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February 21, 1963

Memorandum from JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor to the Secretary of Defense, 'Deployment of POLARIS Submarines to the Mediterranean'

Consistent with the concerns about target coverage, the plan for Polaris patrols required the presence of at least one submarine in the Mediterranean. The overlapping patrols would begin when the U.S.S. Sam Houston entered the Mediterranean on March 28, followed by the U.S.S. John Marshall on April 10, and the U.S.S. Ethan Allen on 1 June. The Sam Houston could make a port call in Turkey, but the stopover had to occur when another submarine was in the Mediterranean. Taylor recommended the port of Glock as the site of a two-day visit, one day for a visit by officials and the second for a “daylight indoctrination cruise by designated observers.” The latter would be barred from sensitive “spaces” used for communications and nuclear propulsion.

January 10, 1963

Memorandum from Maxwell D. Taylor for the Secretary of Defense [Robert McNamara], 'Withdrawal of Italian and Turkish JUPITERs'

Taylor forwarded to McNamara the views of USCINCEUR, CINCLANT, and the DSTP on targeting and submarine deployment issues. According to CINCLANT Admiral Dennison, it was feasible to deploy up to three Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean. They could regain the same “operating efficiency” that they had achieved in their previous Norwegian Sea deployment. In Lemnitzer’s absence, General Lauris Norstad, who was departing as CINCEUR, opposed the withdrawal of the Jupiters as “weakening our nuclear capability” by reducing target coverage and by “destroying” the Jupiter’s “psychological” impact. DSTP General Power was also concerned about target coverage but did not foresee “basic problems as long as Free World missiles are targeted as an integrated package.”

December 24, 1962

Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS, for Discussion with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 26 December [1962]: 'Planning Requirements Resulting from the Nassau Pact and the JUPITER Decision'

JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor was aware of Kennedy’s Jupiter decision, but it is not clear when the other Chiefs learned of the “closely held decisions.” This paper, approved by General Paul S. Emrick, director of Plans and Policy for the Joint Staff, gave an overall look at the “planning requirements” necessitated by the Jupiter decision and the recent Nassau conference between President Kennedy and UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. Among the issues presented by the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles were retargeting requirements, Sergeant missiles for Italy, the number of Polaris submarines patrolling the Mediterranean and their basing, and the speeding up of F-104G deliveries to Turkey.

November 7, 1953

Letter, General Maxwell D. Taylor to Sohn Won-Wil, Minister of National Defense of ROK

General Taylor requests housing and office space for C. Tyler Wood, Economic Coordinator for Korea.

February 3, 1954

Letter, General Maxwell D. Taylor to Minister of Foreign Affairs Byeon Yeong-tae

General Maxwell D.Taylor writes that he has forwarded Pyun [Byeon]'s letter regarding the application of Korean law to the soldiers of the Eighth United States Army to the Commander in chief of the United Nations Command.

February 17, 1954

Letter, General Maxwell D. Taylor to Minister of Foreign Affairs Byeon Yeong-tae

General Maxwell D. Taylor, on behalf of General Hull, reports that the United Nations Command has no jurisdictions over North Korean ex- prisoners of war who choose to proceed to a neutral country.

May 11, 1954

Letter, General Maxwell D. Taylor to Baek Du-jin, the Prime Minister of ROK

General Maxwell D. Taylor suggests cooperative efforts between the ROK National Police and the Eighth United States Army to halt black market activities.

December 1954

Message, President Syngman Rhee to General Taylor and his forces

In this Christmas Message, President Rhee addresses General Taylor and the US Forces. He praises the US troops for their victory against the communist aggression during the Korean War. Rhee recognizes America for continuing to “defend human liberty” not only in Korea but in all of Asia. Rhee ends the message with the goal of creating a “free, united, and democratic” Korea.