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Documents

January 9, 1962

Hungarian Embassy in Havana (Beck), Report on Deputy Foreign Minister Péter Mód’s talks with political leaders in Cuba

Ambassador János Beck reports on Foreign Minister Péter Mód’s visit to Cuba, and with whom he met. The report is divided among four different official meetings: Foreign Minister Raul Roa, Prime Minister Fidel Castro, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI). Beck summarizes each meeting separately. Topics include Cuba’s expectation of a US invasion and the US’s current clandestine activities, Organization of American States (OAS) and its use as a political tool in US-Latin American relations, Sino-Soviet relations, socialist unity and the importance of Soviet trade, Cuba’s perceived Soviet military advantage over the US, and the Communist Party’s development/popularity in Cuba. Many of these topics appear in various meetings outlined in the report.

May 25, 1965

Memorandum of Conversation between Senior Cuban Communist Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCz) official Vladimir Koucky, Prague, 25 May 1965

Rodriguez met with Koucky to clarify misunderstandings which could possibly arise because the reasons were not explained for Cuba’s positions on issues of the international communist movement, and for speeches and statements of some leading Cuban comrade.

November 5, 1962

Memorandum of Conversation, A.I. Mikoyan with Osvaldo Dorticos, Ernesto Guevara, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez

Alekseev and Mikoyan discuss the nature of UN inspections in Cuba with Cuban leadership. Cuban leadership discusses what they feel is a Soviet concession to the US, thereby weakening the international socialist movement.

November 5, 1962

Conversation between the Cuban Leadership and Mikoyan

During Mikoyan's visit to Cuba, the Cuban leadership explains its position following the Missile Crisis. Fidel Casto suggests that, while the Cuban leadership still believes that the Soviet Union is sincere in its desire to protect the Cuban Revolution, mistakes had been made during the crisis. The Soviet decision to withdraw the weapons should was based on the exchanges between the Soviet leadership and US President John F. Kennedy, not on the previous agreements between the USSR and Cuba. Castro suggests that the USSR could chose to go back on its security guarantees to Cuba in order to safeguard the peace, but that the Cubans will resist American agression nevertheless. The document only contains the Cuban responses to Mikoyan, without the Soviet leader's answers.