discuss Germany's role in the stabiliza5ion of the CIS countries and the Balkans. Rafsanjani expresses Iran's desire for the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in a "good atmosphere" without pressure pledging that Iran was not planning any military use.
February 20, 1991	The Chancellor’s [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with President Mitterrand at the Elysée on 15 February 1991 Kohl and Mitterrand examine the Soviet position in the Gulf War and the situation in the Baltics.
December 15, 1980	Resolution on the Status and Mission of Combatting Enemy’s Ideological Sabotage Efforts During This New Period This resolution on combatting “ideological sabotage” lumps Chinese ideological propaganda, Western propaganda operations, international human rights and humanitarian relief activities, and religious radio broadcasts and religious missionary activities all together with the spreading influence of Western culture and music in Vietnam as part of a vast, insidious effort by Vietnam’s enemies designed to corrupt Vietnam’s society and to weaken its “revolutionary” spirit in order to cause the overthrow or collapse of the Vietnamese Communist Party and government. The over-the-top rhetoric used in this resolution illustrates the widespread paranoia that infected the upper ranks of Vietnam’s Party and security apparatus during this period of the Cold War. It was not until six years later, in December 1986, that the pressures of growing internal dissension (even within the Party), the country’s desperate economic situation, and reductions in Soviet military and economic to Vietnam resulted in the decision by the Communist Party’s 6th Party Congress to shift to a policy of reforms, called “Renovation” [Đổi Mới] reforms and to new Vietnamese efforts to normalize relations with China and the United States.