Skip to content

Results:

1 - 10 of 11

Documents

October 28, 2020

Interview with Donald Sinclair

Donald Sinclair is a former Canadian diplomat. He served as a member of the Canadian delegation to ACRS. 

October 2, 2020

Interview with Daniel Poneman

Daniel Poneman was director of Defense Policy and Arms Control at the National Security Council. He served as a member of the US delegation to ACRS.

November 11, 2020

Interview with Sallai Meridor

Sallai Meridor is a former Israeli diplomat. He served as a member of the Israeli delegation to ACRS. 

September 23, 2020

Interview with Daniel Kurtzer

Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer is a former US diplomat. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Near East Bureau at the US Department of State during the ACRS process, the coordinator of the multilateral peace talks following the Madrid peace conference, and the U.S. representative in the multilateral Steering Group .  

September 13, 2020

Interview with Fred Axelgard

Fred Axelgard is a former US diplomat. He served as a member of the US delegation to ACRS.

July 25, 1990

National Intelligence Daily for Wednesday, 25 July 1990

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 25 July 1990 describes the latest developments in Iraq, Kuwait, Liberia, the Soviet Union, China, Taiwan, European Community, Hungary and Germany.

October 22, 1973

Note on Conversation with Comrade Denisov, Counselor at USSR Embassy, on 12 October 1973 in the GDR Embassy

A note on conversation covering North Korea's unification policy, a change of Kim Il Sung's personal adviser, the relationship between North Korea and Syria, and the importation of grains from Soviet Union.

April 2004

KGB Active Measures in Southwest Asia in 1980-82

Materials provided by former KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin to CWIHP, following the publication of the Working Paper No. 40, "The KGB in Afghanistan." As with all Mitrokhin’s notes, his compilation on Soviet “active measures” in South and Southwest Asia is based on other smuggled-out notes and was prepared especially for CWIHP. Please read the Notes on Sources for information on the nature and limitations of these documents.

December 27, 1979

Declaration of the CC CPSU to the Party Leadership concerning the Situation in Afghanistan, Attachment to CPSU Politburo Protocol #177

The CC CPSU states that the removal of N. M Taraki, and the rise of H. Amin to political leadership in Afghanistan bolstered counterrevolutionaries. The CC CPSU approved a small military force to stabilize the country, supporting the regional and international interests of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. The message is sent to the Members and Candidate Members of the CC CPSU, the Members of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission, the CC of the Communist Parties Of Union Republics, Kray Committees, and Oblast Committees of the Party, The Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, the Leningrad City Committee of the CPSU, and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Soviet Navy.

June 20, 1967

On Soviet Policy following the Israeli Aggression in the Middle East

Polish document describing the speech given by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) on the actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership before and during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Brezhnev tells the CC CPSU plenum that the Arab struggle in the Middle East has both a class struggle and a national liberation dimension. Brezhnev blames Israeli aggression for the start of the war and Arab blunders and low morale for the humiliating defeat of the UAR forces. Given the success of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Soviets were forced to consider diplomatic and political methods for saving the Arab leadership. When Israeli forces did not stop their aggression against Syria, threatening to overrun the Syrian capital of Damascus, Brezhnev claims tells the CC CPSU that Soviet leadership warned the Americans that the Soviet Army would have to intervene and, at the same time, threatened the Israeli that any further actions would result in Soviet involvement in the war. Brezhnev claims that, since the war ended just hours after the Soviets had made their threats, the imperialist powers acquiesced to Soviet demands. This documents is a translation of the version the Soviet leadership sent to the United Polish Workers’ Party for the information of the Polish leadership.

Pagination