

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Mr. W. Robert Pearson, et.al. Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Middle East Arms Control [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	07/03/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 293 - July 05, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Arms Control, Keywords: Arms Control, Middle East

Date Closed: 4/10/2009	OA/ID Number: 90020-011
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2003-0261-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENT~~ NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 3, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. ROBERT PEARSON
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL JOHN A. DUBIA
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. ANN LAVIN
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Energy

 (b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]

Central Intelligence Agency

COL GEORGE L. SUMRALL, JR.
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Middle East Arms
Control ~~(S)~~

A Deputies Committee meeting on Middle East arms control will be held on Friday, July 5, at 1:00 p.m. in the Situation Room. Attached are an agenda, issues paper for the meeting, and draft instructions for the upcoming Paris meeting. The Department of State will circulate directly other background materials as necessary. Please confirm attendance with the NSC Executive Secretary's office (202) 456-6534. ~~(S)~~

William F. Sittmann

for William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Issues Paper
Tab C Draft Instructions

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By JOE NARA, Date 04/10/2009

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~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Declassify on: OADR

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: July 5, 1991

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 1:00pm - 2:00pm

MIDDLE EAST ARMS CONTROL

Agenda

- I. Introduction Robert M. Gates
- II. Preview of the Paris meeting Reginald Bartholomew
- III. Discussion of Issues All Participants
 - A. Whether to subject vessels to notification procedures
 - B. How to define which missiles should be subject to notification and control
 - C. Whether to entertain any proposals to permit transfer of space launch vehicles
 - D. When and how to expand discussions beyond the participants in the Paris meeting
 - E. How to coordinate the Paris meeting with the G-7 Summit
- IV. Conclusion Robert M. Gates

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05c. Paper	Re: Arms Control for the Middle East: Remaining Issues before Paris (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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SCOPE PAPER FOR SUPPLIERS' MEETING:
PARIS, 8-9 JULY 1991

This paper lays out U.S. objectives, negotiating positions and fallbacks for the meeting of the Five in Paris, July 8-9.

I. Conventional Arms Transfers

A. Guidelines and Notifications

Guidelines and Notification Procedures

- o We will seek agreement on the U.S. text for both the conventional arms guidelines and notifications procedures (Tab A).
- o If we cannot get agreement on both guidelines and procedures, we will pursue separate agreement on whichever one we can get and will defer the other to an experts group which we will propose before the next plenary (see below).

Agreed Weapons List

- o We will propose that notifications be given for the following categories of weapons: tanks, armored combat vehicles, military aircraft and helicopters, anti-tank weapons, unmanned airbreathing vehicles, missiles, naval vessels and artillery.
- o The text of the agreed list is referred to in the Guidelines as "Technical Annex A" (Tab B).
- o Our initial position will be to seek agreement on all nine weapon categories along with the specific types of weapons associated with each category.
- o If we cannot get agreement on the complete U.S. list because of definitional issues, or because parties are willing to notify some types of weapons but not others in a particular category, we will aim to get broad agreement on the nine categories and will propose that the experts work out the details.
- o If we are unable to get agreement on all nine categories, we will seek to get a list that has group consensus, provided the group is willing to accept the list as incomplete and is committed to continuing work on the list in the experts group.

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- o We will take the position that all transfers of military items on the agreed list should be notified to avoid circumvention.

Production Capabilities

- o We will seek agreement to extend notification requirements to production assistance for end-items on the agreed equipment list, including
 - agreements on coproduction and codevelopment for items on the agreed list; and
 - transfers of full or partial assembly kits, complete (turnkey) production facilities, and production equipment specifically designated for production facilities for listed equipment.
- o If the group is unwilling to accept our language on production, our fallback will be to get broad agreement on including production-related items in the notifications and let the experts work out the details.

Pre-Notifications

- o We will press the group to accept pre-notifications to guarantee the maximum amount of leverage on undesirable transfers.
- o We will propose that notifications be given as soon as possible, but no later than 60 days prior to formal government approval of transfers. We will also take the position that final government approval for such transfers should take place before exports. This is to prevent situations in which shipments begin prior to final approval.
- o As a fallback, we will propose a 30 day pre-notification period.

B. Consultations

We envision two types of consultations, routine (plenary) and special.

Routine Consultations:

- o We will seek agreement to hold plenary sessions twice a year.

- o These meetings are intended:
 - to review arms transfers that had taken place since the previous plenary;
 - to consult and review procedures affecting notification regime; and
 - to review and revise guidelines and agreed lists of items subject to notification when necessary.
- o As a fallback, we will seek commitment to hold periodic plenary meetings.

Special Consultations:

- o Special consultations would be held at the request of any member of the suppliers group if it felt that a notified transfer by another group member is inconsistent with the guidelines governing such transfers.
- o Our position is that these consultations should be held prior to the transfers of the items being disputed, otherwise there is little purpose for the consultations.
- o We will also propose that special consultations be held before a member of the group introduces a new type of weapon not on the agreed list and not currently in the region.
- o We expect that the UK may take the position that notifications and consultations are useless without a common assessment of regional military capabilities. We will resist this and similar proposals. Our position will be that assessments of regional balances are implied in our evaluation of particular sales. Moreover, comparison of regional capabilities will only distract the group from restraining destabilizing transfers.

C. Geographical Scope

- o We will seek agreement to limit the geographical scope to the Middle East: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran.
- o If the other suppliers press for a global approach, we will propose that the Five take a regional focus

initially, with the promise to review expansion of the geographical scope in the future.

- o We will also point out that the U.S. supports the global approach proposed for the UN registry (see below).

D. Relationship to Recipients

- o We will encourage the five to talk to recipient states on the guidelines, procedures and policies of the suppliers group. For individual transfers, would expect the group to honor specific member requests to keep information shared with the group confidential.
- o We will propose that the Five consider the option of group demarches regarding the activities of a regional state.
- o We will also seek agreement that the Five will encourage recipients in bilateral diplomatic channels to acquire only those weapon systems needed for legitimate defensive purposes and to avoid acquiring destabilizing systems, such as surface-to-surface missiles.

E. Relationship to Other Suppliers

Expansion

- o We will recognize the desirability of active discussions with other suppliers, but will take the position that expansion of the suppliers group should be deferred for a reasonable period to see how things go with the arrangement reached among the five.
- o We will propose that the group encourage other supplier countries to adopt the guidelines of the Five, less the notifications requirements and consultations, as a matter of national policy.

UN Registry

- o We will reiterate U.S. support for PM Major's proposal for a UN registry as complementary to the U.S. initiative. We will note the distinctions between the UN registry concept (which is under UN auspices, has a global geoscope, and requires post-notification of transfers) and the supplier's group regime (which is limited to the Five, has a regional geoscope, and requires pre-notification of transfers).

- o If the French raise the idea of establishing a new sub-group in the Conference on Disarmament to examine the registry idea, we will encourage the group to consider the proposal. This could be the best way to involve other supplier countries in discussions on regional arms transfers.

Renegade Suppliers

- o Our ability to put pressure on renegades as a suppliers group will be an important measure of our success.
- o We will seek agreement to encourage the adherence of other world producers to the group's guidelines through bilateral demarches and joint communiques.

II. Missiles

General Position

- o We will seek agreement among the Five to support a ban on exports of all surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) to the region.
- o This proposal will include a commitment by the Five to modify national export policies in order to bring them into compliance with the goal of a regional SSM ban, which is an element of the President's Middle East Arms Control initiative.
- o Our language in the the Agreed List (Tab B), WMD Guidelines (Tab C) and Communique (Tab D) reflects our position on SSMs.
- o If the group are unwilling to accept a ban on the export of all SSMs, our fallback will be to get agreement on banning exports of SSMs exceeding some specified range to be worked out by the experts.
- o Fallback language follows.

Missile Language in Agreed List

- o Current language reads: "Missiles, including surface-to-air missiles, anti-ballistic missile missiles, air-to-surface missiles and air-to-air missiles. (Surface-to-surface ballistic missiles shall not be exported.)"

- o Our fallback is to drop the parenthetical clause and include surface-to-surface missiles in the body of the provision: "Missiles not subject to a regional ban or other international restrictions, including surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles, anti-ballistic missile missiles, air-to-surface missiles and air-to-air missiles."

Missile Language in WMD Guidelines

- o "Surface-to-surface missiles" appears several times in the text. Our fallback would require changing "surface-to-surface missile" to "surface-to-surface missiles exceeding a specified range."

Missile Lanugage in Communique

- o In paragraph on banning missile exports, our fallback would require changing "surface-to-surface missiles" to "surface-to-surface missiles exceeding a specified range."

III. WMD Related Exports

U.S. Policies on WMD Related Exports

- o We will distribute and explain summary of U.S. Guidelines for WMD-related exports.
- o We will ask the other suppliers to describe and explain their export guidelines for WMD.

WMD Guidelines

- o We will seek agreement on general WMD guidelines (Tab C) that would have the effect of harmonizing exports of the Five, without creating a new detailed list that could conflict with existing regulations governing such transfers.
- o If we are unable to get agreement on the general guidelines, we will seek commitment from the group to develop such guidelines. The experts could work on a draft before the next plenary session.

IV. Arms Control in Middle East

- o We will explain the six elements of the President's initiative.
- o We will attempt to gain agreement among the Five to support the steps proposed in the initiative in a communique (Tab D) or press conference.
- o We will also seek agreement among members of the Five to convey in bilateral channels their support for the initiative with regional states and to encourage those states to support it.
- o As a fallback, we will press the Five to endorse publicly the regional goals of the initiative -- the ultimate elimination of WMD and SSMS from the Middle East.

V. Next Steps

- o We will propose that a group of experts meet in September to resolve outstanding issues.
- o We will seek agreement to hold the next plenary in October in London.

Tab A

Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers

The People's Republic of China, the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America,

mindful of the dangers to peace and stability in the Middle East posed by the proliferation of weapons beyond levels needed for defensive purposes,

reaffirming their commitment to seek effective measures of non-proliferation and arms control on a global basis,

determined to ensure that transfers of conventional weapons to the Middle East do not undermine regional stability, serve only to deter military aggression, and provide the confidence and security which would encourage dialogue for peaceful resolution of tension, and

noting the importance of encouraging international commerce for peaceful purposes,

declare that with respect to transfers to countries in the Middle East they will:

1. Carefully consider whether proposed conventional weapons transfers will:

- a) promote the capabilities of the recipient to meet needs for protection of national sovereignty;
- b) serve as an appropriate and proportionate response to the security, military, and other threats confronting the recipient country;
- c) introduce new and destabilizing military capabilities not yet present in the region;
- d) avoid contributing to the economic imbalance or political instability in the region;
- e) enhance the capability of the recipient to participate in regional or collective arrangements or other measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations or

specifically requested by the United Nations;

- f) contribute to the deterrence of aggression and encourage negotiation for the peaceful resolution of conflicts.
2. Notify each member of the group about:
- a) transfers of any military equipment on the agreed list specified in Technical Annex a;
 - b) agreements on coproduction and codevelopment for items on the agreed list;
 - c) transfers of full or partial assembly kits, complete [turnkey] production facilities, and production equipment specifically designated for production facilities for such equipment;

as early as possible, but no later than 60 days prior to final government approval of those transfers or agreements. Final government approval shall always be given prior to the export of such equipment, kits, or facilities.

3. Consult promptly at the request of any state party to this declaration concerning the potential of a proposed conventional weapons transfer to be inconsistent with these guidelines.

4. Provide annually a confidential report to the other parties to this declaration, listing the conventional weapons and production capabilities of the specified categories which were transferred to the region.

5. Agree to consult before introduction of new types of weapons not in technical annex a and not yet present in the region.

6. Maintain export control systems in accordance with their national laws to ensure that these guidelines are respected by all persons subject to their jurisdiction, that conventional weapons or dual-use equipment and technology subject to control are not retransferred without authorization, and that conventional weapons are not modified to acquire nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons capabilities.

7. Meet twice a year to consult on transfers of conventional weapons to the region.

Tab B

Technical Annex A
(Agreed Weapons List)

1. Tanks, including light, medium and heavy tanks.
2. Armored combat vehicles, including armored fighting vehicles, personnel carriers and amphibious vehicles.
3. Military aircraft, including combat, reconnaissance, airborne early warning, aerial refuelers, transport and cargo aircraft.
4. Military helicopters, including combat, reconnaissance, and transport helicopters;
5. Unmanned airbreathing vehicles, including drones, cruise missiles and RPVs;
6. Anti-tank weapons.
7. Missiles, including surface-to-air missiles, air-to-surface missiles and air-to-air missiles. (Surface-to-surface missiles shall not be exported.)
8. Artillery (100 millimeters and above), including mortars, cannons, howitzers, multiple rocket launchers and self-propelled artillery.
9. Naval vessels, including major surface combatants, patrol vessels, submersibles, anti-ship missiles and naval mines.

Tab C

General Guidelines for WMD-Related Exports

The People's Republic of China, the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America,

mindful of the dangers to peace and stability in the middle east posed by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and surface-to-surface missiles,

reaffirming their commitment to seek effective measures of non-proliferation and arms control on a global basis,

noting the importance of encouraging international commerce for peaceful purposes in ways that do not increase the risk of proliferation of destabilizing weapons,

declare that with respect to transfers to states in the middle east, they will observe and consult upon the following guidelines.

1. Not assist in the development, acquisition, manufacture, testing, stockpiling, or deployment of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or of surface-to-surface missiles.
2. Not provide equipment, materials, technology, or other assistance for uranium enrichment, plutonium separation, plutonium handling or heavy water production.
3. Not engage in peaceful nuclear cooperation with any state that does not have all of its nuclear activities subject to international atomic energy agency safeguards.
4. Ensure that any transfers of dual-use or nuclear-related materials, equipment, or technology will not contribute to the acquisition of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, weapons-usable nuclear materials, or surface-to-surface missiles, and work together to increase the effectiveness of export controls on such items. In particular, the following categories of exports will be controlled in accordance with national law and applicable multilateral understandings:

- a) materials, equipment, and technology capable of contributing to nuclear capabilities;
- b) dual-use chemicals that could be used for the production of agents for chemical weapons;
- c) biological organisms, toxins and agents that could be used for the production of biological weapons;
- d) equipment and technology which could contribute to the acquisition of chemical or biological weapons; and
- e) equipment and technology which could contribute to the acquisition of surface-to-surface missiles.

5. In considering whether to permit the export of such dual-use or nuclear-related items for peaceful purposes, give careful consideration to:

- a) the capabilities, objectives, policies, and practices of the recipient, and any related proliferation concerns;
- b) the significance and appropriateness of the items to be transferred;
- c) an assessment of the proposed end-use, including relevant assurances by the government of the recipient state;
- d) whether governmental actions, statements, and policies by the recipient are supportive of non-proliferation and are otherwise consistent with generally accepted international norms;
- e) whether the procurement activities of the recipient government and any other recipient in the chain of custody are consistent with normal commercial practice and have fully respected the laws and regulations of supplier governments.

6. If a party to this declaration notifies the other parties that it has denied an export of a dual-use or nuclear-related item pursuant to these guidelines, any other party, will consult with the party which provided the notice of denial.

Tab D

Communique

1. At the first meeting of the Suppliers Group on Middle East Arms Transfers the People's Republic of China, the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America agreed to participate in a process to limit the proliferation of conventional and unconventional arms in the Middle East. Our nations' concern over destabilizing weapons transfers is reflected in our combined efforts to secure lasting peace and stability in this troubled region. To this end, we have agreed on a set of guidelines for responsible conventional arms transfers and agreed to hold further discussions concerning controls on the transfer of missiles and chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and related technologies to the Middle East.

2. In an effort to promote this non-proliferation agenda and increase the transparency of conventional arms transfers in the region, the Group calls upon the states of the Middle East to act unilaterally:

- a) to freeze the acquisition and production of surface-to-surface missiles;
- b) to agree to be early signatories to the chemical weapons convention and to take steps toward developing related confidence-building measures in the region;
- c) to agree to sign the biological weapons convention and to take steps toward developing related confidence-building measures in the region;
- d) to agree to freeze production and import of weapons-useable nuclear materials and the means to produce them.

We support these measures as important first steps toward the creation of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction.

3. To further promote this process, the Group agrees to facilitate bilateral and multilateral arms control efforts with, and among, Middle East states.

4. Within the Group, the suppliers are committed to a continuing dialogue on arms transfers which will include a mechanism for notifying other group members of future transfers and regular biannual meetings to review the impact of arms transfers on regional security.

5. The Group also agrees to consult on weapons exported to the region by other suppliers and countries of concern and to work bilaterally and in unison to limit destabilizing transfers by these parties.

6. We also support the proposals of President Mitterand and Prime Minister Major as positive steps toward global transparency and multinational nonproliferation efforts.

Drafted: PM/P:JTritak
Wang 2029R 71616 7/2/91