A summary of points made during U.S.-Dutch discussions related to TNF. The Dutch will not oppose NATO’s plans, but only postpone its own decision. However, the Dutch will continue to register their reservations regarding the scope of modernization. The U.S. disagrees with a Dutch proposal to link TNF modernization with SALT II ratification and states that the Dutch should refrain from critiquing TNF modernization since it is postponing its own decision on the issue.

An outline of key points made in each of several meetings over a one week period. Includes the following: the Netherlands and Belgium will try to decide as late and as simultaneously as possible on TNF modernization; Italy will try to help the Dutch influence FRG and U.S. positions; U.K. is committed to helping Dutch cabinet remain intact; FRG does not oppose the Dutch move to delay their decision but also believes Netherlands should not try to block NATO decision-making.

Participants in the meeting included President Carter, Minister Vance, MP van Agt and also Min. Van der Klaauw, Zbigniew Brzezinksi, David Aaron, Tammenoms Bakker, and Merckelbach. Conversation revolves around TNF modernization and arms negotiation with the Soviet Union. Both parties discuss domestic difficulties shaping how these issues are presented and pursued.

Memorandum of an extended one-on-one conversation between the Dutch and Italian Prime Ministers focusing in particular on a description of the reasons for Italy's strong support for TNF modernization as outlined by Cossiga.

A conversation between Dutch Defense Minister Scholten and US Deputy National Security Advisor Aaron in which Aaron outlines and defends the United States' views of the Netherlands' position on TNF modernization.

Memorandum of a conversation between Brandt and Brezhnev. Among other things, Brezhnev focused on the increased hostility between members of the international community. He pointed to debate over missiles in Europe as an example of that tension.

Willy Brandt writes to Leonid Brezhnev about issues plaguing arms control negotiations between the US and the USSR. Particular attention is paid to the way the US Presidential election has hampered progress.

A memo to Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi from his Diplomatic Counselor Antonio Badini. Badini warns against the latest Soviet proposals. He suggests that agreeing to them without making any concessions regarding the deployment of American missiles would be tantamount to the realization of a long term goal of the Soviet Union, i.e. the decoupling between the Western European and the American defense system. […] He writes that the Soviet proposals “can be taken as a possible basis for an agreement is surprising. We can
only hope that this fact does not imply that, from a political and psychological standpoint, the process of Finlandization of Europe is far more advanced than we believed thus far.”

This memo expresses the regrets of the Italian government for the failure of the INF negotiations. According to the memo, Italy “committed itself to the normalization of the East – West dialogue” and proposed resuming Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks.

This memo to Prime Minister Bettino Craxi argues against the merging of the INF and START negotiations proposed by the Finnish government and backed by Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau. The memo suggests that the proposal could jeopardize the Geneva talks and harm European interests.