


TOP SECRET

1 May 1954

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TOP SECRET

SUMMARY

GENERAL

1. Soviet diplomat urges immediate cease-fire in Indochina (page 3).

2.

25X1

3.

FAR EAST

4. Rhee reported displeased with Chiang Kai-shek (page 4).

5.

25X1

6.

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25X1A

GENERAL

1. Soviet diplomat urges immediate cease-fire in Indochina:

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A member of the Soviet UN delegation told a French delegate on 27 April that the time had come to stop the fighting in Indochina and that this could be arranged within 48 hours. He said the USSR could

not appropriately propose a truce but that the French could, if they did it with British support and "free from American influence." He stressed that the important thing was a cease-fire with political arrangements to be made later, adding that "an eventual settlement should be political rather than territorial."

Comment: The Communists' immediate objective appears to be a cease-fire, preferably on French initiative, thus removing the danger of internationalization of the war and affording ample time to maneuver for a favorable political settlement.


The suggestion that a settlement should be political rather than territorial may foreshadow a proposal to create a provisional coalition government, to be followed by elections. It was probably designed to offer the French a solution which would provide them with an excuse for an early troop withdrawal regardless of the eventual consequences.

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2.



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


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
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FAR EAST


4. Rhee reported displeased with Chiang Kai-shek:

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


South Korean president Rhee is displeased with Chiang Kai-shek and is losing faith in him because of the current friendly relations between Taipei and Tokyo and because of Chiang's failure to promote Rhee's Asian anti-Communist conference,

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Rhee believes that because of American pressure Chiang did not do a good job in promoting the conference and did not perform satisfactorily his "task" of persuading the Philippine government to attend the meeting.

Comment: Chiang reportedly feared that the proposed conference would result in isolating Nationalist China and South Korea from the rest of non-Communist Asia and lead to a propaganda defeat which Taipei could ill afford. The conference, originally scheduled for 26 April, has been postponed until midsummer.

Rhee is annoyed because the United States, which did not actively back his proposed Asian anti-Communist alliance, has subsequently pressed for a united front in Asia which would exclude South Korea and Formosa.

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