Seymour Weiss would push back against any efforts to remove the Jupiters, but he and others realized that President Kennedy had a “keen interest” in the matter and that Secretary of Defense McNamara had ordered that action be taken (assigning his General Counsel John McNaughton to take the lead). Nevertheless Weiss and Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler presented Secretary of State Rusk with a memorandum making the case against action on the Jupiters or at least postponing their removal until a “later time.” Paralleling arguments made during the crisis by Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt, Tyler pointed to the “symbolic and psychological importance” of the Jupiter deployments. While Tyler noted parenthetically that the Italians had “given indications of a disposition to work toward the eventual removal of the Jupiters,” the U.S. could not phase them out “without general Alliance agreement,” including Italy and Turkey’s consent, “unless we are prepared to lay ourselves open to the charge of abrogation of specific or implied agreements.” Rusk was in the know on the secret deal, but his reference to a “later time” was consistent with it and signing the memo would have placated Tyler and Weiss.

That some officials in the State Department’s European Affairs bureau were convinced that Kennedy had approved a trade of the Jupiters in Turkey puzzled State Department official Seymour Weiss, who was convinced that the higher-ups has rejected a trade. In this memo, Weiss asked a colleague, Jeffrey Kitchen, to get an “accurate reading” on the matter.

In an “eyes only” response to a State Department query about the Jupiters, U.S. Ambassador Raymond Hare observed that “if proper means could be found, good case could be made for removal of Jupiters from Turkey as counter for removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.” Yet, withdrawing the missiles as part of a Cuban Missile Crisis arrangement would pose a problem that was “partly psycho-political” and “partly substantive.” With reference to the “psycho-political” problem, Hare’s explanation was framed ethnocentrically: The Turks “are proud, courageous people who do not understand concept or process of compromise.” In that context, the U.S. would lose much “if in process of Jupiter removal [the] Turks should get the impression that their interests as an ally were being traded off in order to appease an enemy.” He recommended several alternative solutions to the problem; for example, if the missiles are phased out, the U.S. could provide Turkey with a backup, such as the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF) or Polaris missiles. If Italy gave up its Jupiters, he suggests, that could help with an approach to Turkey. 

On behalf of Gorbachev, Ambassador Terechov complains that the Soviet government was only informed about the start of U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf an hour in advance.

Kohl and Özal debate the Gulf crisis and Turkey's request for the deployment of the air component of NATO's Allied Command Europe Mobile Force. In addition, they discuss the resignation of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 19 July 1991 describes the latest developments in Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Lebanon and Turkey.

The Soviets begin to build radar bases and fix anti-aircraft artillery in Syria, and the Syrian and Russian governments reach an military aid agreement.

Report on Turkish collaboration with Arab countries in a common defense against Russia and Turkish journalists acting as Israeli agents.

TASS reports on rumors of Stalin's illness in Congolese and Turkish newspapers as well as a Turkish analysis of Soviet politics.

The Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, L.D. Wilgress, thoroughly reviews Soviet foreign policy in Europe, Asia, and in Latin America and its relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. Wilgress optimistically concludes that "the Soviet Government are desirous of co-operating fully with the other great powers."