Recommendations adopted by the National Security Council at the suggestion of the Psychological Strategy Board on covert actions to be undertaken in the Soviet Satellite States. Authorized by the National Security Council, NSC 158 envisaged aggressive psychological warfare to exploit and heighten the unrest behind the Iron Curtain. The policy was endorsed by President Eisenhower on June 26, 1953.

Shelepin sets out a plan to discredit CIA chief Allen Dulles.

In this entry, Mitrokhin draws upon KGB sources to describe Yuri Velichkov Bagomil Stanimerov (b.1941), a Bulgarian citizen who graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations in 1968. Stanimerov was recruited by the Bulgarian branch of the KGB in 1970, and became a resident of Sweden in 1972. Mitrokhin’s summary of KGB documents indicates that in April 1974, CIA officer Huey Walter “Hearst” made Stanimerov an offer in the name of the National Security Council. While Stanimerov refused the offer, he told Hearst that he would continue collaborating with him. Stanimerov subsequently traveled to many foreign countries, but the Americans no longer expressed interest in him.

In 1975, Stanimerov was sent to work in the Bulgarian embassy in the United States. The Americans began to train Stanimerov as a spy and tried to ideologically convert him. The Mitrokhin account posits that the KGB gave Stanimerov instructions in case the latter succeeded in infiltrating the CIA. In 1978, the KGB received information regarding the fact that Stanimerov was being investigated by the FBI for his ties with the Bulgarian intelligence services

BCP CC’s First Secretary, Vulko Chervenkov, approves Interior Minister Georgi Tsankov’s recommendations for improving the performance of the intelligence and counter-intelligence services.

In order to combat the perceived threat of hostile, foreign special agents operating on Soviet and Czechoslovak territory, the two parties agree to centralize their efforts to ensure the security of the two countries. In order to counter the special agents of capitalist countries and preserve the security of state secrets, the two parties decide to exchange counter-intelligence activity on subversive activity in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and other socialist states. The two parties agree to focus on citizens of capitalist countries such as the United States, England, France and other NATO member nations and citizens of the People's Republic of China and the German Democratic Republic in their intelligence efforts. Specifically, the parties agree to monitor citizens of these countries working in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and people working for representative agencies of the aforementioned countries. Also being monitored are Czechoslovak and Soviet citizens returning from capitalist or developing countries, corresponding with people in capitalist countries and having an address in a capitalist country. In conclusion, the KGB and Czechoslovak Interior Ministry agree to regular, bilateral exchange of information on hostile residents of both countries who are thought to be in the employ of the special intelligence services of NATO countries and China.