An outline of the Soviet response to the current situation between Israel and the United Arab Republic. Sisco believes their reply is not constructive and will not improve issues in the region.

Sisco discusses a working paper he is negotiating with the Soviet Union, making it clear that the US is not prepared to compromise on the first four points of the agreement. He plans to first inform the UAR of his work with the Soviets, then the Israelis.

Sisco references a memorandum outlining the overall strategy for US discussions with the Soviet Union on the Middle East. He intendeds that the deal they plan to offer will focus on the borders with the UAR and Jordan.

Reflections on Sisco's meetings with Soviet officials. Siscco concludes that the Soviets want bilateral talks to continue and plan to slowly chip away at the US position, but see the current situation as manageable. Sisco also provides some recommendations for US strategy over the following months.

Andropov gives his views on American and Soviet strategy vis-a-vis the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Zhou Enlai and Alhassane Diop discuss prospects a second Asian-African Conference as well as Soviet policy toward the Vietnam War.

Albanian leaders Hysni Kapo and Ramiz Alia meet with a Chinese delegation to discuss industrialization in Communist countries, specificallyAlbania's five-year plan. The Albanians complain about being excluded from international meetings of the socialist countries. The Chinese update the Albanians on their position of supporting Jiang Jieshi over the "Two Chinas" objective of the United States and their relations with other countries throughout Asia, while encouraging the Albanians to reach out to the Muslim nations of Africa.

The CPSU politburo discusses the effects of Molotov's foreign policy on Soviet influence in the Middle East. Molotov is accused of being adventurous, leading to a loss in prestige for the Soviet Union when imperialist powers forced Egypt to withdraw from the Suez Crisis.

Polish document describing the speech given by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) on the actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership before and during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Brezhnev tells the CC CPSU plenum that the Arab struggle in the Middle East has both a class struggle and a national liberation dimension. Brezhnev blames Israeli aggression for the start of the war and Arab blunders and low morale for the humiliating defeat of the UAR forces. Given the success of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Soviets were forced to consider diplomatic and political methods for saving the Arab leadership. When Israeli forces did not stop their aggression against Syria, threatening to overrun the Syrian capital of Damascus, Brezhnev claims tells the CC CPSU that Soviet leadership warned the Americans that the Soviet Army would have to intervene and, at the same time, threatened the Israeli that any further actions would result in Soviet involvement in the war. Brezhnev claims that, since the war ended just hours after the Soviets had made their threats, the imperialist powers acquiesced to Soviet demands. This documents is a translation of the version the Soviet leadership sent to the United Polish Workers’ Party for the information of the Polish leadership.

A report based on military intelligence information and on Zhivkov's conversation with the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev.