Kohl and Mitterrand confer on NATO, European security and the idea of establishing a common security and defense policy under the roof of the European Community.

An outline of the Soviet response to the current situation between Israel and the United Arab Republic. Sisco believes their reply is not constructive and will not improve issues in the region.

Sisco discusses a working paper he is negotiating with the Soviet Union, making it clear that the US is not prepared to compromise on the first four points of the agreement. He plans to first inform the UAR of his work with the Soviets, then the Israelis.

Reflections on Sisco's meetings with Soviet officials. Siscco concludes that the Soviets want bilateral talks to continue and plan to slowly chip away at the US position, but see the current situation as manageable. Sisco also provides some recommendations for US strategy over the following months.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 29 June 1991 describes the latest developments in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Kuwait, the Soviet Union, Palestine, Jordan, Ethiopia, Germany, Poland, Netherlands, Togo, Czechoslovakia and Lebanon.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 3 July 1991 describes the latest developments in Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, Iraq, Israel, Peru, China, and Cuba.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 29 September 1989 describes the latest developments in China, Tunisia, the Soviet Union, Ecuador, Peru, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Philippines, Indonesia, Iran, and Brazil.

Andropov gives his views on American and Soviet strategy vis-a-vis the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

The document records the state of play in Syrian-Soviet relations prior to the Six-Day War. According to the author of the report negotiations between the Syrian Ba’ath delegation and Soviet authorities, which took place in Moscow during January 1967, were tense and uneasy because the Soviets were displeased by the provocative and aggressive Syrian policy toward Israel.

Polish document describing the speech given by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) on the actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership before and during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Brezhnev tells the CC CPSU plenum that the Arab struggle in the Middle East has both a class struggle and a national liberation dimension. Brezhnev blames Israeli aggression for the start of the war and Arab blunders and low morale for the humiliating defeat of the UAR forces. Given the success of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Soviets were forced to consider diplomatic and political methods for saving the Arab leadership. When Israeli forces did not stop their aggression against Syria, threatening to overrun the Syrian capital of Damascus, Brezhnev claims tells the CC CPSU that Soviet leadership warned the Americans that the Soviet Army would have to intervene and, at the same time, threatened the Israeli that any further actions would result in Soviet involvement in the war. Brezhnev claims that, since the war ended just hours after the Soviets had made their threats, the imperialist powers acquiesced to Soviet demands. This documents is a translation of the version the Soviet leadership sent to the United Polish Workers’ Party for the information of the Polish leadership.