This brief note written by the Ministry of State Security includes a number of questions for the leadership of the KGB in the USSR, such as whether other elements, like military doctrine or emergency responses, should be examined as possible options for starting a war.

Information from the KGB shared with the Stasi about a high-level review of US policy by the Department of State. Presidential Directive [NS-NSDD] 54 from [September] 1982 made the main US objective to subvert Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.

In this entry Mitrokhin describes the history of chilly diplomatic relations between the KGB and Vatican City from the 1960s through the mid 1980s.

The two parties consent to assist each other in the surveillance of goods going between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union, letters going between the two countries and from them to capitalist countries, correspondence sent from Czechoslovak or Soviet citizens to people who recently arrived from capitalist countries, the mailing of anti-socialist materials sent through the two nations and mail involving anti-socialist propaganda sent to either country from capitalist countries. Both parties also agree to exchange information on ways subversives use the post to their advantage and how each country’s officials monitor post suspected of containing ideologically injurious material.

The parties agree to assist one another in the collection of intelligence information on political, economic, scientific and technical matters and exchange information on suspicious contacts of Czechoslovak and Soviet citizens suspected to be spies or subversive. Both agree to the exchange of counter-intelligence regarding Czechoslovak and Soviet citizens working in scientific organizations and international exhibitions, fairs and congresses. Steps are outlined to protect railroad cargo using troops from Warsaw Pact states, prevent eavesdropping of telecommunications and detect and prevent foreign terrorist attacks on Czechoslovak and Soviet airplanes and anti-socialist interruption of international trucking lines. Special mention is made of multiple international transportation organizations that need to be monitored. Information-sharing procedures are agreed to for commercial and industrial firms, banks, scientific centers and international scientific organizations.

Both parties discuss the detection of and preparation for a surprise nuclear rocket attack by the USA on socialist countries, the intentions of the main hostile countries- the USA, other NATO countries, the People’s Republic of China- and cooperation to fight ideological diversion from hostile countries and emigrant populations. The two also agree to economic, tourism and cultural exchanges.

The parties agree to exchange information regarding the assurance of safety in civil aviation and the prevention of terrorist and other hostile acts. Plans are laid to coordinate steps for ensuring safety in airports in the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic that are open for international flights and for flights between the two countries. All parties agree to exchange information on international, scientific and technical themes which interest the parties and raise the safety level of civil aviation transport.

This agreement acknowledges the alleged use of post as a method used by subversives to act against the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union. Both parties agree to exchange information after evaluating the effectiveness of their work in this area and plan to prolong the existing cooperative agreement.

The two parties set forth their joint security strategy to manage perceived threats to state authority from the summer of 1978 through 1980. They agree to work with broadcast stations, including Radio Free Europe, to ensure they are not subversive stations and to use Czechoslovak students as agents against subversive radio stations. The parties highlight the importance of fighting Zionist and Trotskyist organizations, and make plans to cooperate to infiltrate organizations, including Jewish religious groups, that may have been infiltrated by these organizations. KGB and Czechoslovak security officials pledge to cooperate in monitoring and infiltrating international communist groups and reactionary church groups, including some associated with the Vatican, in order to detect and foil potential upcoming actions against the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries. Foreign religious groups active in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, such as Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh-day Adventists, are mentioned as potentially anti-state. Both parties agree to cooperate in order to frustrate attempts by anti-socialist parties in Czechoslovak to connect with anti-state dissidents in the Soviet Union and share information on new forms of fighting actions of anti-socialist individuals. To combat ideological diversion, the parties decide to promote scientific and cultural exchanges between the two countries. The Soviet and Czechoslovak delegates decide to implement counter-intelligence and anti-ideological diversion measures at prominent international events such as the 1980 Summer (Moscow) and Winter (Lake Placid) Olympic Games and international film festivals, exhibitions and fairs to be held in the Soviet Union. Both parties agree to monitor extremist and terrorist groups, youth organizations in East Germany, France, England and the United States and Kurdish students studying in Europe.

Annual review presented by V.V. Fedorchuk, chairman of the KGB in the Ukrainian SSR, summarizes the main successes, failures, and future priorities of the KGB in 1971.