This document has two parts. The first is a memo addressed to the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, that focuses on the increasing immediacy of the Pakistan nuclear situation. The second part is a telegram that details the growing pushback from U.S. political leaders after the Carter Administration decided to invoke the Symington Amendment towards Pakistan.

This is a memo authored by Thomas Pickering (Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs) and Harold Saunders (Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs) pertaining to Pakistan's nuclear program. In the piece, Pickering and Saunders advocate a policy of the U.S. sending financial aid and arms to Pakistan, in order to assuage the country's security fears. Warren Christopher’s assistant Steve Oxman thought Pickering and Saunders were "dreaming" if they imagined the package would look like anything other than a bribe for Pakistan and if they believed Congress would permit such a package in the face of persuasive evidence of Pakistani nuclear ambitions

This is an interagency Policy Review Committee paper prepared for Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher. The piece explores possible short and long-term strategies for dealing with Pakistan's nuclear ambitions.

Intelligence reports about recent visits to Beijing by Pakistani defense and science officials raised questions whether China was or would be providing nuclear aid to Pakistan. The latter was already developing close relations with China, a matter which was of great concern to U.S. policymakers, but INR analyst Thomas Thornton concluded that Pakistan was highly unlikely to seek a significant degree of Chinese nuclear assistance.

Only months after China’s first nuclear test in October 1964, INR looked into whether Beijing would help other nations get the bomb.

This CIA report on India, “India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States,” has comparatively few excisions. It discusses in some detail Indian efforts to support its nuclear power and nuclear weapons development program by circumventing international controls through purchases of sensitive technology on “gray markets.” The report depicts a “growing crisis in the Indian civil nuclear program,” which combined with meeting nuclear weapons development goals, was forcing India to expand imports of nuclear-related supplies. The purchasing activities posed a “direct challenge to longstanding US efforts to work with other supplier nations … for tighter export controls.”

Secretary of State George Shultz’s letter to President Reagan covering the history of US responses to Pakistan’s nuclear program and future courses of action by the United States. While each option will rescind United States’ aid money, the Secretary details three different ways to go about it, with varying political implications for each.

Despite the concerns about sharing the ALR-69 radar warning receiver with Pakistan for fear of it falling into Chinese hands, CIA officials argue that failure to meet Pakistani demands would lead to a “serious blow to U.S. worldwide nonproliferation efforts.”

With delivery of U.S. F-16 fighter-bombers imminent, Pakistan threatens to refuse delivery unless the U.S. agrees to include the ALR-69 radar warning receiver for the aircraft. CIA analysts have concerns that including this sensitive radar technology in the delivery of the F-16s would enable China, a close military ally of Pakistan, to obtain and study the device.

A planned update of the Special National Intelligence Estimate 31-32/81 concluded that Pakistan’s nuclear program was continuing and new evidence suggested a “significant” Chinese role in the design of the weapons. Despite this new evidence, CIA estimates suggest that the required amount of fissile material for weapons production would not be available as early as had been predicted, and that a Pakistani nuclear test was not imminent.