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THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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National Intelligence Council

28 December 1982

NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
  
FROM : Hans Heymann  
National Intelligence Officer At Large  
  
SUBJECT : Zia-Vice President Memcon

Subject memcon is attached, FYI.

*Hans*  
Hans Heymann

cc: ✓ C/NIC  
✓ DDI  
✓ NIO/NESA  
✓ NIO/EA  
✓ NIO/USSR-FF

[Redacted box]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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December 14, 1982

December 13, 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Visit of Pakistani President Zia

Attached is a memorandum of conversation for the meeting between the Vice President and Pakistani President Zia which took place on December 8 in the Madison Hotel suite of President Zia.

*L. Paul Bremer, III*  
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

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MICROFILMED  
BY S/S-I

(UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS)

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December 13, 1982

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:United States:

Vice President Bush  
 Ambassador Ronald I. Spiers  
 Admiral Daniel Murphy  
 Mr. Gregg, Vice President's  
 Office  
 Deputy Assistant Secretary  
 Howard B. Schaffer, NEA

Pakistan:

Pakistani President Zia  
 Foreign Minister Yaqub-Khan  
 Finance Minister Ghulam Ishak  
 Khan  
 General K.M. Arif  
 Ambassador Ejaz Azim  
 Governor of Baluchistan  
 Rahmuddin Khan  
 Foreign Secretary Niaz Niak

DATE: December 8, 1982, 3:45 p.m.

PLACE: President Zia's Suite, Madison Hotel

Vice President Bush called on President Zia of Pakistan at his suite in the Madison Hotel for a meeting of approximately thirty minutes. The Vice President was accompanied by Admiral Daniel Murphy and Mr. Donald P. Gregg of his staff. Also present on the U.S. side were Ambassador to Pakistan Ronald I. Spiers and NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Howard B. Schaffer. The Pakistan side included Foreign Minister Yaqub-Kahn, Finance Minister Ghulam Ishak Khan, General K. M. Arif, Ambassador Ejaz Azim, Governor of Baluchistan Rahimuddin Khan, and Foreign Secretary Niaz Niak.

The discussion largely focused on two issues, the Zia-Andropov meeting and prospects for a settlement in Afghanistan; and Sino-U.S. relations.

Zia's discussion of his meeting with Andropov closely paralleled the description he had presented earlier to Secretary Shultz at his White House meeting with the President. Once again he stressed that both the Soviets and he himself had stuck to their positions. He asserted again that the tone of the Soviet side was better. For example, for the first time in any conversation with the Pakistanis, a Soviet leader had acknowledged that Moscow and Islamabad might have different views of the Soviet move into Afghanistan in

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December, 1979. Foreign Minister Yaqub-Kahn, picking this up, said that they suggested that Andropov was of a school which may have been opposed to the move into Afghanistan. Zia concluded by assuring the Vice President he had left Andropov in no doubt that Pakistan wanted a peaceful settlement on the basis of the principles it had consistently insisted upon.

Speaking more generally of relations with the Soviet Union, the Vice President said that we should not be insensitive to whatever suggestions the new Soviet leadership now makes. We will be watching carefully for these. If we begin to see signs of movement, it will be incumbent on us to react to them. He mentioned his own background as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and expressed the hope that as a former head of the KGB, Andropov would be familiar with the process of making a judgment based on intelligence information. In that sense, Andropov's experience at the KGB may have been broadening rather than confining. Such background, in any event, might be more helpful than that which a party boss might bring to a leadership position. He recalled that he had left Moscow somewhat optimistic about prospects but noted that the Soviets continue to be highly critical of us on certain issues, most recently the President's decision on the MX.

#### Sino-U.S. Relations

Recalling his own personal interest in China since he served there as U.S. Envoy, the Vice President asked Zia if he had any advice to give us about the Chinese.

Zia recalled that he had had a long discussion with the Chinese during his recent visit to Beijing. He said that he believed the Chinese thought that the question of Taiwan would be settled in due course and that the U.S. would not abandon it. He felt the Chinese, knowing that he would be visiting the U.S. soon thereafter, had made a special point of briefing him on their position. He had said he would mention their views in the U.S. if the opportunity arose.

Zia said that the Chinese never act in a hurry; their moves are always calm and calculated. He thought that they had expected more technology transfer from the U.S. than had actually been accomplished. The U.S., in their view, had failed to keep its word on technology transfer.

The Vice President stressed the importance of confidence in a relationship such as the one between China and the U.S. He thought that perhaps we had not been able to meet what the Chinese perceived to be our commitments in some areas and that that may have affected their assessment of us.

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Zia then raised the question of U.S. allegations to the Chinese that China was assisting Pakistan in its nuclear program. He said he had already mentioned this issue in his private meeting with President Reagan. The Chinese had told him that General Walters had come to Beijing. They had been surprised by the U.S. position. In Zia's view, the Chinese felt that the U.S. had lumped them with Pakistan in "bad publicity" regarding the Pakistan nuclear program. They did not like this. Zia had told him that he would mention this in Washington. The Vice President said he would talk about this issue with the President. //?

Discussing the broader issue of Sino-U.S. relations, the Foreign Minister recalled an earlier experience when he was Ambassador to the U.S. in 1976. At that time, the Chinese Ambassador had expressed concern that the U.S. was not going ahead as quickly with normalization of relations as the Chinese had anticipated. Their assessment had been related to U.S. relations with Taiwan and specifically to the increase in the number of Taiwan Consulates in the U.S., a move which had been in the works apparently for many years. The Foreign Minister said he cited this as an example because he thought that Chinese assessment of U.S. relations with Taiwan was one of the two important aspects explaining present Chinese unhappiness with the U.S. (The other was the issue of technology transfer). In his view, the Chinese looked closely at the graph of U.S. relations with Taiwan. They will accept this graph if it is going down, or even remaining flat, but if they perceive that it is going up, even if that is not the U.S. intention, this will affect them adversely.

The Vice President said that while he would agree with this assessment, it is also true that the Chinese selectively choose the "beeps" on the graph they perceive. He noted that the Chinese had also hardened their position. He called attention to the importance of the Taiwan Relations Act which the President fully supports and wishes to live by.

Concluding, the Vice President said that it will take time to develop relations between the U.S. and China. We will not try to humiliate the PRC. Indeed, the President is being accused of selling out Taiwan. Secretary Shultz's visit early next year would help. At the very least, we should know what it is that we and the Chinese are disagreeing about. The Vice President said he was optimistic about the issue.

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