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October 19, 1964

J.S. Mehta, 'China's Bomb and Its Consequences on her Nuclear and Political Strategy'

Analysis of the recent Chinese nuclear weapon test and it's strategic implications for China's diplomatic and military policies.

November 24, 1964

K.R. Narayanan, 'India and the Chinese Bomb'

K.R. Narayanan, Director of China Division at Ministry of External Affairs, writes that the explosion of the first nuclear bomb by China will alter the political balance of Asia and the world and development of nuclear weapons by India can be justified and beneficial for the country and the international system as well.

August 2, 1963

Letter, Homi Bhabhi to Jawaharlal Nehru

Homi Bhabha writes to Prime Minister Nehru to convey that the Chinese nuclear test will be of no military significance and Chinese possession of a few bombs will not make any difference to the military situation. In order to counter the Chinese bomb’s psychological-political impact, Dr. Bhabha argues that India needs to be in a position to produce the bomb within few months.

August 30, 1965

Note, P. S. Ratnam, 'Starred Question No. 8196 for 30-8-1965 in Lok Sabha'

The Indian Ministry of Defense evaluated the impact of the Chinese nuclear explosion and reported that the more immediate and real Chinese threat comes from conventional arms. The Chinese nuclear test poses a long term military threat, but its strategic implication and India's consequent actions require constant review.

January 9, 1966

Secret Letter from the Indian Embassy in Beijing to the Foreign Secretary in New Delhi, No. PEK/104/66, 'China and the West'

The Indian Embassy in Beijing sent a letter to the Indian Foreign Secretary to prove an analysis of Chinese foreign policy, such as Beijing's relationship with the West and the impact of Sino-Soviet split on Chinese foreign relations.

May 14, 1964

Research Memorandum INR-16 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Indian Nuclear Weapons Development'

An intelligence report that the fuel core of the Canadian-Indian Reactor (CIR) at Trombay was being changed every six months raised questions about India’s nuclear objectives: a six-month period was quite short for “normal research reactor operations,” but it was the optimum time for using the CIR’s spent fuel for producing weapons grade plutonium. According to INR, India had taken the “first deliberate decision in the series leading to a nuclear weapon,” which was to have “available, on demand, unsafeguarded weapons-grade plutonium or, at the least, the capacity to produce it.”

April 11, 1968

Note from Ambassador M.A. Husain, 'NPT and Security Assurances'

Indian objections to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

April 4, 1968

Telegram from Ambassador M.A. Husain, 'Non-Proliferation Treaty and Brief Answers'

Instructions for the United Nations General Assembly discussion of the Report of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

April 20, 1968

Telegram from P.N. Haksar, 'Instructions to India’s Representative to UN on Non-Proliferation Treaty'

Details on India's position toward the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

May 30, 1967

Draft Reply to Starred Question No. 341 on L.K. Jha, Secretary to the Prime Minister

Haksar summarizes Shri L.K. Jha and Foreign Secretary, Shri C.S Jha's diplomatic activities and exchanges on nuclear security for non-aligned and non-nuclear-weapon states.

Pagination