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November 16, 1979

Rinaldo Petrignani, NATO Deputy Secretary General), Speech to the Atlantic Council's Seminar of Study, Cini Foundation; Venezia, 15th-17th November 1970, 'NATO, Western Europe's security and the issue of SS-20 missiles'

Vice Secretary General of NATO Rinaldo Petrignani sends PM Giulio Andreotti a report from the meeting of the Italian Atlatic Committee regarding Western European security situation and the threat posed by political and military modernization in the Soviet Union, and in particular, the introduction of SS20 missiles.

April 12, 1967

Intelligence Note from Thomas L. Hughes to the Acting Secretary, 'Soviets Continue to Denounce American Interpretation of Nonproliferation Treaty'

The Soviets were insisting that article III on safeguards mention only the IAEA but not the European Atomic Energy Community [EURATOM], even though West Germany and other EURATOM members resisted the idea of IAEA inspections in Western Europe. It would take quite a few months before the Article III wording was to everyone’s satisfaction, but the Soviets also objected to US interpretations of the proposed Article II which would permit a nuclear-armed, united Western Europe.

March 3, 1967

Research Memorandum REU-14 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'How Major NATO Countries View the Prospect of an ABM Deployment'

Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the “adverse consequences” of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

January 11, 1967

Intelligence Note 13 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'The Chinese Nuclear Threat to Non-Communist Asia'

Prepared by Edward Hurwitz, a Foreign Service officer and future ambassador then on assignment to INR, this report treated ICBMs as China’s main weapons goal, an eventual means for a “credible threat” to Beijing’s U.S. and Soviet “arch enemies.”

July 15, 1965

Research Memorandum REU-25 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Attitudes of Selected Countries on Accession to a Soviet Co-sponsored Draft Agreement on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'

With a nuclear nonproliferation treaty under consideration in Washington, INR considered which countries were likely to sign on and why or why not. INR analysts, mistakenly as it turned out, believed it unlikely that the Soviet Union would be a co-sponsor of a treaty in part because of the “international climate” and also because Moscow and Washington differed on whether a treaty would recognize a “group capability.”

February 1980

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Special Project Division, 'Proliferation Analysis and International Assessments'

This issue of Proliferation Analysis and International Assessments includes a heavily excised article on Iraq, a piece on South Africa’s security prospects, and a apparently a third essay that has been wholly exempted. The essay on South Africa’s nuclear aims suggests that the arguments pro and con for a nuclear capability to deal with regional security threats are so powerful that “internal political and bureaucratic” consideration are probably more relevant for nuclear decisions.

January 24, 1996

State Department Telegram 012545 to Intsum Collective, 'Intsum: India: Nuclear Test Unlikely'

Provides an overview of preparations for the nuclear test as well as a discussion on the pressures weighing on Indian Prime Minister Rao to launch the test. Prepared by one of INR’s South Asia experts, Steven Ghitelman, it provides an overview of the test site preparations that began in November and decided described Prime Minister Rao as facing pressures to test from the BJP and from the nuclear establishment. The pressures were not insurmountable because other considerations were important, such as avoiding international sanctions, continuing steps toward economic liberalization, and pressures to support the CTBT. Ghitelman concluded that it would be “vintage Rao” for him to allow the scientists to prepare for a test “while not authorizing them to conduct one.” That is what happened.

April 24, 1985

Address by Willy Brandt before the Council on Foreign Relations

Willy Brandt speaks about East-West relations, specifically focusing on what he views as U.S. misconceptions about nuclear arms, and the concept of Common Security.

May 31, 1974

Telegram No. 120, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Discussion of the importance of internal stability and the concept of independence in guiding India's foreign policy following India's first nuclear test.