

[TC: Three consecutive dots in punctuation annotates a rather longer than usual pause or an incomplete sentence.]

[Saddam Hussein]: Accounting for the special circumstances in which our organization in Argentina is living through, for example. We would envision that things in the state of Iraq are going well. Comrades, you are wrong regarding your Party. I mean it is true that we are not as much caring about the Revolution as you are, but merely it is our duty to guide you to the circumstances in which the Revolution is going through and to their characteristics, and you ought to cooperate in choosing the better route in order to protect the Revolution and to protect the Party.

The Revolution in these five years, if it is proper to express, has humiliated the colonialism many times. It humiliated and ridiculed it [the colonialism] along with its plots. It ridiculed its plots when it [the colonialism] was thinking that 'Abd-al-Razzaq al-Nayif could retaliate against upon the Party, but he was eliminated in 13 days. It ridiculed its plots it was, i` was thinking that division commanders and the Chief of Staff of the Army and high ranking army officer would onslaught upon the Party, and [they] were eliminated.

It ridiculed its plots when it indirectly attempted -we must be fair towards history- indirectly to bring Hardan up and put him in front of the Party. And it ridiculed its plots when it was thinking that Iraq is incapable to nationalize petroleum with their classic accountings. And it ridiculed its calculations when it was thinking that the decision made in the Seventh State Congress about recognizing the Democratic Germany, that it is incapable to do that in front of Einstein principal. And it ridiculed its plots when the colonialism was thinking that Iraq and Ba'ath Party are incapable to achieve the Declaration of March, or to apply peace principals in the Iraqi Kurdistan. And it ridiculed.., and ridiculed.., and ridiculed.

The Revolution of your party in this state, humiliated it [the colonialism] more than once; therefore, it is not possible that it [the colonialism] would sit speechless about it, but rather it ought to revenge from this Party and from this Revolution in a vindictive way, in order to completely reinstate its consideration in the area.

These circumstances, which the Revolution is facing, we could be curious, in a situation of being stabbed from behind by people accounted for in the Party; if the Revolution is going in stagnation stage, or in a course... or in a regression course, but the Revolution is recording the most marvelous of its victories, until a recent time, and it is recording the highest hike in its life. And having it stabbed from behind! So that is a clear intuitive matter. I mean, even we... we are not in need to ask what the motives are?! Because this indicator alone, indicates for us where the motives of these people could be.

First of March is not destroyed as your Party and its valiant Revolution has recorded in this state the most marvelous victory, in the history of the whole region, upon the monopolistic companies, but not only upon the monopolistic companies but rather upon imperialism in general, and upon the largest and most fortified of its strongholds, and they are the imperial... the...the... the monopolistic companies.

Only few months went by since first of March, and Nazim Guzar appeared for us! People are writing about stability in Iraq, writing about prosperity, writing about the Ba'ath Party which is going to become the leader for the region in its future, and yet Nazim Guzar appears to us and stabs us with this treacherous stabbing on which he was artistic in its treachery.

I the... I will say enough at this point, and I apologize if I started passionately, because when talking about the Revolution and about its circumstances and about its real internal life, it makes us somewhat passionate about what we talk about. [TC: sound of water being poured into a cup] And we hear from the comrades if... So comrade Shibli and comrade 'Ali, we hear from them their inquiries and their explanations and their questions in every matter. And we also [will] answer these questions without touch ups and in a direct and precise way.

[[*Inaudible*], it sounds like they are passing the microphone]

[05:00] - [MV1]: Comrade Fadil, Walid, comrade Faruq, Salman, Mustafa, Mandi, Nasib, 'Abdallah, Zuhayr, Nawwaf, Nun, Hisham, and Shakir. [*Inaudible*] We shall start with comrade Fadil.

[Fadil]: Comrade Nur, whenever the comrades spoke about the leadership, he was aware or sensed that there were two certain [*Inaudible*], and they do not abide by the opinion of the leadership. So, what is the role of the leadership in regards with those comrades and those whom you sense about them in the beginning? Because comrade Shibli says: "We have a sense regarding those comrades that they have negativities?" And I don't know if they have negativities; and we wait for these negativities to accumulate and then we get to this result. So, what was the role of the leadership regarding to those comrades you spoke about them?

IMV21[Levantine accent]: The comrades who were speaking were in the leadership, command members, and when a command member speaks another command member, he is supposed to speak out with the most criticism he has. And I pointed out that we were interpreting these situations that they are some types of acute or extreme criticism. But given that there is a conspiracy act of this level behind it, then no one in the leadership had an idea, because if we had any idea that there is actually a conspiracy behind it, then it is natural and preferred that a limit would have been set for it before it goes out to the execution field. However, after what happened we became to realize the meaning of these styles of criticism. And after

that, we became to hear that these sayings being said by a command member to a command member are being leaked to non-command elements! These command members were not speaking to non-command members in front of us. We were not aware that there was, I mean, with whom exactly they communicate and with whom they gossip or with whom they leak news. As far as I am concerned there was nothing in this regards.

IFadill: [*Inaudible*] complicated speech.

[Saddam Hussein]: I don't know if the comrades are aware of all of the details of the operation! Maybe we started... as far as I am concerned, I was talking and in my mind I thought that you were aware of all the details of the matters. So if the... the statement of the official spokesperson was included in the publication.

[TN: Multiple voices commenting about the meeting publications and it sounds that they are locating a certain statement within the publications]

Saddam Hussein: err... almost all the... Bring us tea, would you? Err... almost all the... I mean all what is concerned about the matter is what is mentioned by the official spokesperson. And if comrade 'Ali would allow me to reiterate it briefly. The... summary of the story, oh comrades, is that we went to the airport to receive comrade Secretary General and everything was calm.

Nazim Guzar was actually enjoying the trust and support of the leadership, also the other comrades who were comrades at that time, starting with 'Abd-al-Khaliq and ending with Muhammad Fadil.

Lately, the leadership started to sense that Nazim Guzar has started to conduct behaviors outside of his authorities. But rather he started not to only make mistakes, as previously he would commit a mistake and when he was questioned he would admit and criticize his behavior. **[10:00]** Lately, in the past eight months, he started to carry out actions, and when we would question him about them... -there are three services: Military Intelligence, Intelligence, and Security.- When we would question him about them, he would deny! Or would deny that he carried them out! When we started lately to gather information, our convictions would indicate that he has carried out this action. And the last three significant actions were... among them were explosion incidents in the northern region, and of them was the... Cairo operation, and of them was Pakistan operation, and the... the killing of the Jews. The killing of the Jews!

As far as Pakistan and Cairo concerned, he admitted them because he could not conceal them. I mean, he sent 29 individual to Cairo and all of them were from the Security Service, so he would not say such-and-such, and we know them so-and-so, so-and-so, and so-and-so! I mean, he ought to admit, and the same deal is with that of Pakistan, but he tried to belittle it. However the information that was reached to us... all of what is published is true. I mean... of

course, you all were imagining that this is what you hear about, and the leadership definitely has a role in it, or at least it is aware of it, i.e. its opinion is inquired. While completely denied the explosion incidents of the northern region and the killings of Jews, and denied his awareness and knowledge about them. As well as the disappearance of some individuals like one of the Kakiyah tribes in Khanaqin...

[MV3]: Mr. [*Inaudible*] did not hear.

[**Saddam Hussein**]: I forgot his name.

Information is gathered from other services for us. The other agencies do not deny, they tell us, I mean they send us what they have. The information we have indicate that he is the perpetrator of the action. And then we started to call-up officers. Information reached us when they went to the location of one of the explosions in the northern region. [To call-up officers] regarding one of the officers of rank of Major of the Security Service who carried out this action as an assignment from him [from Nazim Guzar]. I called him up to my office, with an order from the leadership, and I told him "the information we have that you carried out this action! So tell us in order for us to be aware." He denied, he told me "Sir, how could you conceive that?! That is impossible and we are not aware!"

I mean, it reached to a point that not only he denies, but he trains his officers how to deny, I mean, in front of the leadership regarding a certain action he did!

Of course... during the conference of the security and intelligence members, I told him "Is not that so?" he told me "Yes Sir!" He stood up and I told him "Did not you carry them out?" He said "Yes, Sir, I admit." But when... after the... [*meaning it was too late*]

So, as a matter of fact, we started to feel uncomfortable about this behavior of his. But saying that this behavior would bring him to a point where he conspires upon us and kill us! In other words he would kill the Party! No, definitely that could not strike our minds at all. Although I told Muhammad Fadil "beware that Nazim Guzar had stepped beyond his limits! And by this behavior Nazim might then also come kidnap one of us and kill him and say... And the leadership assigns him for the investigation!" I did not actually mean that. I was joking and! meant to clarify for Muhammad the danger of the actions being carried out by Nazim and to clarify for Nazim the danger about the feelings that has being created by the leadership in order for him to give up his actions. But saying that in my mind I really thought that Nazim would detain us? This definitely did not strike my mind ever.

Or whether if we were researching or thinking to remove Nazim from Security General, in spite of all the mistakes that... But rather it was decided that the National Security Council holds a session and hold him accountable for the mistakes he has done, and this subject was among the paragraphs of the agenda. So we never decided to kick him out of Security

Service as it was mentioned in his statements when he said "I feel like the leadership wanted to cut me out." So I said with him that we must hurry up in carrying out this action that I did. [15:00] so we went to the airport and everything was normal. And we by accident assigned the Intelligence Service, I mean, we could have assigned the Security Service to protect the route and assign with the security of the aircraft, and the security of the airport. Also by accident, the Intelligence Service... I mean we do not claim that we have guessed... I mean this is the only operation that we could not guess its thump before it takes place. Or as the nature of the fact that he is a military comrade and director general of security service that he is the one who supposedly protects us! I mean it is difficult someone who... I mean meets with people's movements, the closest people to the leadership, who are prominent comrades in the party! [It is difficult] to interpret their movements, and record them as mistake, or rather record them as conspiracy. I mean by God, this is not estimated by higher command either!

And Muhammad Fadil also was among the individuals who enjoyed the trust of the leadership, and enjoyed... he rather enjoyed my personal trust! And 'Abd-al-Khaliq also was of the individuals who enjoyed the trust of the leadership. It is true that we have criticism about him, a severe criticism. And we have spoken to him about this criticism face to face, meaning that we did not hold it from him. And I think this is the issue meant by Mr. Shibli, and I will clarify it.

But he was enjoying our respect and trust, meaning that we would never think that he would come -I mean- conspire upon us or would suffice by the edge of the confessions that he knew about the conspiracy act and remains silent! This would never strike our minds. It did strike our minds that when a conspiracy is found to come against the Party that he would take the lead to defeat it. And it is difficult for us in a case like this to distinguish a conspiracy to slaughter the leadership and a conspiracy to slaughter the Party. The whole Party would definitely be slaughtered in an operation like this if its pages were completed. And the most dangerous of its pages is when it was decided to be carried out in the airport.

Comrade Khudayyir, you are stronger when you are a tank regiment commander if I... by measures of...

[**Khudayyir**]: Tank regiment.

[**Saddam Hussein**]: Isn't that so?!

So, whoever thinks of using the weapon in this technical way of Nazim Guzar, and imagines that when he kills the leadership, he would take over the rule, he is very much wrong. Because a thousand tank regiment commanders would come up him, and the division commanders would come up to him, and others will come up to him and tell him: "Brother!

So long it is for the stronger, then we are stronger than you and are capable to strike you with a hundred slaps on the face, and we are capable to become the rulers of the government as long as the issue of the members' powers is in the use of the weapon. You used the technical aspect and we will come to you with armors. I mean, you used treachery to rob people and kill them, and we will come to you at the daylight with the Iraqi Army." And the Armed Civilian Service of the Party will come up to you where a comrade will stick out and tell him, "we the public armed militia..." Because we deployed them to the streets immediately when we felt it, although we knew that Nazim Guzar carried out the operation, but we never thought that Nazim Guzar could use this treacherous way to find ten men within the Party. Therefore, we said the Party shall deploy to the streets first. And I mean the whole party was armed and deployed into Baghdad at the blink of an eye.

Also a Party comrade would come up to him and tell him: "Well brother, let's swordplay together, both the Security General Services and the armed Party!" He would, is not that so? Definitely, we could never imagine the way of massacres that could have taken place in this country or in the Party and the future of things if another page was completed.

And the summary of it: we went to the airport and everything was normal and we received the President, we returned and we both left the Palace. Then after about, I think, one hour or something like that, the attendances came to me in order to tell me that Mr. President -I was outside of the Palace- is calling you and he is inside the Palace. And what... and the news I heard is vague and that Hammad and Sa'dun detained Nazim Guzar and 'Abd-al-Khaliq and Muhammad Fadil. So I told them Muhammad Fadil and 'Abd-al-Khaliq were just with me in the airport! However we missed martyr Hammad and we missed Sa'dun, but I did not miss Director General of Security. I mean in fact... I mean... he didn't... he didn't... he didn't strike my mind personally [20:00] but the others missed him. Some comrades missed him, and all the Ambassadors missed them.

I mean, I also... this... the crooked deal, I was in a room by myself and I don't know who was present and who was present in the airport during the time of aircraft delay. But we missed them when we came to greet Mr. President [*Inaudible*].

What is the deal?! [TC: this is an expression of surprise] In which way we have this kind of operation?! It is true that we have had indicated and said that the... it is possible that the treachery might occur from within the Party and certain covers could be employed. At that time the issue of the oil was not cleared with the companies, and they put one of the covers that could... I mean... If budgeting was not reached precisely then the solution would be in the hand of the companies and would be actually forced with the solution; and the Iranian case and the issue if dealing with it; and the Kurdish case and the case... the Palestinian case.

But, it is true from the scientific standpoint, that a report has been put forth and has been

read, but the issue of someone comes to you and tells you that, in fact today, the comrades are there all with high levels and each one is detaining the other! And what it means... where is the Party... I mean to this point the leadership is disgraced?! The Party is disparaged?! Is it true that comrades the ministers of interior and defense are detaining command members?! I mean this is an unbearable operation and it could not be perceived by mind and it could not settle in it cohesively.

So, facing a circumstance like this.., of course we have an emergency plan and we have views on how to behave in a case like this type. I did not come to the Palace directly. I tried to call in via a telephone from outside to make sure about the presence of the President in the Palace and make sure from his voice. He told me "I am present and waiting for you."

We went there, we started to gather information. What have been gathered by us in early stages was that everyone was kidnapped. Meaning, not Hammad and Sa'dun detained those three and not those three detained.., but no, Muhammad Fadil and 'Abd-al-Khaliq are present! Meaning nothing happened to them! But all of those have disappeared, so there is a certain power. And actually our thought went to the Kurds! [Suggesting] that an enticement have taken place such as an invitation; a lunch invitation; by some friend... etc. And then they have been kidnapped. And the telegram being sent, because a telegram has been sent stating from Directorate General of Security to National Command... you may find it published with the... comrade Nasib did you provide a publication of it?

IMV41: Yes, yes.

[Saddam Hussein]: So, you will find it published... etc. And our demands are such, and in case of non-fulfillment the hostages would be executed. Say that this power has been studying to disturb the Party and tried to send such a telegram in order to disturb Party forces to portray for it that things are getting out of control internally, hence that power can then enter with lethargy to finalize the case.

So we started to review the information.., no, the information came to us that once comrade Sa'dun Ghaydan was taken alone in a vehicle and they made appointment to meet in a certain point and without protection, and in another time that they made appointment with martyr Hammad since the morning at seven o'clock, and he was taken, also alone. And another time 'Adnan Sharif was taken from Directorate General of Security!

So, this information was gathered, and I entered upon comrade Abu-Haytham and told him, "What is up with you? This is chilled out! Nazim Guzar is the one who detained them, it is obvious." He told me, "Abu-1.1day, by God I mean, I also have the same conclusion." But what I mean I could not help it to say that one of them has detained the others. I mean all of them are Ba'athists and each one of them was holding a commanding position! But this one, I mean,

it is obvious.

A telegram was issued to arrest Nazim Guzar and we notified the Party to be deployed on the streets and then we notified military assets with a certain telegram... etc.

Investigation of information gathering started and our minds went directly to the actual location where assembly took place. I mean if information came to us before this time, we could have certainly avoided a large portion of the catastrophe, because this location is a location to produce special supplies for the Ministry of Defense. Muhammad Fadil was assigned to oversee it and with our knowledge.

At the end of the winter he one time made an appointment with us, myself and Mr. President, to supposedly take us there. Also in the same way we were supposed to go there without protection in order for the location not to be uncovered! And Mr. President was busy, so I went and I was driving the vehicle and Sa'dun Shakir and Muhammad Fadil and Nazim Guzar were with me. One of the guards' vehicles went out of their way and insisted to follow us, and it did follow us to the location, but they were able to, [25:00] I mean what can four of the guards do if someone is prepared and wants to conduct an evil operation?! Isn't that so?!

They showed me the chambers, but they did not show me the cellar, because the detained brothers were also passed through the same episode; "see here we produce such-and-such and when this one comes here..." and then they take them to a staircase leading to a cellar and inside is made in a special way which will suggest that planning was not made today. And then he would tell him..., after entering the cellar supposedly to show it to him... and they will pull the guns upon him and tell him "you are under arrest!"

So only the cellar I did not enter. While they passed me through all the facilities above, and I don't know that there was a cellar. Of course they did not tell me. This is also of the matters that draw attention; I mean why would they conceal the cellar from me while showing me all the facilities?!

I became sick from the extreme coldness as the location was not heated, and the nature of the supplies being made there require not to be heated. I was sick the next day and I called comrade the Secretary General and told him, "This location if Muhammad Fadil and Nazim Guzar wanted to take you there, do not go! You will become sick. My built is stronger than yours and I got sick, so you will definitely fall [sick]! So do not try going there." He [Guzar] called him [Secretary], and the latter told the former "I swear by God that Abu-'Uday told me, that this location is cold and I can't bear, so I won't go."

He could have easily taken us for the trust we have between us, I mean God is great my comrade

I mean if comrade 'Ali Ghannam calls and invites me to his house, should not I go?! I mean...

So this was... I mean from this standpoint this operation was very much hurting [or bitter], because it shocked much of the trust between the party members and we will talk about it and it shall not settle in our minds for a long time.

So we started... [*Speaker coughs*] So we started to investigate the case and we saw the others, I saw myself in the Palace and an investigation commission and a court were created. The investigation commission was headed by a branch member comrade and section member comrades were in it [as members], while the court was headed by a command member comrade and two branch member comrades as its members [members of the court].

When we come and take a moment with ourselves... I mean... the... it is not conceivable that things end up to this far! I mean... ok... Hammad and Sa'dun Ghaydan and other comrades accompanied by them were kidnapped. Okay, and then what?! What would happen?! The leadership is there! We are all there and thriving! They want to tell us that they will execute them? If they have told us this, I would tell them "execute a thousand individuals!!" Psychologically we could not surrender to someone to come and imposes himself upon the leadership and upon the Party and take four humans [as hostages] and says by God if... I either execute them... or... or... or you will surrender such-and-such and such, etc... of course even if this was a cover, but even if it was real and if he executes one thousand and executes our families, we would tell him "execute all our families," and we will go and crush his head!

So, it is natural for us to take a moment with ourselves and say that there ought to be another thing, and it is not the thing that floated on surface. And the command member comrades would meet and talk about this thing more passionately than him and mention... I told them my comrades, because I cannot tell you not to speak out your conclusions because it is your right, but I hope that these conclusions go out of the frame of leadership, because in one hand it would harm us, and on the other hand let's wait for the investigation in order for us not to psychologically influence the investigation.

The investigation came out... [*Speaker coughs*] no matter how I was, and how I want to see things and say that Muhammad Fadil must have had knowledge, or some conclusion. So the same night I called Muhammad Fadil to come to the Palace. I told him you are his friend; you kind of live with him. And the seven days in which Mr. President was absent, in six of them we started... of course the information started to accumulate, it is true that we do not want to conclude and speak exclusively, but in our minds we have conclusions that things are not for nothing. I mean the issue is the issue of Nazim and taking six hostages. There must be... there must be a certain form behind the subject... there must be a missing link in the operation.

He started to tell for me the story of how he went to the second investigation commission and the car... once he said "my car was broken" and another time he said in the second day he said "no I dismissed the driver and I said why I would call the driver? I would call the investigation commission and would request a car." And I went there and found Nazim Guzar and the time struck five o'clock in the evening. [30:00] And comrade Secretary General was supposed to arrive at six o'clock.

And the aircraft was late for circumstances which you will also find explained in the... in the official correspondence. I mean completely out of our will. And I told him "go together with me to the airport." He told me "I am not going to the airport." And all of this speech is by Muhammad Fadil. He replied reiterating and telling him "according to the protocols, you are a security director; you ought to be in the airport." He replied telling him "I will not go, I am busy." So Muhammad Fadil took the car and went to the airport.

This is what he told me. Of course later it appeared that he wanted to say this because all of the attendees would see who is coming at that moment therefore he could not conceal. He knows that investigation must reach one way or another. But he would not tell the truth that is related to the essential subject which we want. And he thought that he could conceal that, and that the investigation can only reach to that Muhammad Fadil at the moment of such-and-such was there, and thus he would be notifying the leadership in advanced and the case would look normal.

The investigation committee came and told us about the case, I mean, it is bigger than Nazim Guzar's case and it reached the leadership. Hence, we told them that your job finishes here, and our job starts here, and you do not investigate with command members, we investigate with them.

We picked up the telephone and called Muhammad Fadil, "Hello! Muhammad Fadil?" He said "Yes!" We told them "Well please come here, we have business." We did not tell him what the case was... I mean we are telling it honestly.

So, Muhammad came [speaker coughs], and we sat with him in a normal way. "Why?" I told him "O! Muhammad!" I mean... "Why they did this catastrophe? And why are you denying to in front of the leadership?"

IMV21[Levantine accent]: I think during the third day, ha?

[Saddam Hussein]: The third day? Yeah,

IMV2[[Levantine accent]: The fourth, four, 4

[Saddam Hussein]: The fourth.

IIVIV51: Day four.

[Saddam Hussein]: The fourth day. So he started to admit and said: "By God that is true, but I..." I mean he said: "I went at five o'clock..." and reiterated his story but this time he changed the style, and told me "Nazim..." and explained all the details for me and said "I detained so-and- so, so-and-so, and so-and-so." "Why did you detain them?" He said "I just detained them!" He is saying. "Well, why did you detain them?" He is telling me "By God, I just felt that I am being challenged and I detained them," and so forth of nonsense... ok, "You didn't take part?" He said "No, I did not take part, only..." I mean...

So, he started to speak about how he went to the airport and reported to comrade 'Abd-al-Khaliq -of course a comrade in the past- and now... and told him that the operation is at half past six. And he [the former] told him [the later] that Nazim had detained so-and-so, so-and-so, and so and-so, etc.

"Why didn't you tell us? We also are command members and your comrades!" He said "By God, this is it!" And for the sake of honesty he said "We were thinking the he [likely referring to Nazim] would send you a telegram and tell you." I mean "You would definitely hear from him.

He would report to you later and would tell you (**I** have detained those!) So why would we tell you." **I** mean and so forth of this kind of childish talk. [Speaker coughs]

Of course, this talk took place while he was completely calm, neat, relaxed, at the Republican Palace, and in front of us but not in front of investigators, and we told him "Alright!"

"Please comrade Tahir..." member of the investigation commission or the court? [Speaker seeks confirmation for Tahir's role]

IMV6]: Court member.

'Saddam Hussein]: Branch member

IMV21[Levantine accent]: Yes.

[Saddam Hussein]: "Take him!" [Saddam asked Tahir to detain Muhammad Fadil] **I** told him "Son! You are now detained. Go face the investigation!"

In the same way we sent after 'Abd-al-Khaliq. He denied his knowledge and denied the statement of Muhammad Fadil. We told him "Okay then, please get into the prison!" So, there were no compliments and the only thing we did was that we let them be treated differently to the last moment and we even made recommendations to the investigation commission in order not to exercise pressure upon them, not even during questioning.

Of course if we wanted to use the investigation style used with other conspirers, Muhammad Fadil could have admitted in another way! [35:00] I don't mean that... the... I mean that he informs against others, no! It is an operation based on treason, and they know that Party members would not accept any act of this kind. Therefore, he almost limited it upon the executors and more than half of them are non-Ba'athist and culprit people. I mean... and with previous convictions! Those in the Second Investigation Commission were gathered by Nazim and he made a section without our knowledge and also without the knowledge of the Interior Minister. He named it the Ninth Section and he appointed as its head a person who cooperated with the ill-reputed special investigation commission of -'Ammar 'Alwah- of year 63. [*Speaker coughs*] and he is a confessed communist and he was used to... I mean they used him to psychologically torture the communists by influencing them [*TC: method of influence not known*]. He [*Nazim*] handed this 9th Section to him [*'Ammar 'Alwah*] and gathered prior convicts in it, and so forth.

The 9th Section and the Second Investigation Commission are supervised by Nazim Guzar personally as Director General of Security. They carried out the major role in the investigation process and they accompanied him during escape operation from this location where he gathered the comrades who were detained and into Zurbatiyah towards the Iranian border, and then they were arrested.

Although, we are convinced as leadership, that Muhammad Fadil did take part in planning, and he didn't only know about it at five o'clock. We don't want to ignore our conscience and say that 'Abd-al-Khaliq took part in the planning, but with confidence and a satisfied conscience we can say that 'Abd-al-Khaliq is the tactical philosopher [*TC: meaning the tactical mastermind*], he carried out the charging process since months ago. This is what I want to elaborate about Mr. Shibli's talk.

'Abd-al-Khaliq answers a telephone call by a command member "How did this decision took place?!" They would tell him over the telephone "O comrade! Weren't you there when this decision took place? And secondly, why aren't you attending the meetings of the Command and that of the Council?"

'Abd-al-Khaliq, in fact... I mean there is a report that Mr. Michel attends meetings as he wants and when he wishes. But now, 'Abd-al-Khaliq also becomes to attend meetings as he wants!! However this affair has actually happened that sometimes 'Abd-al-Khaliq goes two months, three months without attending the meetings of the Command and the Council. And we criticize him and hold him accountable very closely. Only God knows if we terminated 'Abd-al-Khaliq, how the hell would be raised upon us from more than a direction, as far to "How could you terminate 'Abd-al-Khaliq?!" I mean...

So, don't think that commutation has any relation with the investigation, as according to the criminal law and partisanship crime, 'Abd-al-Khaliq deserves to be executed before a soldier, and before a non-commissioned officer, and before the low rank security [officer] whom took part in the act. Because he is a member of the National Command, he is not only supposed to report this to the leadership; this would be a shame, as he should act accordingly in order to defeat the treason! He is a leader, a command member! I mean, why would he report to Saddam in order to defeat the treason? Why wouldn't he lead in order to defeat the treason?!

Commutation... change of his punishment, is not like when a journalist asks questions from a questions notepad, that supposedly today at seven... [TC: *Sentences are not clearly structured in the source*]

[TN: Saddam discontinues speech and directs comments to Sabah and asks him to turn up the heat] The room started to become cold, Sabah, do a little..., we can't stand it. [TN: *And he returns to continue his speech*]

Like it is said did we hear that mediation took place for commutation? I swear by God, if we are not satisfied by work, we could never accept mediation even if God the Exalted mediated. We refuse unjust mediation. As far as the Party concerned, the Party would strike with us as one hand, because the issue targets the Party. So, we would not accept anyone from the Party to mediate as well.

It reached this far, but why?! The answer is as follows, and so it was written in al-Thawrah newspaper, and the text written in al-Thawrah newspaper is also present in the internal journal of the Party. And the summary of it is: We as the leadership and as the strivers of this Party wanted -as we were dealing with the most dangerous case, and the most dangerous case threatening the life of the Party and the life of individuals who are leading... in other words to kill them! Is there anything worse than this?- [we wanted] [40:00] to remain an illuminating sign on the path related to the ethics of the Party; and at the same time to point out what is this procedure and how it relates with the party ethics. To point out that aggression is only used as necessary and not for the purpose of vengeance or abhorrence. Aggression is used as much as to repel a danger away from the Party and away from the Revolution, and it is not used as a continuous case. So, we used aggression against 36 individuals and we executed them, and it is not possible to forgive anyone.

This was the reason, and it is not that we are convinced -by God- that it is ok that he knew! Those who know are less from... I mean from those who didn't know?!

This one is a leader! He is not just a little soldier who was aware! Not only how would he report! And comrades, it is a mistake to degrade the position! Not the person [*in that position*], the person is done! But for the position it is a mistake to say why did not he

report? Because you suppose to say that why did not he lead towards defeating this criminal action?

So, the other episode was discovered that we would be mainly killed in the airport, comrade Secretary General, and Saddam! I mean along with the detention of a number of comrades where some of whom are military branch positions and some others in military sections, and of them is Defense Minister, and of them is Interior Minister, and then to kill and could be detaining them and then slaughtering them! And the Party cannot undertake pleading Nazim Guzar non-guilty during the investigation.

He could also slaughter the executors, yes! Because certain actions became to be revealed about him that this is of the easiest things that he does [*TC: meaning the slaughtering of the executors*]. Given that a person who takes photographs of the people who executed the action with him the same day, in private and immoral situations... By God, we hear in intelligence work that they are taken for a certain individual in a certain position, such as a foreign military attaché member, in order to use them as a mean of pressure against him, isn't that so? In order to give them information, but to use against his comrades and against those people whom he used in the execution... to use... and against some high ranking government officials and high ranking employees in the armed forces!! I mean these kinds of things that make the human check and inspect the personality of this individual and all of his general affairs. And then the leadership could assign Nazim Guzar and the member of the two commands will come -of course a member of the two commands, they all are members of the two commands! Command and command! Even the comrade Secretary General and Saddam are members of the two commands even though in the media they say member of command not two commands- and things are going on normally.

This is how they plan, but of course we know, if you ask us, we know that things could never go on normally. We know what the Party is, we know what the people are, and we know how to look at the Party and how we look on people, and how to deal with things! And the planning was technically built on this base.

This is the summary of the most significant matters in order for you to use of it in the questions.

[MV2][Levantine Accent]: Comrade Fadil's question was: why the leadership, when knew about him or was aware about this irresponsible criticism, why it did not take a decision against the individuals who were exercising that criticism?

In my answer I read a paragraph of which one of the comrades asked in this meeting, who said: in the speech of the comrade Assistant Secretary General has pointed out the peaceful criticism as cover for the conspiracy.

This is true as there is a type of immature criticism, but rather dishonest one, however we ought to pay attention to the fine and sharp line between the positive criticism and the dishonest criticism. And that passion shall not drag us into standing up against the striving voices that puts the criticism within the marching of the Party and the Revolution. Both of them are true sayings, and I mean the saying that... the question that was asked by comrade Fadil has a point, and the warning has a point! In it he warns one of the comrades. And this is the reason... [TN: *Audio Loss at 44:57*].

[45:00] ...in his heart with all that is permitted and criticizes; it is absolutely not mentioned that a command member meets with supporters and regular members and speaks up with all of his confidences. I would not hide from you that this was going on and this trend was always ended up with the creation of personal gangs, mobs, and blocs. This was in the experience of the Party and we shall not allow any member of the command to create followers for self. The Party is what remains. The so-and-so leader and the other leader are not immortals, no! If we continue towards these negative directions, they we would have *[[Inaudible]]* the Party.

Yes, please.

[Saddam Hussein]: In this meeting, and in any meeting, we must also admit our duty... what is upon us, and I as a Deputy of State Secretary General, I take on both commands, National and State, the responsibility of not reprimanding comrade 'Abd-al-Khaliq about his behaviors and mistakes. And we still have similar situations with other grades, because those who does not attend National Command meetings for six months; can't you tell me what kind of internal system says that he is not to be terminated from the Party?!

However, it is up to you when they would... when I would personally be a real party member and start questioning people about a mistake. And then these trends would start to disappear. And if we remain as gangs and mobs; and this is no problem; and that is, etc; then these trends will start to stick out. We were witnessing with our own eyes, the sabotage activity carried out by comrade 'Abd-al-Khaliq, and I am of the most significant of those who undertake the responsibility of not questioning him.

I mean, we have to admit, and we have to admit that a trend similar to, or trends similar to that of 'Abd-al-Khaliq are still in existance. Not at the state level, but at the national level. He who does not attend the meetings of the National Command for six months and seven months, the leadership ought to come and question him, and tell him: brother, my comrade, come on! I mean how would we lead the Party?!

The Party... if we return to its history and be honest and count, then we would see the reason behind the weak connection between the organizations in the Arab Homeland and in the

world and between the National Command, and the reason behind it is that it does not exert its leadership role.

Comrades! You can make me a leader in the internal system. But you cannot make me a leader from the practical and psychological aspects. There is a psychological, humanistic aspect and a practical aspect with connection to the daily work, which if I could not achieve it from my position as a leading human!

You could impose me as an obligation, based on the internal system as a leader as a gang would come and elect me during the national congress and make me a leader -and the same is the deal at state level- but you cannot make me a real leader if I don't exercise my actual role in the process of leading!

So, of the illnesses of this establishment.., and this speech for your information, I am not only saying it here, I have said it during the national congress if the comrades remember. And I have said it in a meeting where comrade, the founding leader, comrade Michel was attending, and in this National Council in this hall.

If we want to care for the cohesion of our party organizations and their abiding by the directions of the center; principally, yes, but from the psychological and practical aspects, we must care for pushing the best of our capabilities up to the highest head, not just push the extra people who are not needed, or the people whom we get rid of within states. [And push them up] to the National Command as it was happening during the past, and even the state of Iraq was doing it.

Those who went to the 9th National Congress were not... I mean they were not selected [50:00] according to revolutionary and partisanship bases as it should. But Iraq had its circumstances where not all strivers -I mean those could be selected according to partisanship bases- were all able to go up to Lebanon to attend because of the secret work conditions. But it happened in the congress that "who can obtain a passport?" they would raise their hands and would tell us "we can obtain passport[s]." Alright comrades... The opportunity of selection was laid upon them.

We must not let this matter loose, and [especially] after we become party members and leading the political authority. We must not be soft where a comrade comes... and regretfully this goes on, and we hear about it in conferences, and some of you, rather most of you attend conferences.., they come and say comrade so-and-so has been six months and he had not attended the congress of the National Command, and yet we come back and select him again to the membership of National Command!

Where is the concern about our Party?! We dig our grave by our hands, and then we come and say how did we fall?! We are sometimes failing ourselves!

So, we have to admit that not only the thing mentioned by comrade 'Ali, as there is an additional thing. What he said is true, but the additional thing is that we as a national and state command, must undertake the responsibility of not firmly reprimanding 'Abd-al-Khaliq, because 'Abd-al-Khaliq had situated himself in a divan and gathered around himself all kinds of punished, suspended, and so forth individuals; of those who from a general director was demoted into an inspector because of negligence. I mean they roam around him, and of course not only them, but other comrades from the Party roam around him; and most importantly, what kind of talk goes on [There]?! For example the comrades would ask him about such-and-such decision and he would say "by God, I don't know how it happened." He would not say "I did not attend the meetings of the Council and that of the Command." I mean this other comrade would think that there must be something wrong with the Command, is not that so? Command member does not know how a decision was made! Doesn't it mean, that... that... that there is something with a different prospective?! But he would not say what he had to say and for example say that "I did not attend the meetings of the Command."

Alright!

[MV2][Levantine accent]: Venerable comrade, [Are you] done with questions?

[MV7]: Aha, yes.

[MV2][Levantine accent]: Comrade Walid al-Duwaydari.

[Walid al-Duwaydari][Levantine accent]: [*Inaudible*] there are a number of comrades who do not know anything about the incident that took place in Iraq. I have four questions.

The first question: We have heard and noticed through a number of foreign and Lebanese newspapers that the State Command violated the internal system of investigation methods...

[*TC: when Duwaydari mentioned newspapers, Saddam started to not pay attention to him and sounded like he was chatting with some individuals around him*].

[MV2]: Excuse for a minute comrade.

[Walid al-Duwaydari] [Levantine accent]: We have heard and noticed through a number of foreign and Lebanese newspapers that the State Command violated the internal system of investigation methods. In other words, it did not inform the National Command to take part and to take responsibility of the former leaders of the Party before their detention. And I specifically mean comrade 'Abd-al-Khaliq and Muhammad Fadil.

So, is this true? And what was the reason? This was the first question.

[Walid al-Duwaydari] [Levantine accent]: What news agency was that? How is it that I did not read it from the news agencies?

[Walid al-Duwaydari] [Levantine accent]: The French agency, it started to publish

directly and the National Command did not notice.

[Saddam Hussein]: Yeah, we would answer the one about the National Command, and we will answer directly, that it was being made aware about the details of every ongoing case as they were current, I think from day to day or from day to meeting.

[Multiple MV]: *[Inaudible]*

[Saddam Hussein]: I mean comrades, news agencies speak everything, I mean you should not reference news agencies. Tell us directly, let's leave news agencies out, we are not in need to reference to them, we say directly, comrades: Was the National Command notified? Was it made aware? Was it making decisions? Was it taking part? Was it leading? Like that we would answer.

[Walid al-Duwaydari] [Levantine accent]: The second question: Is the armed force in the state of Iraq currently in the hands of the Party?

The third question: There was talking about the case of September incidents: what was the reason behind that the National Command was late to explain its position regarding September incidents?

The fourth question: Comrade Saddam Hussein talked about the revolution of July 17th and the method in which it was done: why don't we use the same plan in order to work in the state of Syria?

[Saddam Hussein]: *[Starting with laughing out loud.]* Comrade Walid wants to put us in trouble! *[And he continues to laugh out loud].*

We can say by revolutionary standards that the army and all government services are in the hands of the Party and under its steering and its command **[55:00]**, based on the standards of the current stage. But is this all what we talk about within the stage is the whole ambition? The answer is no, we are still aspiring for the best, and the following stages are still recording better indications in regards to the army and in regards to every service of the government services. But we can say, and by the standards of the current stage, that the army service is about to be the control for the benefit of the Party and steering it is much firmer than that of any another service in the country; of the civil service, more than the Ministry of Justice, more than the Directorate General, for example, of the Frozen Assets, and more than any other directorate. But, and in order you don't tell me, just in case we sit here in this hall in front of another Nazim Guzar, you tell me and say "comrade Saddam, how did you tell us the story?!" This is also my speech and I don't deny the possibility of a new Nazim Guzar to appear upon us.

In the history of revolutionary work, comrades some of you might have read even more than

us in books of revolutionary work. These phenomena are present and will not disappear, and the attempts... I only want to explain something that might benefit the comrades. Let us imagine the treason... it is always... or any phenomenon that floats on the surface always has a direct connection with colonialism and imperialistic plots. However, there are two cases, a case where imperialism prepares the atmosphere for a phenomenon to emerge, and another case where a phenomenon emerges to the surface then the imperialism makes it subject to its plots and draws it to the positions where it suits them; meaning that the tribal mind-set was not found by imperialism, the tribal mind-set and the tribe was found before the existence of imperialism. But this phenomenon exists in the backward societies; imperialism picks it and converts it within its transitional and long term plotting and into a part of the process of harming the movement... the... the revolutionary movements, or to confront progressive regimes.

And on the other hand, the case of preparing the stage for conditions to make... make a sickening phenomenon emerge. For example, to always release negative rumors about the regime. Releasing rumors that talk about the strongest man, and the first man, and the second man, and the third man, and the fourth man; such as those you read in newspapers; with the goal to reach certain objectives; either it instigates humans against each other by [one of them to say why am I in the third rank? Let me become in the second rank! Isn't that so?

Or it would inflict the comrades with arrogance when the talk is about them or the revolutionists in the third world countries; and we ask all those dead and those alive of the revolutionists of the third world countries and tell them "How much would this influence you in making mistakes?" We would definitely be looking at a great number of mistakes and divisions that were going on among the ranks of the revolutionist movements because of the propaganda of the counter-media services and making it a focal point.

So the revolutionists would be inflicted with arrogance, as that who thinks that they are talking about him as the strong man, and the iron man, and the steel man, and so forth of descriptions which regretfully appeal to the revolutionists of the third world. So, he would behave as he is such and make mistakes against himself and against the revolutionaries working with him, and the things would lead to a series of divisions, and the results would reach to the purpose which was plotted by the colonialism in its plots.

The other aspect which imperialism uses to visualize things for some adventurers that all the doors are open in front of you, and you just need to make your move! So he would make his move and then finds himself in front of a back door that he did not account for, shut in his face! They would lay out every step as an open door, but in the following stage, an invisible wall stands in front of him with a tightly shut door in it and the guard is imperialism! [1:00:00] so, once he passes by it they will chop his head and the authority

would be for them.

These are the stages which sometimes they use to deal with revolutions affairs and in the issue of adventures and converting them for the benefit of their plot.

Some of you would definitely ask, and tell me, where is Nazim Guzar's connection with the foreign countries? I was asked with this question once during the State Congress and during the Advanced Cadre [*meeting*]. And I want to repeat the same answer here which is that during investigation, no connection the work happened appeared to be related with any foreign country. Some asked these devices in these three years and all of these capabilities he was performing... I mean, how could he obtain them?! And here the question goes back to the issues we explained, as when it was found within the information of Western Germany through a person whom Nazim Guzar relies upon, who is not a Ba'athist, and an individual with prior convictions... That whatever the more they furnish for Nazim Guzar more destruction means, the more he destroys the Ba'ath Party! Alright ...because this harms the reputation of the Ba'ath Party, so, where would they find better occasion to prepare these devices for him when he requests them! They would prepare them for him in a blink of an eye as long as they [Devices] are being used in evil acts and will cause damage... as results, yes, I am not saying that Nazim Guzar was using those devices and imported them specifically in order to inflict harm upon the Ba'ath Party, because Nazim Guzar is one of... was one of the strivers of the Ba'ath Party. Rather these matters shed light upon the formation which carried and prepared these devices and what drew our attention were these devices, and this photographing of individuals; he photographed the people who were working with him.

Okay... You photograph a member of the Pakistani military attaché, for example, or the Iranian, okay this is an intelligence work. But why would you photograph the other individual who does not have anything, who is just a civilian employee, a director general in the government of Iraq or a Deputy Minister?! On top of that he photographed them and did not bother to tell us "I..." alright you photograph, you should come and write a report in which you say... okay don't say that you photographed them because he expects that we definitely reject such styles. But you can say that this director general is not good to be a director general.

He collected all of these photographs! He did not attempt to write a report about them and he did not try to tell any entity. And they were questioned during the investigation: "What would you do with these photographs? You were collecting them, what would you benefit from them?" They would say: "By God, we don't know, and the director would order us and we would collect them."

The entirety of this image would give you an impression that matters are not free of some sort of connection, but [the question is if that connection] is direct? If we go back to the interpretation

which we provided prior to the receiving of the political authority, we would be mistaking. As it was interpreted, we say, we always ask ourselves, but not the question of: Is Kaddafi a hireling or a nationalist? Rather the question of: What is the service that acts through Qadhafi? I mean it is not sufficient enough to ask if Kaddafi is a nationalist or if Saddam is a nationalist! This is not enough! The important thing is for us to search for the services, and for the cadre around him, and upon whom he relies; those who steer the political cadre and who steer the affairs around him; and those who influence him in addition to the general political trends in which he plays.

The... what was that?

1:03:56 - [Levant MV]: Remaining [question] about the army.

1:04:00 – [Saddam Hussein]: No, we talked about the army.

1:04:04 – [Multiple MV]: [*apparently assisting Saddam to remember which question he answered and which one is still needed to be answered*].

1:04:09 – [Saddam Hussein]: What would Syria have to involve us in this action?! We are talking about this action because it has become a part of the past. We would not be talking if you asked us about it on the day of the 16th of July. We are talking about July's tactic because it has become a part of five years ago. But if we were asked this question on the day of the 16th of July, we would have said "we don't have anything." I mean we work with... we gathered the comrade a number of times. It [the gathering] took place twice, and the last time they discovered us and that is why we did not do the revolution of July, we did another form.

Before this date we had two attempts, as we were -you know all the comrades are present and they all know- we were gathering them in conferences and they would discuss the idea of power sharing by two ministers in the ministry of Tahir Yahya. **[1:05:00]** they were discussing seriously, a delegate of the leadership and would wait in a certain hour in order for us to tell him "Ok, you don't accept to share? Okay let's make a revolution!" We have tied it with the onset of the Revolution together in a certain time; as in the last time the discussion took long and it was done, and they remained waiting. Then they discovered that some of the comrades have discovered that the case is not the question of our participation in the rule and there must be a plan behind this story!

UNCLASSIFIEDNFOU0

So, my comrade, we were planning and wanted to join the comrades in an armed revolution against the narrow-minded regime and at the same time we would invite them into exclusive meetings based on the participation in the ministry. We would take on the resentment of the party service against us and accept it. As far as how could we take part in a narrow-minded regime! We would tell them, not a problem, and etcetera in relation to the stage. Is not that so? So twice [*the above took place*].

My point of the speech is always... although that this matter is left for the future, however everything is talked about at its time. Mean the revolutionary action uses numerous tactical styles depending on the awesomeness of the leadership and the assessments of the concerned stage. In other words not every tactical form will always fit every case and the evidence here is what is currently going on with the communist parties in the third world countries. It puts them in significant mistake... as they try to use the tactic used in the revolution of October!

Where is the tactic used in October of 1917 as they were using -they are still using- using the homing pigeon sometime! While now there is the computer, the telex, the express communication between Washington and its hirelings flows as [*fast as*] the lightning, meaning that opportunities are no longer given to Kerensky to gather-up on us, and to Lenin to gather-up on us!

These revolutions which took place in the third world countries must take place like a blink of an eye. I mean the strike shall be well-prepared, precise, and swift, whereas the reaction by the colonialism would not catch to rescue its hirelings to whom the strike is directed.

Of course, this is different from case to case. I mean it is possible that the conditions are ripe for a people's revolution in a country of the third world, and let's not forget that the nature of the ground shall tolerate. I.e. let's not think that what goes on in Vietnam can be transferred exactly as is to Saudi for example. Meaning, where can you on this flat land do a war of people's liberation in front of this modern technical armament?!

In Lenin's time, he was able to disband the army, the whole Caesarean army, and was able to build an army of workers and peasants at once. Because the rifle used that time was a single shot rifle which doesn't require a much sweat in physical training. You just lineup the rear and front sights [*of the rifle*] on the target, and they train the worker on using the rifle in seven day, is not that so? However now if... and so forth...

Sometimes, some of our comrades who have read about this experience would ask us in the beginning: Why would not you disband the army? Okay comrades, how would we disband the

army? This officer [*for example*] in order for you to train him to become a taxi leader -I mean taxiing pilot of an airplane and not a skilled pilot- he needs three years [of training]! Okay and now how a revolution would disband its army while it is surrounded small-minded powers which possess modern weapons and strong armies? I mean now is not like old times as the revolution in the Soviet Union was in a vast area of land and it was in the year 1917, and the military techniques of the old times are different than what you would find in Iraq. If you disband your army, Iran would take over you the next day, and would convert the whole system into a new system!

Anyhow, my point comrade Walid is that every stage has its own talk and every case has its own plans and tactics although the target is fixed. I mean the strategic target, what is militarily expressed as the logistic target, remains unchanged and the coloration [*meaning variation of tactics and actions*] occurs in the styles and transitional targets and their tactics. So, we cannot say that whatever applied in the revolution of 1968 can fit in a similar action in Syria, or in a similar action in Algeria, or in a similar action in Yemen, or in a similar action in any location of the world with the difference in the viewpoint, meaning naming examples by names does not mean an attempt for that purpose.

1:09:44 - [Levant MV]: I want to bring to the attention that we are in a party meeting and freedom, the whole freedom is due in party meetings, and I hope that we hear the opinions [**1:10:00**] of the comrades with complete candidness. Let's not reference to a newspaper or a magazine and so forth, because I am certain that there is no newspaper that had written about the internal system... so far about this story of the internal system. And in order for me not to fall in a mistake, I hope to provide with these newspapers and magazines which wrote about this story [*Inaudible*] and there is speech that has been heard or rumors being promotes leading to the creation of this misunderstanding. I rest assured that we will hear from our comrades about their inquiries in candid way.

And in regards to September [*TC: sound of water being poured from a container to another like a cup*], question about September. In fact we would not hide from you if we were -the National Command- was not completely agreeing upon the same atmosphere which comrade Abu-'Uday spoke about during those events and its interpretation influenced the delay. That is the reason in the delay of the publication however it did reach us at last to be common ground and issued a sufficient and complete publication... I mean, and according to what I remember, that it is more than twenty pages. This answer was distributed unless there are organizations that did not receive, and then we apologize.

1:11:19 - [UKN MV]: Comrade Faruq Hammudi.

Please, whoever is waiting for his turn is not required to record.

Comrade Faruq Hammudi.

1:11:32 - Faruq Hammudi: *[TN: the volume level of speaker's voice is very poor and not audible in numerous instances and is represented with Inaudible in square brackets whenever [Inaudible] or unintelligible].* *[Inaudible]* the party in the state of Iraq has a leading role *[Inaudible]* in directing other organizations in the Arab Homeland *[Inaudible]* the latest conspiracy *[Inaudible]*. Regarding achievements it realized in the state of Iraq during the following two days *[Inaudible]* in Iraq we observed with all *[Inaudible]* the achievements realized *[Inaudible]*. Our organizations abroad are with extreme regret *[Inaudible]* does not have this information at all. And apparently when you ask and we answer *[Inaudible]* and it is of the duty of the party to publicize its directives and the things it has in order for us to be able to use it in the development of its activities abroad. *[Inaudible]* because we do not live nor exercise the daily events. Therefore, the presence of any materials in our hands would help us do our duty in order for our activity to multiply by tens of times. And *[Inaudible]* if there were present events by you *[Inaudible]* at the international level and outside organizations. This is one point.

The other point is: We don't have that a newspaper reaches us abroad, not even al-Thawrah newspaper, it does not reach us at once as they arrive after a month or two... I mean *[Inaudible]* public and democratic, even the regular sections get them and we go to them in order to know the political analyses and news and *[Inaudible]*.

And we are who can, of course through our presence here *[Inaudible]* but we want to make benefit from the experiences *[Inaudible]* and we tell the Arab community and the foreigners through *[Inaudible]*.

The second point is *[Inaudible]* the National Command in the external activity, with extreme regrets this is very much absent *[Inaudible]* North America *[Inaudible]* numerous questions like: Why the news of the National Command does not reach us via publications and news-flashes about the other countries. Of course there is the internal newspaper which always provides us with cultural and ideological matters, but regrettably and in regards to other organizations *[Inaudible]* other activities. And this is very much absent.

Regarding the second point; it is about the latest conspiracy *[Inaudible]* that any party member, whether inside or outside *[Inaudible]*, are completely denouncing any attempt in order to impose a party opinion by the force of weapons and we, singular and groups, extremely denounce any justifications laid to accomplish these things by the weapon force but *[Inaudible]* and we know what are the reasons that lead to these things, and [we know what the] objective are *[Inaudible]* and did *[Inaudible]* tried to deal as necessary by the means of weapons? We deal with them within the organizations according to democratic customs in the proper way so as in the future we avoid

complications for the Party.

The last observation is about the Secretary General, Mr. Michel 'Aflaq, of course [*Inaudible*] comrade [*Inaudible*] is present by the recommendation of [*Inaudible*] why Mr. Michel 'Aflaq does not exercise his authorities as a party's secretary general? Why would not he have an active role? [*Inaudible*] in the National Command to carry out authorities and to perform his duty [*Inaudible*] not reprimanding the Secretary General [*Inaudible*].

In regards with comrade al-Samarra'i, [*Inaudible*] it did not stem from his blind belief [*Inaudible*] that is he really [*Inaudible*] he denied [*Inaudible*]

1:18:56 - Saddam Hussein: [*Inaudible*] [*speaker clears his throat*], the comrade who asks about an extensive series of cases, and all of these cases are crucial and a precise answer around them or about them must be provided.

We must admit, starting from the comrade and all the comrades, that the Party cadres at the levels of the state [*command*] and national [*command*], and which is available in our hands, is the least capability to cover all the tasks out there as they should. As far as the cadre... our national cadre concerned, which we seek and crave for, that the Party shall raise the slogan **[1:20:00]** of... consolidating and defense of the Revolution is of its first duties. And not just raising this slogan, but apply it as well. So it would be in place of a tax charged upon any organization, wherever existed in the world.

A number of comrades come and contribute in the construction of the revolution, and in its development, and to interact with it. Because the revolution is not only in need of an effort from the Party from everywhere in order to protect it and build it, but for it being as the revolution of the Party is also in need of this form in order for all the comrades to take part in a unified vision about the nature of marching of the revolution and about the necessities of its work; and about the necessities of protecting it and about the necessities of developing it. And this cannot only be done by reading about what goes on about the revolution, but rather many comrades from the Arab Homeland, and from the world, ought to be present in this state and carry out the process of construction directly and actually.

The other reason, the state residues cannot be displaced by think..., by theoretical education, but there ought to be a practical exercise on the road of achieving this purpose.

The comrades in the state of Iraq see in their offices and in the factory and on the farm and in the official offices, [they see] comrades for them from all over the Arab Homeland and the world who are contributing with the same enthusiasm and with the same care, they contribute into the process of construction of the revolution. This will definitely have a basic and a main role, and even more active -if I could be creative in this field- than the role of theoretical

education in order to push away the state-based thinking and the illnesses of the state-based thinking and so forth.

This did not happen so far, and I pointed out that some party organizations -and I spoke in a nonparty related form- in which I said that we tried to beg to comrades to at least support our actions in the offices of the National Command in writing. Previously, for your information, the struggling affairs and the secret works was occupying them from being able to get to the process of self-education, or even to view the details about the culture of the Party like the opportunity which other comrades in other location of the Arab Homeland and the world have.

From the other hand... and here I want to be creative and leave it for the National Command in its meeting to discuss this creativity. I am from those who believe that the world cannot anymore... I mean... the ratio of the philosophers produced by the world is not as the same ratio of the philosophers which it was producing in the year 1920 anymore, or during the nineteenth century. And reason behind this [*is that*] philosophy needs two things: contemplation and dedication of detailed, deep, and broad reading, as the current circumstances of the world cannot anymore make any human capable to isolate from the world for seven years or ten years in order for him to contemplate and write a book and read it.

So we are not waited to come and contemplate and isolate and issue a new book to be added onto the library of our Party. And this thing being added to the ideology of our Party in my opinion and in my estimate is the reaction with the revolution itself and it is the addition of what is a new thing for the benefit of the Party ideology and its analysis.

I mean, the process keeps going -the revolution proves- [*keeps going*] forward plus the connection of this process to the party ideology, as the analysis is ongoing... the relation of the Agricultural Reform with the ideology of the Party... what goes on?! Where did we miss? Where did we hit on target? Is not that so? And then the addition of new ideas; new ideas are not added in regards to the real revolutionary action through contemplation and isolation, but they are added through the actual exercising of the leadership role in the process of construction of the revolution and of the government. And here the... I want to also say. **[1:25:00]** And saying may not be true one hundred percent, but I believe it is true to a significant extent, that if we read the books of Lenin in which we find a real life is in those books written, or rather said by him and then become into books after the Communist Party took over the rule in October of 1917.

So, for another additional reason, my comrades, that there are capabilities in this Party, we would hear and we would seek and we would crave, and we would crave -by God- to go to

Argentina in order to see what is going on! And to go to Cuba... you were telling me let's go to Cuba for few years in order to see this experience.

Okay, why would not you come to your Party and see this experience?! I mean why in the summer vacation, we would not crave and domesticate ourselves, instead of spending all of it for example in West Germany, we shall spend a whole month of it by coming and publically seeing the experience of our Party and criticize it from close locations. Let's not criticize it from there, let's criticize from here! When we interact with it, we would be able to criticize it with a stinging criticism about its mistakes and we would be able to criticize it with a creative criticism in order to advance forward.

And return and say, what the comrade kindly addressed... the issue of informing the party service in order to unify the view and find the education about what goes on in the state of Iraq, and which is a fruit of their Party and practically it is the effort of their strivers wherever they exist, whether inside the state of Iraq or outside of it. See, we are carrying out this role on behalf of you. I mean, only because we are in the state and because the condition of each one of us has its rank in a certain position. Otherwise supposedly... I mean... if we give up this role, you should not give it up, because the process is out of that when it was the 17th - 30th July process where it could have been done by other than your Iraqi comrades.

Now the turn comes to the building of a country, and for this all the efforts must come shoulder to shoulder in order for the building to be in the direction of which the strivers of the Party are seeking.

So we, my comrades, I return and say, and in order for me to show an aspect of the practical excuse and from another aspect to criticize myself, is namely the National Command...

In the state of Iraq, the circumstances in which the Party went through were harsh, and the Party lost many of its advanced cadres during the period between the years 1963 and 1968 because of the divisions and blocs, and the unjust despair because of which the harsh conditions came upon the Party to make blocs.

The Party in the state of Iraq is above all of that, you see... It is new based on the standards of the experiences of revolutionary actions. It started in the year 1953... Right Mr. Shibli? I cannot talk about the history of the Party while you are present because you are the talk of the time in these matters.

So it started during 1952 - 1953 and took over the rule in 1963... I mean its age was ten year, isn't it? I mean this age is not fit for a revolutionary movement with a rich experience at the national level, while it did not have prior experience to take it as support such as the case with the communist parties, where it is true that the age of so-and-so communist party is twenty years but along with it comes the experience of the rule in the Soviet Union with the

age of 57 years! So the case is different here...

We come back and say that these are our circumstances, our cadres are few, and yes the Party is valiant, striving, faithful, and the strivers work in it day and night, a constant movement. But in ourselves we must admit in front of you that our cadre is incapable to cover at once, and from all fronts, all of its works and deal with the things in a satisfactory way as some times what happens?! We place priorities in the fronts, so we pull strivers out from so-and-so front and pile them up in the so-and-so front, we clear it and then move again, and like what we talked about in this subject goes on. **[1:30:00]** the day before yesterday the process of checking other fronts on the expense of the front which required to being cleared with higher priority according to our assessments.... the assessments of the leadership in a certain stage. And if we had the sufficient number of Party strivers and of its cadres... if nationally the Party assist itself, now we would have been, the marching would have scored a hike probably multiplied by another number than what we have now.

And the reason, we come back to the origin of the question which the comrade kindly addressed, and which we must deal with it, and it is not sufficient enough to provide excuses even if they were acceptable by you. Our education become to provide the writers, except for the cadres who added to the educational library [*Audio cuts out and ends at 01:30:48*]

01:30:48 - 01:34:38: [Blank]