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October 30, 1962

Memorandum from Seymour Weiss, Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, to Jeffrey Kitchen, 'Turkish IRBM Trade-Off'

That some officials in the State Department’s European Affairs bureau were convinced that Kennedy had approved a trade of the Jupiters in Turkey puzzled State Department official Seymour Weiss, who was convinced that the higher-ups has rejected a trade. In this memo, Weiss asked a colleague, Jeffrey Kitchen, to get an “accurate reading” on the matter.

October 26, 1962

American Embassy Ankara Telegram 587 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

In an “eyes only” response to a State Department query about the Jupiters, U.S. Ambassador Raymond Hare observed that “if proper means could be found, good case could be made for removal of Jupiters from Turkey as counter for removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.” Yet, withdrawing the missiles as part of a Cuban Missile Crisis arrangement would pose a problem that was “partly psycho-political” and “partly substantive.” With reference to the “psycho-political” problem, Hare’s explanation was framed ethnocentrically: The Turks “are proud, courageous people who do not understand concept or process of compromise.” In that context, the U.S. would lose much “if in process of Jupiter removal [the] Turks should get the impression that their interests as an ally were being traded off in order to appease an enemy.” He recommended several alternative solutions to the problem; for example, if the missiles are phased out, the U.S. could provide Turkey with a backup, such as the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF) or Polaris missiles. If Italy gave up its Jupiters, he suggests, that could help with an approach to Turkey. 

April 30, 1948

George F. Kennan, 'The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare'

State Department Policy Planning Director George Kennan outlines, in a document for the National Security Council, the idea of a public committee, working closely with the US government, to sponsor various émigré activities.

March 27, 1967

Memorandum of Conversation between Vice President Hubert Humphrey and ACDA Director Foster, 'Ambassador Foster’s Briefing of Vice President on NPT,' with enclosure, 'Questions Most Likely to be Asked on NPT'

During this conversation, Director Foster briefed Vice President Humphrey about the progress of the NPT. Foster said that he was willing to meet Germany’s concerns about such issues as protecting its civil nuclear industry and a future European federation. Moreover, noting that Washington had to discuss the NPT with other countries that could “otherwise go nuclear,” Foster worried that a long delay caused by consultations could “jeopardize the chance of the rest of the world getting signed up.”

January 17, 1967

Memorandum of Conversation between General Counsel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency George Bunn and Soviet Counselor Yuli M. Vorontsov, 'Non-Proliferation Treaty and Other Arms Control Matters'

Information about the recent U.S.-West German discussions had leaked to the press and in this conversation, Vorontsov “wanted to know what we had told the Germans with respect to participation in a European nuclear force.” Bunn told him that the “Germans were concerned that nothing in the treaty stand in the way of steps which might ultimately produce a United States of Europe.”

November 26, 1966

Message to the President from Secretary Rusk

In this message, Secretary Rusk reported to President Johnson that the Soviet non-transfer principle, which ruled out MLF-type arrangements but left open other alternatives, was a “good formulation” that would be “acceptable” to the incipient West German “Grand Coalition” government.

October 17, 1966

US Permanent Representative on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Harlan Cleveland, 'Notes on Washington Trip'

In the U.S. Ambassador to NATO Harlen Cleveland's notes on his meeting with Secretary Rusk, Cleveland details Rusk's thoughts about Soviet interest in the NPT. According to the Secretary, the “Soviets should have no real difficulty in finding a common interest with us in signing a treaty which enshrines [the] two self-denying provisions” of no-transfer to non-nuclear weapons states and “no relinquishment of control by the US over US warheads.”

September 23, 1966

Adrian Fisher, Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to Hays Redmon, Staff Assistant to the President, enclosing 'Summary of Recent Soviet "Signals" on Non-Proliferation'

In this report, ACDA Deputy Director Adrian Fisher summarizes Moscow's growing interest in reaching a final agreement on an NPT, in part because of its recognition of “pressures growing in third countries for development of nuclear capabilities.”

November 1, 1965

Thomas L. Hughes, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Secretary, 'Dobrynin’s October 29 Oral Statement on Nonproliferation'

In this report, the INR commented on Soviet policy language regarding nuclear proliferation. They called Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin's criticism of MLF proposals "absurd," telling Secretary Rusk that “in no way can we be blamed for taking steps which even with a most fault-finding approach would look like disseminating nuclear weapons."

November 27, 1962

Secretary of State to the President, 'Agreement on Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons,' with Enclosures and Cover Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy

In this proposed agreement, Secretary of State Rusk asked the White House for authorization to approach the Soviets. Rusk had two central goals in mind: to determine if the Soviets would state whether its allies, such as China, would agree to a nonproliferation agreement and to give Moscow a “somewhat more precise indication of what we have in mind concerning the obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons.”

Pagination