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Documents

August 27, 1957

Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-2-57, 'The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China'

Analysts at the CIA write that "the National Government remains politically stable and the economy of Taiwan continues gradually to improve. The military establishment is growing stronger, but Nationalist forces alone could not defend their territories against a full-scale Chinese Communist attack."

April 9, 1957

Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-57, 'Likelihood of Military Action by the Government of the Republic of China'

Analysts at the CIA conclude that "the Chinese Nationalists are very unlikely to launch an invasion or, in the absence of Chinese Communist provocation, to initiate ether major military action against the mainland in the next year or so."

October 9, 1956

National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-56, 'The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China'

This National Intelligence Estimate concludes that "the Government of the Republic of China continues to exercise firm political control on Taiwan. With US assistance, an expanding economy has been maintained and the strength of the armed forces has been increased. At the same time, however, the international position of the National Government has declined, causing an increased feeling of insecurity and concern for the future."

January 1985

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'The Political Succession on Taiwan: An Intelligence Assessment'

The CIA's Office of East Asian Analysis concludes that "Chiang Ching-kuo is likely to be succeeded by a collegial, technocratic leadership governing in a somewhat less authoritarian style. The immediate succession will be dominated by a collegium of older mainlanders and is expected to go smoothly. Differences within this group over internal or foreign policy issues are unlikely to trigger a major power struggle."

This document has been review and declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency on at least two separate occasions. The above version was approved for release on January 20, 2010. An alternative version, with different material withheld, was approved for release on May 12, 2011.

June 3, 1985

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Taiwan: Maneuvering for the Succession'

The CIA assesses rumors of an impending government reorganization on Taiwan in light of President Chiang Ching-kuo's declining health.

July 7, 1977

Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Intelligence Estimate on Reaction to Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China'

Brzezinski outlines the conditions under which the Carter administration would move to recognize the PRC. They include both that the US would cease to recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan, but that the people of Taiwan would still be able to live in peace and maintain a prosperous economy.

August 27, 1957

National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-2-57, 'The Prospects for the Government of the Republic of China (Advance Conclusions)'

A CIA estimate of the strengths, weaknesses, and prospects of the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan, with particular reference to its staying power. The declassified portion of this report includes only the report's summary and conclusions.

July 1986

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Taiwan: Looking Toward December Elections: An Intelligence Assessment'

A report on Kuomintang efforts for the upcoming national election in Taiwan and the individuals surrounding Chiang Ching-kuo.

December 18, 1985

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Taiwan's Provincial Elections: Clearing the Way for Change'

A CIA assessment on the likely political and personnel outcomes of the Kuomintang's recent electoral victories.

January 1985

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'The Political Succession on Taiwan: An Intelligence Assessment'

The CIA's Office of East Asian Analysis concludes that "Chiang Ching-kuo is likely to be succeeded by a collegial, technocratic leadership governing in a somewhat less authoritarian style. The immediate succession will be dominated by a collegium of older mainlanders and is expected to go smoothly. Differences within this group over internal or foreign policy issues are unlikely to trigger a major power struggle."

This document has been review and declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency on at least two separate occasions. The above version was approved for release on May 12, 2011. An alternative version, with different material withheld, was approved for release on January 20, 2010.

Pagination