



CONFIDENTIAL N-311

26 September 1973

Dear Ahmet,

I am most grateful to you for your kind good wishes on the assumption of my new duties.

I would like to reply in one letter to several letters which arrived at the same time.

1. I have taken note of the Summary of Developments for the period 6 through 19 September 1973. In the usual manner, a copy of this has been sent to the Under-Secretary-General in PSCA.
2. As far as the issuance of a press release on UNCURK's Annual Report is concerned, since we had already issued a press release in accordance with the wishes of the Commission, we did not think that it was necessary to issue another release at the time when the Report itself was distributed. Accordingly, we did not pursue this matter. As you know, the Report was distributed early last week and I sent a copy to you for your information.
3. With regard to the United Nations Day reception, Mr. Lansky spoke to us about this and he will be writing to you. Our feeling is that you are the best judge of what you should do on this occasion.
4. On other administrative matters concerning the winding up of UNCURK, you will no doubt be hearing from Mr. Lansky as to how we should proceed once the General Assembly takes a firm decision in this regard.
5. As far as Mr. Hudicourt is concerned, as you are aware he has been on several extensions beyond retirement age, and I am not sure whether the Office of Personnel Services will be able to find a suitable consultant type of assignment at Headquarters or elsewhere. My suggestion is that he address this enquiry to the Director of Personnel who, I am sure, will be able to explain the situation to Mr. Hudicourt.

Yours sincerely,

Issat T. Kittani
Executive Assistant to the
Secretary-General

Mr. Ahmet S. Osbudun
Principal Secretary
UNCURK
Seoul, Korea.



UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
(UNCURK)

CONFIDENTIAL : No. 213

20 September 1973

POLITICAL MATTERS

Dear Mr. Kittani,

INFORMATION FROM HEADQUARTERS

In this very first political letter (as opposed to administrative, etc.) which I am pleased to present to you in your new function as Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General, I feel somewhat at a loss since the centre of gravity on the Korean question has totally shifted from this Peninsula to the UN Headquarters.

Handwritten initials | Inter alia, I would be indebted at this end for any cabled information on pertinent non-classified matters as to General Committee, Plenary and First Committee deliberations, including voting posture of Member States, list of co-sponsors, intervention of speakers, etc.

These are regarded as essential by UNCURK members, and they feel embarrassed, as I do, to seek such information from the Foreign Ministry, various Embassies and news media.

I remember drafting such cables for the signatures of Messrs. Vello di and Chacko for seven years between my second and third Korean assignments upon being designated to do so by arrangements between the Chef de Cabinet and my Under-Secretary-General.

In addition I would thank you for having all documentation pouched in fifteen copies, including verbatim and summary records.

These will enable me to assess developments and deliberations for your consideration and that of the members, whenever warranted.

SOME ANTICIPATIONS REGARDING
UNGA DELIBERATIONS ON KOREA

The absence of any significant developments on the Korean question at this end does not preclude presentation on my part some of my anticipations:

First, while the rare UNGA phenomena to adopt both competing draft resolutions cannot be altogether ruled out (thereby compounding

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existing confusion), the chances are for the so-called "Western" resolution to prevail over its "Algerian" counterpart, whatever ^{such resolution} is worth, if anything.

Second, the unique low-key wording of the two proposals will probably not preclude one of the bitterest vituperations in the annals of the Korean question, unless a "gentlemen's agreement" can temper or prevent mutual escalation of North and South delegations at the First Committee. The absence of such advance "agreement" will cause a contagion of violent tempers.

Third, the Sino-Soviet cleavage is bound sooner or later to burst itself on the Korean question as their divergent interests on the Peninsula will reveal themselves. However, the very fact that everyone expects this, might cause an uneasy and unspelled-out "truce" during at least part of the Korean deliberations for the "sake of socialist support" for the DPRK. This, however, cannot, at best, exceed superficial composure as Pyongyang is under extra pressure to choose either Peking or Moscow; has chosen or would probably opt soon for Peking; and be thus dropped as a "hot potato" by Moscow which, subsequent to Korean deliberations, will continue its overtures (and its allies) to Seoul. Regardless of whether the "Algerian" proposal "succeeds", the aforesaid will be Pyongyang's bitter and chronic woe henceforth.

Fourth, Seoul's woes in turn will be far more imminent if not also worse than those of its adversary -- even if its side emerged with "victory" from the deliberations: (a) Its concessions have been pointlessly exaggerated in return to no tangible counter-concession. (b) It has banked on the "egg" of dual Korean membership which will not hatch. (c) The "Western" draft resolution, through incessant and non-meaningful concessions, has been actually watered down into next-to-nothingness. (d) The fire-power against the ROK will concentrate on its "actual abandonment" of the principle and goal of Korean unification, and in the opinion of qualified observers, with soon-to-be-proven realism.

Fifth, the departure of UNCURK as a result of the inexplicable lack of "sure-bet" efforts to replace it with another (perhaps more viable and mutually acceptable) political presence will be much regretted in time to come. [It is relatively easy now to establish a top-notch representative of the Secretary-General for all of Korea; or one such person for each side; or at least one for the ROK alone (if the other two alternatives are unacceptable for Pyongyang)]. It may be too late to accomplish such representation subsequently even if the need to do so became generally indisputable.

Sixth, apart from expediting the exit of also the UNC (by galloping erosion rather than a Security Council decision), the voidance without substitute of the UN political presence will also enhance prospects of a US military withdrawal -- which is actually wanted by no one, at this time at any rate.

Seventh, even at this late hour, the Secretary-General might wish to elicit support, also from the ROK, to a "Jarring" or "Bunche" or "Spinelli" calibre personal political representation in Korea. This would help


preclude the aforesaid prospects and also discourage prospects of imminent, violent if inadvertant eruption on the Korean Peninsula. Surely, such eruption, this time, is most capable, if untowardly, to obliterate the thin barrier to global warfare.

Eighth, some here have gained the impression that the ROK at any rate, is growing more and more aware of the aforesaid potentialities, and beyond that of fatal ramifications of establishing another UN political presence in Korea. One reliable observer believes that the ROK might welcome an opportunity to probe prospects of eliciting the Secretary-General's positive involvement in the Korean question (a) directly, as mediator, travelling between Pyongyang and Seoul, upon invitation -- even to attend a Co-ordinating Committee or Red Cross session; (b) by appointing, representative(s) on the Peninsula (point 5 above); or (c) by maintaining some political liaison between the UN and Seoul which would also link him more desirably with the United Nations Command (the absence of this is believed to be full with extremely undesirable potentialities).

Ninth, the Secretary-General may wish most cautiously to coax or elicit divulgence to this effect in his skilful way (not only to protect my source but to hear out "voluntary" inner-thinking, when he meets the ROK Foreign Minister on 26 September.

With best wishes and kindest personal regards,

Yours sincerely,



Ahmet H. Ozbudun
Principal Secretary