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November 2, 1962

Summary of a Conversation between Cde. A. M. Rumyantsev, Editor-in-Chief of the journal 'Problemy Mira i Sotsializma', and Cde. Blas Roca, Member of the Secretariat of the National Leadership of the United Revolutionary Organizations

Blas Roca explains that the Cuban Missile Crisis "ought to be viewed as a defeat" for Cuba and the Soviet Union.

May 24, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 32 (continued)

The Presidium decides to adopt Protocol 32.

November 19, 1962

Memorandum of Conversation between Polish Leader Władysław Gomułka and British Journalist David Astor, 19 November 1962 (excerpt)

Polish leader Władysław Gomułka and British journalist David Astor discuss the stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union in the situation of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

October 25, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 61

In response to President Kennedy's letter protesting the placement of missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev proposes a resolution to the crisis. When the time seemed right he would offer to dismantle the missiles already on the island (the MRBMs or R-12s) if Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba.

December 3, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 71

Protocol 71 gives details to the immediate fallout of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet perspective. Thanks to Castro’s so-called Armageddon letter and his five points, by December 1962 (date of this protocol), Khrushchev was calling the Cubans “unreliable allies.”

November 16, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 66

Protocol 66 is the first Malin note dated after the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 11 November. The tone of the protocol indicates that Castro is not pleased with Khrushchev's handling of the crisis, and there is a growing sense of distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union.

October 28, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 63

According to Protocol 63, Khrushchev probably assumed that Kennedy’s patience was at an end and the Cuban Missile Crisis might either be resolved or spin out of control, and the Kremlin again considered how it might respond to a US attack. If anyone suggested a preemptive strike, or even a retaliatory strike, against a target outside of the Caribbean, Malin did not note it for the official record.

October 27, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 62

Protocol 62 illustrates how it was Khrushchev who raised the stakes during the missile crisis and dictated a new letter to Kennedy indicating he would only remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange of the United States withdrawing its military bases from Turkey and Pakistan. The Pakistan demand would later be dropped, however and the US would only agree to remove its IRBMs from Turkey.

October 25, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 61

Protocol 61 indicates Khrushchev was already taking steps away from the crisis unfolding. Khrushchev decided that the ships carrying the IRBM missiles (the R-14s) on the high seas should turn around and come home.

October 23, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 60

Protocol 60 details the first meeting of the Communist Party during the crisis. As Khrushchev is awaiting the announcement by President Kennedy of the discovery of missiles in Cuba, he and some of his colleagues briefly considered using tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a US airborne assault. But, at the suggestion of Soviet defense minister Rodion Malinovsky, the Kremlin postponed its consideration of a nuclear response pending details of Kennedy’s speech.The Kremlin wasted no time in taking steps to reduce the risks of confrontation. It ordered some ships that were still in the Mediterranean to turn around. The Aleksandrovsk, the ship carrying the nuclear warheads for the IRBMs (the R-14s), was ordered to keep sailing, however, because it was close enough to Cuban shores to dock before the blockade went into effect.

Pagination