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June 3, 1991

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with President Mitterrand on Thursday, 30 May 1991, in Lille (working breakfast)

Kohl and Mitterrand confer on NATO, European security and the idea of establishing a common security and defense policy under the roof of the European Community.

January 16, 1963

Diary Entry of Amintore Fanfani for 16 January 1963

Fanfani covered the events of the day in this journal entry, noting that he told Kennedy he would make no commitment on the Jupiter-Polaris replacement until he spoke with McNamara. With McNamara, Fanfani emphasized the point about using the Jupiter base for space launches. Both Kennedy and McNamara denied that there was a trade with the USSR, with McNamara emphasizing the risks posed by the Jupiters during the Missile Crisis.

November 9, 1962

Memorandum from William R. Tyler to the Secretary [Dean Rusk] through U. Alexis Johnson, 'Turkish and Italian IRBM's'

Seymour Weiss would push back against any efforts to remove the Jupiters, but he and others realized that President Kennedy had a “keen interest” in the matter and that Secretary of Defense McNamara had ordered that action be taken (assigning his General Counsel John McNaughton to take the lead). Nevertheless Weiss and Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler presented Secretary of State Rusk with a memorandum making the case against action on the Jupiters or at least postponing their removal until a “later time.” Paralleling arguments made during the crisis by Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt, Tyler pointed to the “symbolic and psychological importance” of the Jupiter deployments. While Tyler noted parenthetically that the Italians had “given indications of a disposition to work toward the eventual removal of the Jupiters,” the U.S. could not phase them out “without general Alliance agreement,” including Italy and Turkey’s consent, “unless we are prepared to lay ourselves open to the charge of abrogation of specific or implied agreements.” Rusk was in the know on the secret deal, but his reference to a “later time” was consistent with it and signing the memo would have placated Tyler and Weiss.

October 30, 1962

Memorandum from Seymour Weiss, Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, to Jeffrey Kitchen, 'Turkish IRBM Trade-Off'

That some officials in the State Department’s European Affairs bureau were convinced that Kennedy had approved a trade of the Jupiters in Turkey puzzled State Department official Seymour Weiss, who was convinced that the higher-ups has rejected a trade. In this memo, Weiss asked a colleague, Jeffrey Kitchen, to get an “accurate reading” on the matter.

October 26, 1962

American Embassy Ankara Telegram 587 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

In an “eyes only” response to a State Department query about the Jupiters, U.S. Ambassador Raymond Hare observed that “if proper means could be found, good case could be made for removal of Jupiters from Turkey as counter for removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.” Yet, withdrawing the missiles as part of a Cuban Missile Crisis arrangement would pose a problem that was “partly psycho-political” and “partly substantive.” With reference to the “psycho-political” problem, Hare’s explanation was framed ethnocentrically: The Turks “are proud, courageous people who do not understand concept or process of compromise.” In that context, the U.S. would lose much “if in process of Jupiter removal [the] Turks should get the impression that their interests as an ally were being traded off in order to appease an enemy.” He recommended several alternative solutions to the problem; for example, if the missiles are phased out, the U.S. could provide Turkey with a backup, such as the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF) or Polaris missiles. If Italy gave up its Jupiters, he suggests, that could help with an approach to Turkey. 

February 1, 1982

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Taiwan: Reaction to US Arms Sale Announcement'

A CIA assessment of how leading figures in Taipei will react following the announcement that the United States will sell Northrop F-5E aircraft to Taiwan.

May 1, 1954

Current Intelligence Bulletin, 1 May 1954

A heavily redacted copy of the CIA's "Current Intelligence Bulletin" for May 1, 1954. Released sections include "Soviet diplomat urges immediate cease-fire in Indochina" and "[Syngman] Rhee reported dis leased with Chiang Kai-shek." Four other sections were withheld in their entirety.

November 13, 1990

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Soviet President M.S. Gorbachev on 9 November 1990, 3:15 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. at the Federal Chancellery

Kohl and Gorbachev review the state of bilateral relations, the Gulf crisis and the sitution in the Soviet Union, especialy with regards to Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost and the Soviet Union's economic reforms. They discuss Western economic assistance and food supplies for the Soviet Union as well.

September 14, 1961

Reception by N.S. Khrushchev of Japanese Ambassador H. Yamada, September 14, 1961

The two parties discuss solutions for improving Soviet-Japanese trade relations. Khrushchev expresses concern about Japan's military ties with the US, given that there are US army bases in Japan. Yamada raises the concern of logistical difficulties faced by Japanese businesspeople visiting the USSR. The two parties also discuss Soviet-Japanese treaties and geopolitical relations. 

August 29, 1960

Record of Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Prominent Political Figure of Japan M. Suzuki on August 29, 1960

Khrushchev and Suzuki discuss Japan's neutrality, the American intelligence plane incident, and the failure of the Paris summit. 

Pagination