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Documents

March 1, 1965

Statement of Raul Castro Ruz Pertaining to Cuba’s Minister of Industry, Ernesto "Che" Guevara

In a conversation between Kliszko and Raul Castro, a referral was made to the position assumed by the Minister of Industry in Cuba, Ernesto Guevara, at the economic seminar of Afro-Asian countries in Algeria in February 1965. Castro stated that he was not prepared to discuss the essence of the issue, e.g. the extent of aid from socialist countries to developing countries, but he felt Guevara's comments were extreme and out-of-place at the seminar.

March 25, 1965

Conversation between Raul Castro Ruz, and a Member of the Polish Politburo, Zenon Kliszko

The conversation between Castro and Gomulka took place on the initiative of Castro. Parties discussed the following topics: (1) relations between the UPSR and the PUWP, (2) the issue of the legalization of the Cuban Revolution, (3) the Situation in Vietnam, (4) Cuba and the Current Situation in Latin America, (5) the position of the PUWP with regard to the conference of 81 parties, and (6) the attitude of the socialist camp towards Cuba.

March 22, 1965

Conversation between Raul Castro Ruz, and a member of the Polish Politburo, Cde. Zenon Kliszko

During a trip from Orneta to Katowice, Raul Castro and Zenon Kliszko had conversation on the following topics: (1) assessment of the position of the Italian Communist Party, (2)assessment of the position of the Romanian Workers’ Party, (3) the UPSR and other Communist Parties in Asia, and (4) the Matter of a Former Member of the National Leadership UPSR – J. Ordoqui. For the Polish side, the program of the Italian Communist Party is not clear, particularly with regard to the question of establishing a uniform workers’ party.

March 20, 1965

Minutes of Conversation between Cuban Defense Minister Raúl Castro and Polish Leader Władysław Gomułka, Warsaw, 20 March 1965

During his visit in Poland, Castro relates Cuba's position on a conversation taken place in Moscow and why it may be of interest to the Cubans. Gomulka raises the issue of the missiles. In Gomulka's opinion two factors were decisive: contradictions which arose within the socialist camp and the policy which was conducted by Khrushchev. Gomulka is assured that US is capable of conducting a war with Cuba by way of conventional weapons, it does not have to use nuclear weapons. It is clear that the socialist camp and the USSR cannot defend Cuba in any other way but by using nuclear weapons. If a conflict is meant to be, then it will be a nuclear conflict, there is no other way. Gomulka further raises a question whether to go into a nuclear war or not. Castro disagrees with a manner nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Cuba by Soviets. Khruchshev explained that he did not have time. Per Gomulka, Khrushchev conducted a policy which was not thought-out and which was all-out. Gomulka further discusses his talks with Chinese and Vietnamese comrades re: nuclear weapons issue.

July 9, 1963

Cable from Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, The Hague, to Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 9 July 1963

Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns responds to Boissevain's two cables regarding Castro's proposal for an agreement with the United States. Luns is wary of Castro's request to use the Boissevain as the mediator, and urges caution and reserve. He asks Boissevain to keep him updated of any future developments, should Castro make a future proposal.

December 13, 1962

Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 13 December 1962

Boissevain reports on the ongoing cold war between the United States and Cuba and its effect on Cuban society. Cuba's national airport is maintaining service to Mexico city but is marked by continued delays and cancellations. Trade is limited only to Cuban and Spanish ships flying under the flag of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Kennedy's latest address heralds more hardship for the Cuban people. The letter concludes with the prospect of Japan buying Cuban sugar based on a meeting with Japanese Ambassador to Cuba Rokuzo Yaguchi.

November 17, 1967

Operation MANUEL: Origins, Development and Aims

Comrade Josef Houska submits a document concerning issues related to cooperation with the Cuban intelligence service especially the Operation MANUEL to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Operational MANUEL started in 1962 when the Cuban intelligence asked the Czechoslovak resident in Havana to arrange a transit through Prague for Venezuelan nationals who underwent guerrilla training in Cuba. In 1964 talks were held between Cuban and Czechoslovak intelligence services but no formal agreement of the tasks and responsibilities was concluded between the two. The Soviet government was informed about the Operation MANUEL and stated its agreement with the project. Houska says that the main objective of the operation is the education and training of revolutionary cadres from Latin America and the organization of combat groups. Participants of the operation were not confined to cadres from among the ranks of communist parties but also included members from various nationalist and anti-American groupings. The routes of individual participants in the operation were determined by the Cuban intelligence service who mainly directed the Operation MANUEL. Houska says problems that arisen in the course of the operation were solved in collaboration with Cuban and the Soviet authorities. The document cautioned about counter-espionage institutions' increasing interests in the operation and the fact that the US intelligence service agents were among the operation participants. Houska says refusal to offer assistance would have a negative impact on Cuba and Czechoslovakia would lose control over the operation.

January 11, 1967

Cooperation between the Czechoslovak and Cuban Intelligence Services

The report introduces Czechoslovak's assistance in the Operation MANUEL after the isolation of socialist Castro regime. Cuba looked for alternative routes in Europe in order to promote and influence the revolutionary movement in Latin America. Czechoslovakia assistance in the operation is of a strictly technical nature and its intelligence service is doing its utmost to protect the interests of the country by securing all technical matters. The report says that terminating the assistance was not possible for both practical and political reasons-- all direct flights between Czechoslovakia and Cuba would be suspended and a drastic cooling off of relations between two governments. Czechoslovak's refusal in assisting the operation would be interpreted as a political decision to suspend assistance to the national liberation movement in Latin America countries. However, the reports says that the assistance of Czechoslovak intelligence service to the operation is in no way amounts to agreeing with its political content and constitutes a minor aspect of intelligence work. The Soviet intelligence was also involved in organizing the operation in Moscow and offered assistance to its Cuban counterpart.