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Soviet Nuclear History

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August 19, 1991	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with President George Bush, Monday, 19 August 1991, 13:40 until 13:50 hours Kohl and Bush assess the situation in the Soviet Union after the coup. They reiterate their continued support for Gorbachev and his reform policy.
June 3, 1991	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with President Mitterrand on Thursday, 30 May 1991, in Lille (working breakfast) Kohl and Mitterrand confer on NATO, European security and the idea of establishing a common security and defense policy under the roof of the European Community.
December 1962	Report of the Commander of the 51st Missile Division concerning the Operations of the Division during the Period from 12 July through 1 December 1962 Commander of the 51st Missile Division General-Major Igor Demyanovich Statsenko's detailed postmortem on the deployment of Soviet missiles to Cuba in mid-1962 and their removal later that year following the nuclear confrontation with the United States. The report includes an attachment titled: "Some Questions of Operational and Tactical Concealment during the Operation of the Division on the Island of Cuba."
November 9, 1962	Memorandum from William R. Tyler to the Secretary [Dean Rusk] through U. Alexis Johnson, 'Turkish and Italian IRBM's' Seymour Weiss would push back against any efforts to remove the Jupiters, but he and others realized that President Kennedy had a “keen interest” in the matter and that Secretary of Defense McNamara had ordered that action be taken (assigning his General Counsel John McNaughton to take the lead). Nevertheless Weiss and Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler presented Secretary of State Rusk with a memorandum making the case against action on the Jupiters or at least postponing their removal until a “later time.” Paralleling arguments made during the crisis by Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt, Tyler pointed to the “symbolic and psychological importance” of the Jupiter deployments. While Tyler noted parenthetically that the Italians had “given indications of a disposition to work toward the eventual removal of the Jupiters,” the U.S. could not phase them out “without general Alliance agreement,” including Italy and Turkey’s consent, “unless we are prepared to lay ourselves open to the charge of abrogation of specific or implied agreements.” Rusk was in the know on the secret deal, but his reference to a “later time” was consistent with it and signing the memo would have placated Tyler and Weiss.
September 14, 1961	Reception by N.S. Khrushchev of Japanese Ambassador H. Yamada, September 14, 1961 The two parties discuss solutions for improving Soviet-Japanese trade relations. Khrushchev expresses concern about Japan's military ties with the US, given that there are US army bases in Japan. Yamada raises the concern of logistical difficulties faced by Japanese businesspeople visiting the USSR. The two parties also discuss Soviet-Japanese treaties and geopolitical relations.
August 29, 1960	Record of Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Prominent Political Figure of Japan M. Suzuki on August 29, 1960 Khrushchev and Suzuki discuss Japan's neutrality, the American intelligence plane incident, and the failure of the Paris summit.
November 1968	Radio Liberty Policy Manual: Annex: Ukrainian Broadcasts Radio Liberty outlines its approach to broadcasts in Ukraine, emphasizing the importance of providing alternative perspectives to Ukrainians.
1946	Letter, Ya. Malik to Cde. V.M. Molotov In this undated memo, written sometime after July 1946, Malik informs Molotov that he has completed a new draft directive for the Soviet delegation in the Joint Soviet-American Commission cconcerning Korea.
May 31, 1946	Report on the Work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission to Implement the Moscow Decision of the Three Ministers concerning Korea The Soviet delegation proposed procedures for the work of the Joint Commission on Korea and the terms for consultation with parties and public organization; specifically, it called for the Commission to consult and only listen to parties and organizations of Korea that agreed with the Moscow Decision. The American delegation refused this demand, causing lengthy disputes. A list of parties and public organizations from both South Korea and North Korea for the consultation were drawn, but the right-wing parties in the Democratic Chamber, the administrative body of South Korea, opposed the Moscow decision and Joint Commission decision, and the discussion associated with the formation of a Provisional Korean Government was halted.
December 6, 1946	Report from General-Colonel T. Shtykov to Cde. I.V. Stalin and Cde. V.M. Molotov Shytkov concludes that the Soviet delegation cannot back down from its demands for the parties in Korea to support the Moscow decision. A reversal of this position, Shtykov writes, would lead to the domination of US-backed, right-wing parties to take control over the Provisional Government of Korea.