The Joint Staff prepared a detailed and lengthy report in response to a request from the Defense Department’s Office of International Security Affairs for an “outline plan for withdrawal and complete disposition” of the Jupiter missiles. A number of options were considered and rejected, including other military uses, offering the Jupiters to other agencies as a space booster, storing the missiles, and destroying them “without reclamation.” As there was “no identifiable requirement for the missiles,” the most appropriate option was “promptly dismantling and removing [them] from operational launch site.” While the warheads should be speedily returned to the United States, other useful components could be reclaimed, and the rest could be salvaged. The process would prevent the loss of high value components that were still usable, such as rocket motors, fueling trailers, and electronic devices. Such an outcome required decisions on the final disposition of Jupiter assets.

Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani’s visit to the U.S. was an opportunity for he and President Kennedy to reach “a meeting of the minds” on the Jupiter-Polaris problem. The two had several conversations during the next two days on East-West relations, NATO nuclear issues, and the developing world, among other topics.  During this conversation, with only the U.S. translator present, Kennedy explained to Fanfani that Polaris/Sergeant missiles as a replacement for Jupiter/Corporals, along with Italian participation in an eventual MLF, should be announced as “whole package” rather than to have “the different points of decision simply leak out, without coherence and possibly at the wrong moment.” He believed that the main elements of the agreement would find “general approval” among most political groupings in Italy. When Fanfani brought up the possibility of announcing the U.S. request on Jupiters and Polaris and then taking it to his government, Kennedy emphasized the need for quick action, adding that it would “not be desirable to allow for prolonged discussion” of the package.

At Fanfani’s request, Kennedy explained the arrangements for Polaris missions in the Mediterranean, which operated out of a base in the Iberian Peninsula (Rota, Spain), and the various options for an MLF, either surface or submarine ships. Such an approach, Kennedy believed, was a way to improve the “position of the West.” Accepting Kennedy’s assertions about the dangers of the Jupiter missiles, Fanfani nevertheless saw a “psychological” problem involving the “prestige and strength” of Italy’s armed forces. Kennedy “indicated lively interest” in Fanfani’s question as to whether the Jupiter bases could be used for “cooperative peaceful space efforts.”

At the meeting’s conclusion, Kennedy “stressed that by the following morning they should be able to combine four or five points into a proposal that would strengthen the Italian and American position within the framework of the Alliance, thus making this meeting a gain in its cohesiveness and hence political strength.”

Seymour Weiss would push back against any efforts to remove the Jupiters, but he and others realized that President Kennedy had a “keen interest” in the matter and that Secretary of Defense McNamara had ordered that action be taken (assigning his General Counsel John McNaughton to take the lead). Nevertheless Weiss and Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler presented Secretary of State Rusk with a memorandum making the case against action on the Jupiters or at least postponing their removal until a “later time.” Paralleling arguments made during the crisis by Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt, Tyler pointed to the “symbolic and psychological importance” of the Jupiter deployments. While Tyler noted parenthetically that the Italians had “given indications of a disposition to work toward the eventual removal of the Jupiters,” the U.S. could not phase them out “without general Alliance agreement,” including Italy and Turkey’s consent, “unless we are prepared to lay ourselves open to the charge of abrogation of specific or implied agreements.” Rusk was in the know on the secret deal, but his reference to a “later time” was consistent with it and signing the memo would have placated Tyler and Weiss.

Keating alleges that the Soviet Union is building "rocket installations" in Cuba and urges President Kennedy to take action.

The Bulgarian diplomatic mission (legation or embassy) to the US reported to the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sofia what actions the embassy executed and planned to execute to prevent seizure of documents during the "international situation," or Cuban Missile Crisis. Enclosed in the letter is an explanation of items destroyed and items placed under heightened security. The letter also includes information about security for the embassy staff.

The cable from van Roijen concerns a conversation between him and Director of UN Political Affairs at the U.S. Department of State Joseph Sisco. Sisco informs van Roijen that the Kennedy Administration has decided to let the Cuban issue quietly die, boiling down to the United States and the Soviet Union "agreeing to disagree." The State Department does not think there should be further debate on the issue in the UN Security Council because the U.S. is not willing to make further concessions while there have been no UN inspections. Sisco also reports that the Soviets have made a commitment to withdraw all combat troops from Cuba.

Boissevain relates the Cuban response to the crisis. In a speech, Castro does not deny the placement of nuclear weapons, and claims this kind of denial has been heard more from Khrushchev. The impression is one of building missile silos which look like "ground-to-ground" launch sites from the air. The Cuban government is satisfied with the developments from the UN Security Council regarding the issue, as evidenced by the Havana airport being reopened for international flights.

The report details Mikoyan's talks with President John F. Kennedy in Washington D.C. Among the topics of discussion were questions of hemispheres of influence, whether the Soviet Union promoted a revolution against the USA in Cuba, and whether Castro was made an enemy of the USA or was one from the beginning. Conduct of both nations with regards to the Cuban question is discussed at length, ranging from whether U.S. was correct in acting against a perceived threat to security, the conduct of the Cuban people, the extent of Soviet involvement in Cuba, and what military hardware would be left in Cuba after the removal of the nuclear missile bases.

The cable reveals serious misgivings by the Cubans with regard to Soviet handling of the crisis. Roy Inchaustegui was criticized by Castro for discussing the question of document authenticity about the missile bases instead of discussing Cuba's right to defense at the UN Security Council. Pavlicek reports the Council asked on Czechoslovakia's stance towards Castro's 5 Points. While responding with support, he still asked for an official viewpoint from the Czechoslovak government in Prague.

Report on a breakfast held by Zorin - chairman of the Security Council - with its members. The topics of discussion include: American agreement to the Soviet proposal for checks on vessels carried out by representatives of the International Red Cross, the Irish proposal to convene the Council right after U Thant's return from Cuba to decide on an inspection mechanism for the dismantlings, and the Ghanaian delegate's remarks on the situation in Congo.