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Documents

October 21, 1976

Cable, US Embassy Stockholm to the Secretary of State, 'North Korean Embassy Illegal Trafficking--Swedish Phase'

This cable describes extensive Swedish media coverage of illegal North Korean trafficking in both Sweden and other nordic countries and considers the factors influencing whether the North Korean Ambassador will be expelled by the Swedish government.

October 26, 1976

Cable, US Embassy Stockholm to the Secretary of State, 'Government Statements on Trafficking by North Korean Embassy Personnel'

This cable reports on Swedish press coverage of illegal alcohol, tobacco, and narcotics trafficking by North Korean diplomats as well as the broader implication of the trafficking disclosures for the Swedish-North Korean relationship.

October 30, 1976

The President's Daily Brief, October 30, 1976

A summary of the North Korean smuggling scandal in Scandinavia produced by the US intelligence community.

October 19, 1976

The President's Daily Brief, October 19, 1976

The CIA reports that Norway and Denmark have expelled North Korean diplomats for smuggling alcohol and tobacco.

July 15, 1965

Research Memorandum REU-25 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Attitudes of Selected Countries on Accession to a Soviet Co-sponsored Draft Agreement on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'

With a nuclear nonproliferation treaty under consideration in Washington, INR considered which countries were likely to sign on and why or why not. INR analysts, mistakenly as it turned out, believed it unlikely that the Soviet Union would be a co-sponsor of a treaty in part because of the “international climate” and also because Moscow and Washington differed on whether a treaty would recognize a “group capability.”

March 20, 1967

Research Memorandum REU-16 from George C. Denney, Jr., to the Secretary, 'Swedish Decision to Cut Military Spending Causes Defense Review, Reduces Likelihood of Nuclear Weapons Acquisition'

The Swedish government rejected Supreme Commander Torsten Rapp’s proposals to fund a nuclear weapons program. This INR report from March 1967 on proposed cuts in defense spending suggested that the possibility that Sweden would acquire nuclear weapons had grown even more remote.

July 28, 1966

Research Memorandum REU-52 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Nuclear Weapons Question Continues to Plague Swedish Government'

In 1966, Sweden's Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Torsten Rapp, sought funds to support planning to produce nuclear weapons.

August 28, 1963

Research Memorandum REU-56 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Sweden Still Faces Question of Acquiring Nuclear Weapons'

Based on the evidence, mainly various statements made by leading politicians, diplomats, and policymakers, INR experts concluded that most of the countries surveyed (Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Greece) were “relatively satisfied,” while only West Germany was “restive” to the extent that some of its officials were interested in a NATO or European nuclear force

June 4, 1957

Department of State Office of Intelligence Research, 'OIR Contribution to NIE 100-6-57: Nuclear Weapons Production by Fourth Countries – Likelihood and Consequences'

This lengthy report was State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research's contribution to the first National Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear proliferation, NIE 100-6-57. Written at a time when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were the only nuclear weapons states, the “Fourth Country” problem referred to the probability that some unspecified country, whether France or China, was likely to be the next nuclear weapons state. Enclosed with letter from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Division of Research for USSR and Western Europe, to Roger Mateson, 4 June 1957, Secret

June 11, 1976

George Vest to the Secretary of State, 'London Nuclear Suppliers Meeting'

This document provides an overview of the London Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting which included the addition of the five newest countries to the original seven. Most old and new members were receptive when Washington lobbied them to support a “long term and stable regime of restraint” on the export of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology. While the French were supportive of the moratorium proposal, the Germans were uncomfortable with it, not least because of the implications for their deal with Brazil.