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Documents

March 6, 1962

Resolution of the 186th Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia of March 6, 1962, 'Preparation of Czechoslovak Delegation and Proposal to be Sent to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament'

A record of the conclusions of the 186th meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which met on March 6, 1962.  The attachment includes the initial instructions for the Czechoslovak delegations to the first meeting of ENDC. The document testifies to the strong preoccupation with West Germany’s re-armament, and the possibility of West Germany nuclear-weapon acquisition. Czechoslovakia travelled to Geneva with a goal of avoiding this outcome at any cost. Although the document offers a broad overview of the “lay of the land” ahead of the first meeting of ENDC, it is the focus on West Germany that is the most obvious here

November 29, 1962

Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United States (Dr. Miloslav Ruzek), Report on Anastas Mikoyan’s Conversations in Washington

The report details Mikoyan's talks with President John F. Kennedy in Washington D.C. Among the topics of discussion were questions of hemispheres of influence, whether the Soviet Union promoted a revolution against the USA in Cuba, and whether Castro was made an enemy of the USA or was one from the beginning. Conduct of both nations with regards to the Cuban question is discussed at length, ranging from whether U.S. was correct in acting against a perceived threat to security, the conduct of the Cuban people, the extent of Soviet involvement in Cuba, and what military hardware would be left in Cuba after the removal of the nuclear missile bases.

October 30, 1962

Minutes of Conversation between the Delegations of the CPCz and the CPSU, The Kremlin (excerpt)

In this conversation between Khrushchev and Novotny, Khrushchev used exceptionally candid language to defend his handling of the superpower confrontation, what he described as “six days which shook the world.” While well aware that many fellow communists (including the Chinese and Cubans) regarded his agreement under pressure from US President John F. Kennedy to remove the missiles as a surrender to the imperialists, Khrushchev stoutly defended his action as not only a necessary measure to avoid a catastrophic nuclear war, but actually a victory. Khrushchev bluntly criticized Fidel Castro for failing to comprehend the true nature of war in the thermonuclear age and, that at the height of the crisis, he had suggested in a letter to Khrushchev that the Soviets should be the first to use nuclear weapons, striking the United States should it attack Cuba, even though this would lead promptly to a global war.

January 20, 1965

Minutes of the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact Member States, Warsaw

(Excerpts) Minutes of discussions of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee concerning non-proliferation. The Romanian delegation argues against a joint declaration of the Warsaw Pact on non-proliferation for fear that it might be used against China. The other delegations argue that a joint declaration is necessary in order to prevent the creation of the Multilaterall Nuclear Force proposed by NATO.