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Documents

January 24, 1973

Memorandum from Ronald I Spiers to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 'US – French Military Cooperation: Status Report'

Description of weapons safety talks between US and French nuclear weapons technicians. The US team is impressed that the French employ safety tactics that are on par with US practices. A third talk would help cover any remaining issues related to safety, and would also be a time to discuss underground nuclear testing by the French. The French continue to press for more technical assistance for their missile program.

April 23, 1975

Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Henry A. Kissinger, 'Meeting with French on Missile Cooperation'

Description of a meeting between Sonnenfeldt and Jean-Laurens Delpech, French Minister of Armaments. Delpech was concerned about the slow response to the French requests for further nuclear assistance. Sonnenfeldt explained that they were awaiting a detailed technical analysis of the requests and limitations of US policy. Delpech also raised the issues of French use of the Nevada Test Site. Attached to the memorandum is a handwritten letter by Delpech to National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft.

June 23, 1975

President Ford to Secretary of Defense, 'Missile Cooperation with France'

President Ford authorizes providing additional ballistic missile assistance to France. The assistance was extended to cover new French missiles, penetrative aid technology, and intelligence information about Soviet systems and potential French vulnerabilities to attack.

February 3, 1973

Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Henry A. Kissinger, 'Missile Assistance to France -- New NSSM'

Laird has made four practical recommendations on how to proceed with French/US nuclear relations. Laird's four points involve information on nuclear effects simulator types, the sale of small simulators, general hardening technology, and/or ABM intelligence. The US has given as much technical assistance as possible thus far within the current guidelines, and it is up to the president to address the issues related to changes in policy to continue the assistance. He is urged to consider especially the impact such aid would have on relations with the UK and the Soviet Union, but we should not cut off all assistance while these issues are being addressed.

June 23, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 299, 'Cooperation with France'

Directive from President Ford expanding nuclear safety cooperation with France to include assistance with improving the safety of underground testing. This would involve only information sharing, and "no French nuclear explosive devices of any type may be accepted for test by the US."

April 19, 1973

Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Henry A. Kissinger, 'US Assistance to the French Missile Program'

Sonnenfeldt worries about documents concerning French nuclear aid passing through so many hands that their security is at risk; Kissinger is to tell Richardson to be as discrete as possible. Richardson has recently sent Galley information on the new areas of U.S. aid to France and of the talks that will be used to implement such aid. He informs Galley that we are willing to go ahead on the four areas recommended by his predecessor Laird: information on nuclear effects simulators; sales of small simulators; hardening technology; and ABM intelligence.

October 9, 1975

Memorandum for the Record by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 'Conversation with Delpech'

Description of conversation between Sonnenfeldt and Jean-Laurens Delpech, French Minister of Armaments, on October 7. Delpech asked about the status of US nuclear assistance to France. He specifically asks about French requests for testing of reentry vehicle material in US nuclear tests, the importation of advanced computers, technical assistance with booster trigger design, and information on submarine vulnerabilities. Other topics included the French sale of helicopters to China and the potential sale of ECM equipment to Arab states.

June 27, 1973

Memorandum from Richard T. Kennedy to William G. Hyland, 'Jobert Meeting: US-French Nuclear Cooperation'

Kennedy sends Hyland a review of the current status and future prospects of French aid as drafted by Denis Clift, as well as a summary of Dr. Foster’s most recent meeting with the French where they discussed new areas of cooperation. It also discusses the advantages if the French were to implement a missile warning system, and how French assistance might be a useful bargaining tool for the U.S. especially when it comes to improving French-European relations.

August 1, 1975

Memorandum of Conversation, 'Economic Policy/Cyprus; French Nuclear Programs; Energy'

Transcript of a conversation between President Ford, Henry Kissinger, and French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. The conversation opens with a discussion of economic policy and the embargo on northern Cyprus following the 1974 Turkish invasion. Giscard then asks about the slow progress of US technical assistance to the French nuclear program. Lastly they discuss energy and oil prices.

July 26, 1973

Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, 'Supplementary Checklist for Meeting with French Defense Minister'

When meeting with the French Defense Minister Kissinger is to stress how much the U.S. has supported France despite negative views on such assistance by European countries and by Congress, and that this president could not be more sympathetic to French needs. The NSSM 175 review of the policy towards France is attached, and it reviews previous aid given to France, complications that arouse due to restrictions on such aid, and what the French are now requesting. It extensively reviews missile assistance, nuclear safety exchanges, and other French aid issues. The second part addresses the issue in light of U.S.-European political relations, and the effect any such aid might have on such relations. It notes that future French aid might be given to hardening technologies, and to aiding in Poseidon information, and to underground nuclear testing, and it weighs the pros and cons in the eyes of the British. It concludes with an overview of how such aid could be in the interest (or not) of the U.S., but several parts of the last part of this document are blacked-out, marked for secrecy.

Pagination