Memorandum of a conversation with Yuri Andropov. He and Boleslaw Jaszczuk discuss Chinese influence military and economic influence in Vietnam, as well as Vietnam's opinion on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Finally he notes the poor communications technology in place in Southeast Asia.

Information on a Czechoslovak delegation to the DRV. The Czechoslovak delegation assess the Vietnamese situation and determine that the Vietnamese successes are overestimated while American strength and fighting potential are underestimated. The Czechoslovak and Vietnamese groups disagree on China, with the Czechoslovak delegation saying the Vietnamese are simply unable to take a stance against China because it would jeopardize the aid they are receiving.

A record of a North Vietnamese delegation to Moscow, which affirmed their belief that they would be able to defeat the Americans. They raise a request for additional supplies in 1967, and it is noted that China has continued to refuse to unite with the other socialist countries, which has complicated matters.

Conversation with First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Sverev, describing the Vietnamese attitude toward China as becoming colder. At the same time, printing of China's anti-Soviet propaganda has become more limited and the Vietnamese appear grateful for Soviet aid. Sverev also estimates that there are over 200,000 Chinese troops stationed in North Vietnam.

Soviet Ambassador Ilya Shcherbakov reported that Vietnamese officers lately seem defensive and not trusting, while emphasizing their autonomy. Also states that Ho Chi Minh was made to promise not to talk with the US or call for volunteers from socialist countries without first consulting the Chinese.

Telegram from the GDR ambassador to China, Bierbach, assesses the Chinese position in the Vietnam conflict. He states that China aims to exacerbate the conflict for it's own gain; by pushing theDRV to action in the South, it focuses its efforts in the North, with minimal risk of conflict with US troops. Specifically, Bierbach believes China is attempting to instigate a conflict between the US and the USSR.

Letter from East German Foreign Minister to members of the SED Politburo which contains parts of a report by a Soviet delegation headed by Ambassador Shcherbakov. The Vietnamese situation is discussed, and it is asserted that Vietnamese officials are to quick to listen to Chinese advisors. It is also noted that, while the American morale is decreasing, it will still be most difficult to bring about the second "Dien Bien Phu" they are looking for.

Polish official, Jerzy Michalowski, discusses the Vietnamese situation after meeting with several high ranking officials there. He asserts that the Vietnamese misguided in their belief that the US is not willing to fight a broadened war. He also notes that, although Vietnamese allies recognize this, they discourage Vietnam from opening negotiations.

Statement put forward by the DRV in a private meeting with American representatives: The US had to pull out completely from South Vietnam and other Indochinese countries by the end of 1971. The release of POWs and civilians captured during the war would be implemented simultaneously. The Americans had to stop supporting Thieu-Ky-Khiem (the three leaders of the government of South Vietnam), bear all responsibilities and pay compensation for all damages incurred in Vietnam. The US had to respect the 1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina and the 1965 Geneva Accords on Laos and stop all intervention in Indochina.

The two leaders talk about Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the situation in Europe.