

Forms, Methods, and Organization of Intelligence Work from Illegal Positions¹

Introduction

Intelligence conducted from illegal positions consists of intelligence officers operating abroad not using legal cover, i.e. with documents of Polish institutions. They are not employees of PRL representations abroad, nor do they use Polish passports. Conventionally, we identify such intelligence with the letter "N" and we speak in our professional language of "N" intelligence, illegal intelligence, or intelligence work of intelligence officers from illegal positions. It is illegal because it is based on fictitious personal documents and a fictitious biography. We call such intelligence officers illegal, or colloquially, illegals.

Organizing an illegal intelligence apparatus in capitalist countries is not a simple or easy matter. It is much simpler to organize an intelligence apparatus by covering intelligence activities with diplomatic service, commercial work, etc.

However, an intelligence apparatus organized from illegal positions has a huge advantage over an apparatus created based on the cover provided by legal Polish institutions. This advantage lies primarily in better clandestinity, freedom of action resulting from the lack of permanent hostile counterintelligence surveillance, and the possibility of conducting intelligence work under any conditions: after a break in diplomatic relations, during wartime, etc.

In the current international situation, with the existence of two social systems, when there is a constant struggle between capitalism and socialism, when aggressive imperialism provokes armed conflicts and threatens peace, the work of illegal intelligence takes on special significance. Every armed conflict, every break of diplomatic relations, every instance of increased surveillance on our foreign representations places us in a situation that requires a well-organized and well-working intelligence apparatus operating from illegal positions.

Only on the basis of such an organized apparatus can we ensure uninterrupted continuity in intelligence work, deeply penetrate enemy objects of interest to us, and obtain timely information about hostile intentions and plans in relation to our homeland.

This document explains the organizational principles, forms, and methods of illegal intelligence work. It should be assumed that studying these principles will not only benefit those who work directly from illegal positions but will encourage cooperation with this department and the use of some of its forms and methods of work for those employees who conduct intelligence work from legal positions.

¹ Ministry of the Interior, Warsaw, date not specified, but likely early 1970s. Institute of National Remembrance, file number IPN BU 3484/75.

I. GENERAL CONCEPT OF THE WORK OF INTELLIGENCE FROM ILLEGAL POSITIONS.

Intelligence activities from illegal positions are by no means a new form of intelligence. Ever since there has been a need to obtain secret information about an opponent, illegal forms of intelligence have been used.

This form of intelligence was actively used by the bourgeois states in their struggle for primacy in world politics and economics, the conquest of colonies, etc.

The following give us extensive experience of operating in illegal conditions:

- the history of the creation and fight of the CPSU in the period of preparation for the socialist revolution,
- the activities of our Party and other communist and workers' parties during their heroic struggles against their own bourgeois regimes and the Nazi occupier,
- the activities of communist parties in imperialist countries, especially in those where communist parties are officially banned and thus forced to enter a deep underground.

The history of the creation and operation of communist and workers' parties is full of examples when various forms of illegal work were successfully used in the execution of very complex and responsible tasks.

Intelligence services from socialist countries creatively use all this rich experience when organizing intelligence work from an illegal position abroad.

Recently, the significance of this form of intelligence has increased significantly due to the deterioration of the intelligence situation in many capitalist countries, and therefore difficulties that have arisen in conducting intelligence from "legal" positions.

Unlike intelligence activity using legal cover, in which intelligence offices and collaborators travel to capitalist countries as employees of official P.R.L. representations abroad, as members of various delegations, or as tourists and mask their intelligence activities by performing official duties, intelligence work from illegal positions is organized from the very beginning in such a way that it does not have any visible communication with the official representations of our state.

In work from an illegal position, intelligence officers and agents are specially prepared and supplied with necessary documents as citizens of foreign countries when traveling to capitalist countries. They settle there as local citizens of any allied country as stateless persons.

They conceal their intelligence activities by working in state institutions, enterprises, companies or private industrial, commercial, free professions, etc.

When considering the problem of organizing intelligence from illegal positions in capitalist countries, specific characteristics should be taken into account, related to the fact that the security service must send its intelligence agents to countries with a different social system.

For example, English intelligence can send its intelligence agent to another capitalist country under the cover of an English merchant. He does not have to change his citizenship or nationality, because he will not be exposed to intrusive and continuous counterintelligence surveillance.

Consequently, the organizational forms of illegal intelligence depend on objectively existing possibilities of their application.

For example, the intelligence services of imperialist countries may use numerous emigration and displaced persons on a large scale as a recruitment base for conducting illegal intelligence in socialist countries. Among this category of people, it is easy to find traitors to the homeland and supporters of capitalism, who can be dispatched to our countries under the cover of repatriates and re-emigrants.

Our intelligence does not have such opportunities. When we send our intelligence officer to a capitalist country, we provide him with appropriate documents that would confirm his citizenship and nationality to any country with a capitalist system--other solutions should not be rejected, but they are not typical. Only in this case our intelligence officer can effectively deal with intelligence activities without attracting the attention of local authorities.

This is explained by the fact that local counterintelligence and police services in capitalist countries are particularly suspicious of and systematically organize agent and operational surveillance against citizens of socialist countries residing there.

Additionally, our intelligence officer often faces psychological and living difficulties. He comes to a new bourgeois world for him, in which people live in many ways differently than in our society. It takes no small effort, time, and willpower to "survive" in the tone of the new capitalist world.

When organizing work from illegal positions, our intelligence service primarily relies on recruiting staff--intelligence officers and secret collaborators--from among our own citizens completely devoted to their homeland.

Citizens of other nationalities who have been living in our country for a long time and consider our country as their homeland may also be used.

When organizing an illegal intelligence apparatus, we can also use citizens of capitalist countries who are our loyal agents and who are proven in practical activities.

The organization of illegal intelligence residencies in capitalist countries should be based on specific tasks facing our intelligence. It is desirable to have illegal intelligence residencies in those capitalist states that are of particular interest to us and in which the complex intelligence situation and the severe law enforcement system seriously inhibit intelligence work from legal positions.

II. FORMS AND RULES OF ORGANIZING ILLEGAL INTELLIGENCE RESIDENCIES / CELLS / ABROAD.

The basic organizational forms of illegal intelligence residencies / cells / abroad can be:

- residencies,
- intelligence groups,
- separate intelligence agents or independent agents.

The most complicated is to organize illegal residencies.

We call residencies illegal when they consist of staff intelligence officers and agents operating from illegal positions.

In individual cases, illegal residencies may be completely made up of reliable agents - foreigners who have their own bona fide or fictitious documents.

The illegal residency apparatus is typically small. The practice of intelligence work shows that creating illegal residencies with a large number of intelligence agents is ineffective for both organizational and operational security reasons.

Communication from the Center to illegal residencies is organized using independent channels.

Illegal intelligence uses "legal" residencies' communication capabilities with the Center only in special cases when it is necessary for organizing the operation better.

Depending on the assigned tasks, illegal residencies may conduct their activities in one or several directions (political, economic, scientific and technical, military, etc.), ensuring systematic acquisition of valuable intelligence materials and carrying out other agent and operational tasks.

If necessary, special purpose illegal residencies are created, for example, to perform an important and complicated task or to carry out a responsible operational project. After completing the task, such residencies are dissolved or receive other tasks.

Intelligence groups can work independently without any connections between them. Their number in a single country can be unlimited. The same principles apply to separate and independent officers and agents. They can have independent communications with the Center just as intelligence groups. In justified cases, these intelligence cells can be subordinated to residencies.

Rules for organizing illegal intelligence residencies.

When organizing intelligence residencies on the territory of capitalist states, our intelligence should be guided by the rich experience of the underground activities of communist parties and adhere to certain principles ensuring political and psychological resilience as well as offensive and flexibility in action.

The basic principles of organization and work of intelligence facilities are: operational security, operability, and constant mobilization readiness.

Operational Security.

This is one of the main conditions for organizing the work of illegal intelligence residencies. Operational security should be observed not only in the intelligence officer's clandestine operations but also in his personal life abroad.

The principles of operational security must be followed by illegal intelligence agents from the very beginning of their preparation for illegal work.

The requirements of operational security to be considered when organizing illegal work are as follows:

- a) The illegal residency or other intelligence base should consist of a small number of personnel. It is better to organize several unrelated intelligence groups in the opponent's country than one large residency. The smaller - in terms of composition - the intelligence cell, the more secretive and less endangered by local counterintelligence authorities it is.
- b) When organizing an illegal intelligence cell, it should involve a minimum number of intelligence personnel, especially agents. It is absolutely forbidden to use the capabilities of communist and workers' parties in capitalist countries in these matters. It must be remembered that the participation of communists within capitalist countries in the work of socialist intelligence can cause unpredictable political damage to a communist party. Furthermore, in the event that local communists are under observation, local counterintelligence can lead to the trail of our illegal residency.
- c) Each illegal intelligence residency operates independently. Residency staff should not be privy to the existence and activity of other illegal cells in one or another capitalist country.
- d) Only the resident can know the legalization details of illegal intelligence subordinates. Line personnel should know their supervisor only by face and by the name he gives them, but they should not know his legalization details, place of work, or home address. They should have legends that explain their mutual knowledge and contact with the resident in case they need to explain the reason for maintaining relations between them.

- e) Residency personnel that are employed by an intelligence organization should not know each other. If the need to meet two illegals arises in individual work-related cases, these meetings are organized clandestinely based on a strong cover legend.
- f) Employees of intelligence residencies should have no contact with employees of "legal" residencies. Only in exceptional cases is the illegal call allowed to establish or maintain permanent contact with a "legal" residency. In these cases, contact with the "legal" residency is personally maintained by the resident managing the residency or a permanent liaison officer.

It is unacceptable for all employees of an illegal residency to maintain regular contact with "legal" residencies. The "legal" residency should also seek to limit the number of its employees knowledgeable of the existence of an illegal intelligence cell associated with it.

Operability.

This is the second basic principle that should be followed when organizing the work of illegal intelligence residencies.

Operability of work means:

- the ability to perform assigned intelligence task in the minimum time,
- correctly understanding and executing management orders and quickly sending intelligence materials to the Center,
- the ability to reorganize work in accordance with assignments and constantly changing conditions.

The ability to communicate with the Center and with agents without interruption and disruption plays a decisive role in ensuring the operability of illegal residencies.

Also important in the work of illegal intelligence cells is strict discipline, which ensures precision in operations and guarantees operability and mobilizes action.

Mobilization readiness.

This is the third basic principle in illegal intelligence, which means the ability to quickly adapt work in the event of a sharp deterioration of the intelligence situation in a given country or when the illegal intelligence cell is assigned new tasks.

The Center and illegal intelligence residencies should plan in advance to create the necessary conditions for uninterrupted intelligence work regardless of the changing situation in a given country.

For these purposes are used:

- backup methods of operational technique,
- backup communication channels,
- clandestine facilities, addresses, and phones,
- financial resources.

In the event of a threat of compromise, every illegal officer should have back-up documents in a different name, which are stored in a secure but easily accessible location. It is also absolutely necessary for the intelligence residency to have spare operational funds.

In addition to existing illegal intelligence residencies, backup residencies may be created. They are activated when required by operational needs or in a complicated intelligence situation. Of course, they are activated on orders of the Center.

These are the basic principles and forms of organizing intelligence work from illegal positions.

III. POSITIVE ASPECTS (BENEFITS) OF CONDUCTING INTELLIGENCE FROM ILLEGAL POSITIONS COMPARED TO INTELLIGENCE FROM LEGAL POSITIONS

Intelligence activities from illegal positions have a number of very significant advantages compared to intelligence from legal covers.

It is known that the creation of "legal" residences in the countries under development is possible only if there are official institutions of our state there (embassy, consulate, commercial representation, etc.).

Every official institution abroad and every citizen residing there are, to a greater or lesser extent, under the surveillance of the opponent's intelligence and counterintelligence bodies.

Telephone conversations by staff members are intercepted and their private correspondence that passes through the local post office is subjected to strict control. Eavesdropping technology is often installed in office and living quarters. There are permanent outdoor observation points next to the buildings where they work or live. In many capitalist countries, it is impossible for any employee of our embassy or commercial establishment to travel to another city without first informing local authorities and obtaining the appropriate permission.

All this, naturally, makes it very difficult to conduct intelligence operations and, first and foremost, work with agents. Our "legal" residences have a particular difficulty acquiring new agent networks.

Staff in our official establishments, due to their official duties, are forced to maintain relations with employees of official local institutions, organizations, and foreign institutions that undoubtedly include among them many adversarial intelligence officers and agents.

Overt contact by personnel in our "legal" residences with people who do not have direct or indirect business relations with our facilities prompts suspicion and surveillance by local counterintelligence authorities and law enforcement.

Illegal intelligence officers operating in an opponent's country as local citizens or citizens of other "friendly capitalist states" are not the subject of observation by local counterintelligence organs or police, of course, if they avoid drawing attention to themselves by ill-considered and careless actions. They are not under the opponent's suspicion and therefore they are not exposed to double agents or surveillance by local counterintelligence, methods that are constantly used against intelligence officers working from legal positions.

Illegal intelligence officers as local citizens or friendly foreigners have open access to parts of the country and to social spheres where it is difficult for "legal" residents to obtain intelligence.

For understandable reasons, illegal intelligence officers always try to stay as far as possible from the local progressive circles, which also contributes to strengthening their position as loyal citizens in a developed country.

If illegal intelligence officers follow the rules of operational security, then even in the event of an accident in an agent network operation, they do not necessarily fall under the scrutiny of local counterintelligence, and in the event of serious danger they can escape the developed country in time or change their place of residence and personal documents.

Often, a "legal" residency is forced to reduce the number of meetings or temporarily suspend work with some valuable agents as a result of the deterioration of the intelligence situation. Reducing the frequency of meetings with an agent network or suspending communication with it for a certain period of time undoubtedly negatively affects the results of intelligence work.

Sometimes it is only for this reason that our intelligence service lags behind events on some issues and cannot get the intelligence information it needs in a timely manner. This situation is particularly unfortunate when the intelligence service has an agent network capable of providing important information, but "legal" residencies cannot ensure timely receipt of the information merely because intelligence officers who have contacts among the appropriate agents are under intense surveillance by the opponent's counterintelligence service.

An illegal intelligence officer acting as a typical loyal citizen of a foreign country can successfully and constantly work with a valuable agent network and make the most of all its operational capabilities, regardless of a deterioration in the intelligence situation.

At certain times, when, as a result of a deterioration of the intelligence situation, "legal" residences' operations are completely paralyzed, intelligence from illegal positions becomes the basic, and often the only, form of our intelligence activities.

Such difficulties may arise during the time of war or as a result of severing diplomatic relations. For example, in the early years of the Soviet Union, which had very limited diplomatic relations with capitalist countries, Soviet intelligence could only employ illegal forms of intelligence work.

Thus, intelligence operations from illegal positions can be carried out regardless of whether we have diplomatic or other relations with developed capitalist countries. They can be conducted in any international situation, even when our country is in a state of war.

At such a time, the best way to overcome difficulties is to establish an illegal intelligence residency with personnel using documents of foreigners of an allied country, because they will not be subject to war mobilization.

Some "legal" residencies, after having received from an agent network interesting recruitment targets among the personnel of important enemy facilities, face great difficulties in using them

and in developing the selected persons for recruitment. In such cases, illegal officers may be of great assistance to "legal" residencies.

Other tasks can also be carried out in this way. For example, locating an agent with whom contact has been lost, or renewing and continuing communication with valuable agents living in cities inaccessible to intelligence officer under legal cover.

Based on the foregoing, illegal intelligence has a number of advantages. The basic ones are:

- ability to work in the most complex conditions,
- no territorial restrictions,
- no constant adversarial surveillance,
- relatively greater (compared to "legal") security in working with agents.

It goes without saying that in order to take advantage of these advantages, one must strictly adhere to the basic principles of organizing operations from illegal positions.

While fully appreciating the advantages of illegal intelligence discussed above, one should be aware of the great difficulties associated with organizing and conducting these operations. Creating illegal residencies and other intelligence facilities requires our intelligence personnel to be very resourceful and persistent in their work. Organizations dispatching an officer or colleague to a foreign country, legalization, creating cover for him, etc., are very complicated tasks that require special and sometimes lengthy preparation.

Despite these difficulties, the great benefits of intelligence operations from illegal positions must be fully appreciated, and good organization of illegal intelligence should be our most important task, because only illegal intelligence opens up a wide range of opportunities for constant and systematic acquisition of valuable information.

IV. SELECTION AND TRAINING OF ILLEGAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TO WORK ABROAD.

Preparing intelligence agents for illegal work abroad takes a long time (about 2 years, and sometimes longer).

Work to organize an intelligence facility can be divided into the following stages:

- selection of candidates suitable for illegal intelligence work,
- proper training and preparation of candidates,
- provision of appropriate documents, instruction and transfer abroad.

An illegal intelligence officer should be prepared so that he can play the role of the person whose legalization documents he will use well. He should have a duly authorized résumé, necessary documents confirming his identity, and finally a profession that would serve him as a legal source of livelihood and facilitate the performance of intelligence tasks.

When looking for suitable candidates, you should first consider personnel from the security service. It is also possible in some cases, that a candidate can be selected for a time from our counterintelligence service and hired for operational purposes.

In addition, secret collaborators and even some agents should be considered if they are closely connected with us. Besides suitability for illegal work, their loyalty to us and their operational experience are requirements that must be taken into account to give the best results.

When selecting candidates, remember that an illegal intelligence officer should be a person devoted to the People's Poland and the cause of socialism.

He should have:

- unlimited devotion to the homeland,
- intransigence towards the enemies of socialism,
- honesty and integrity,
- devotion to our service, discipline and proper attitude to our duties.

An illegal intelligence officer should be characterized by a strong will, self-control, and the ability to make the sound decisions in difficult situations.

He should be brave, persistent in pursuit of the goal, clever and cunning, have a great sense of responsibility, be able to make decisions independently, be offensive in his work, and boldly

accept reasonable risk. At the same time, he must pay attention to minor obstacles that may affect the overall work. That is why he must constantly remember his duty to vigilance, operational security, and discipline.

Personal initiative plays a significant role in intelligence work. Sensible and rational initiative by no means contradicts adherence to conscious discipline and uncompromising execution of orders from the Center. Personal initiative allows the intelligence officer to approach orders from Headquarters creatively, which promotes better performance of intelligence tasks.

An illegal intelligence officer should know the country where he will operate and his country of "origin" in accordance with his legalization documents. He should have a perfect command of the foreign language that corresponds to his legend, and he should know his cover profession.

The above characteristics should be taken into account when selecting candidates for illegal work.

Next, we will discuss the preparation of the intelligence officer for illegal work abroad.

a. Ideological and political training.

Implementation should be in terms of ideological and political questions. The training program should include selected issues related to both Marxist and bourgeois philosophy, sociology and economics. In addition, the trainee must be familiarized with issues related to the foreign and internal policy of the country to which he will be dispatched, as well as with the international situation and the direction of our policy.

This is vital, because he will live and work in a foreign country away from his homeland, in bourgeois society.

Only an intelligence officer that is well prepared ideologically and politically can deliberately and correctly analyze and evaluate political events and understand the essence of class struggle well and react independently and make timely political and operational decisions.

b. Training in foreign languages.

An illegal intelligence officer cannot practice his profession without a good command of foreign languages. Therefore, he should have excellent proficiency in at least one foreign language.

If the intelligence officer is dispatched to a country of interest under the cover of a citizen of another capitalist country where he was "born" and "raised," he should know both the language of the country where he is operating and the language of the country of his "origin," i.e. his "native" language.

When learning foreign languages, the future illegal intelligence officer should pay special attention to the pronunciation and dialect proper to the city in which the legend was born and raised.

For example, the language of Paris is very different from the pronunciation of a Frenchman from the Spanish or Italian border, and the pronunciation of a German from Bavaria is different from the dialect of a German from Berlin or Hamburg, etc.

When learning a foreign language, it is sometimes difficult to eliminate a native accent. In this case, it is necessary to include in the officer's legend elements that would explain a different accent in his "native" language, because the accent can sometimes determine the speaker's origin.

To explain another accent, for example, an American passport is convenient, because among Americans you can meet a large number of people who speak English with an Italian, Spanish, Polish, Russian, or other accent, which can be successfully used in the legend.

During World War II and in the early post-war years, major changes occurred in the places where people resided. Many people moved from one country to another and settled there, and some of them took local citizenship. A different accent with these people will always be justified. This circumstance can also be used in legends developed for illegal intelligence officers.

c. Preparation in the officer's cover profession.

While in a foreign country, an intelligence officer should have a profession that could serve as cover for his intelligence activities and justify his source of livelihood and residence in a given country. There may sometimes be exceptions, e.g. getting married, "finding" a family, etc.

University studies can also be an exception. However, also in this case, if the dispatched intelligence officer is of a mature age, he should have a profession that would justify a means of income until he entered university and during his studies.

It should be emphasized that studying in capitalist countries is good cover for illegal intelligence. It allows for sufficient free time needed for intelligence work. It is very convenient to enter a university as a single student. If it becomes necessary to extend the stay in a given country, the officer can enter another university after completing one degree.

Cover professions can be varied and the choice of profession often depends on many circumstances:

- on the nature of the tasks facing illegal residency,
- on illegal intelligence officer's legend,

- on the officer's personal characteristics,
- on intelligence situation in a given country, etc.

It is best that the officer is specially prepared and educated in an occupation that is most needed and sought after in a given country at a given time. This makes it easier to settle and obtain citizenship.

The officer must know all the features of his profession and work in it as is characteristic of the country in which he obtained it according to the legend, in order to mask where he actually graduated. For example, when preparing for the role of a tailor from Vienna, it is not enough to just be able to sew clothes, but you need to master the styles that are typical for Viennese tailors, etc.

d. Vocational training / intelligence and technical / operational training /.

The illegal intelligence officer should know well the country where he will be operating and his country of "origin." He should know the economic situation, political life, state system, structure of the state apparatus, traditions and customs of the population, literature, art, religion, etc. In addition, he should study all the intelligence and official materials possessed by the Center depicting the so-called intelligence situation of these countries.

He should be familiar with all communication methods, surveillance and counter-surveillance methods, and methods for detecting and evading surveillance, not only theoretically but practically.

He should also be able to operate and make arrangements clandestinely. He should also be taught operational tradecraft -- photography, microphotography, secret writing, ciphers, radio communications, etc. -- because he will use it in the field and, in particular cases, teach it to agents.

Operational tradecraft plays an important role in the work of illegal intelligence cells because in modern conditions, reliable and uninterrupted communication with the Center is often not possible without operational tradecraft.

For illegal intelligence cells, it is preferable to identify intelligence officers who already possess operational experience, are able to conduct agent operations, and can practically implement operational plans, recruit agents, and manage and organize communications.

However, operational necessity forces us to send intelligence officers abroad who do not have experience in practical operational work. They should be well trained and prepared to operate. Only then can they quickly acquire appropriate field experience and successfully perform their

tasks. The skillful management of a young intelligence officer by an experienced resident plays a large role in acquiring this practice.

In some cases, the preparation of an illegal intelligence officer may be organized in a so-called intermediate country. Before the intelligence officer goes to the destination country, it is sometimes necessary for him to live for a certain period of time in his country of "origin" or in any third country similar in language, traditions, and customs to the country of "origin." The intelligence officer adjusts there to the role he will play in the operational country. He undergoes further professional and operational training and supplements the information about his country of "origin" and the destination country, which he acquired in at home.

To reside in an intermediate country, the intelligence officer deals with formalities of a citizen of any capitalist country who possesses relevant documents.

Being in an intermediate country becomes particularly important if the country chooses intelligence officers with "homeland" cover. While in the intermediate country, the intelligence officer not only perfects the "native" language and becomes familiar with the traditions and customs of the population, but he also learns his "homeland" to the minutest details. He should know, for example, "his" village or city, street, and house where he "lived," friends and school and university teachers, supervisors in "his" previous work place, comrades from the army, people widely known in the city, etc.

In this way, he carefully refines all the details of his legend biography.

If it is not possible for the intelligence agent to stay in the cover "homeland" for a long time, he should at least spend time there vacationing. When traveling around the "home" country, the intelligence officer will get an idea of how his "fellow countrymen" live; and become acquainted with the passport, currency, and customs system, with entry and exit regulations, and with some elements of the habits and customs of his "countrymen," etc.

In the event of operational need, an illegal intelligence officer also learns judo throws, how to wield a firearm, drive a car, drive a motorboat, ice skate and ski, play tennis, dance, etc.

V. DISPATCH ABROAD AND LEGALIZATION OF AN ILLEGAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

In order to dispatch an illegal intelligence officer to a foreign country in which he will conduct intelligence work and settle him there for a long-term stay as a citizen of any capitalist state, it takes a great deal of work that requires much effort, perseverance, persistence, and operability from all employees involved.

The dispatch of intelligence officers abroad can be done in the following ways:

- Entering the destination country using basic documents to complete all formalities related to residence in the country. In this case, entry is generally from the intermediate country to which the intelligence officer had previously arrived using other documents (called indirect documents).
- Illegal crossing of the border, illegal disembarkation, dropping from a parachute, etc. In this case the intelligence officer immediately uses the basic documents.
- Legal border crossing of the country of destination based on the so-called "intermediate" documents used only temporarily, followed by legalization based on basic documents.

The choice of method depends primarily on the operationally developed intelligence résumé. For example, if according to the legend, an illegal was born in the destination country and had not traveled anywhere else, then he should enter illegally or on the basis of indirect documents, so that the documents he will use while residing in the given country bear no traces of travel to other countries.

In other cases, to facilitate the intelligence officer's entry into the destination country, an appropriately placed agent is used, from which we receive the necessary cover, recommendation, or guarantee. This is necessary when recommendations of consulates, banks, commercial companies, known buyers, etc., are required to obtain a visa; when a foreigner required a guarantee from someone to enter the country from abroad, etc.

In these cases, the role of the agent can be different.

For example, if our proven and reliable agent informs a business in a capitalist country that he can employ our intelligence officer for a certain period of time, then he can be transferred to the country of destination as his company's sales representative.

It could be that, with our financial backing, an agent opens a commercial or industrial enterprise and takes on the officer in the role of a partner. Sometimes an agent can endorse an officer as a good partner to his friend who has an enterprise, can give a surety, recommend, etc.

It is emphasized once again that such agents should be thoroughly checked in the course of intelligence work and absolutely sure.

Legalization of illegal intelligence officers.

Under legalization of intelligence from illegal positions we mean the process of an intelligence officer embarking on a new life base on a legend developed for him and supported by relevant documents: entry into the destination country, establishing cover, and providing conditions that allow him to stay in the country legally for the period of time necessary for intelligence.

The basic elements of legalization are, legend, documentation, and cover.

a. Legend.

The legend is a fictitious biography, supported by relevant documents, that an illegal intelligence officer has deeply assimilated. The biography can be completely fabricated, but it is better if it partially or completely replicates another person's life. The primary goal of the résumé legend is to provide proof and confirmation, with appropriately chosen data, that the intelligence officer is the person he is claiming to be. The legend allows the illegal to explain the basis on which he obtained or has the right to obtain citizenship in a given country, explain his life history as reflected his documents, etc.

The legend should be simple and natural. It should contain no contradictions that would raise doubts as to its veracity. The legend should be natural and easy to remember. It would be unnatural, for example, for the intelligence officer to claim, according to the legend, to be the son of a poor family (a worker, peasant, etc.), but to travel to another country for higher education that would require significant financial resources.

To make such a legend plausible, it would be necessary to introduce, for example, an "aunt" or "uncle," who provides a specific amount of money especially for that purpose, i.e., to obtain a higher education abroad.

The legend should be composed so that, if it is checked, it can be easily confirmed by relevant facts, documents, notes, witnesses, etc. If this cannot be done, then the legend should be composed in such a way as to make it difficult to check. There are many ways to obstruct police examination of a legend. All decisions in such matters should take into account the individual nature of the legend.

For example, events during wartime offer opportunities in this regard. Much of the data in a legend can be attributed to cities that were more or less destroyed during the last war. It is also possible to use other events related to the war in the legend, such as the relocation of a large numbers of people from one country to another, or the intelligence officer's "parents" or himself spent time in captivity, etc.

However, it should always be ensured that archives covering those years have not actually survived, or that they are in our hands and thus not accessible to the opponent.

Some “facts” can be created to reinforce the legend. For example, placing gravestones in the cemetery where “parents” are buried, etc.

The legend is developed at the Center together with the intelligence officer. This should be a very important part of intelligence preparation.

The intelligence officer should not depart from his legend or add any new elements to it.

It is inadvisable to reveal the details of a legend biography openly and among contacts if there is no special operational need to do so. However, it is permissible to reinforce the details of the legend. For example, an intelligence officer can talk about facts from his “parents” life, about their character traits, habits, inclinations, etc., in the course of inevitable conversations with people around him in a loose and inobtrusive way. This kind of reinforcement makes the legend more natural and gives it the appearance of greater authenticity.

An illegal intelligence officer should master all details of the legend perfectly. Experience shows that unfamiliarity with or ignorance about discrete details of the legend, even if they seem insignificant at first glance, sometimes leads to operational compromise. This is confirmed by past examples of how inadequate mastery of a “native accent” or ignorance of the details of a “homeland’s” coat of arms have led to an officer’s demise.

An illegal intelligence officer (we will call him “Spaniard”) was supposed to travel from Mexico to the United States. For this trip he decided to use the entry and exit permits belonging to a substituted person - a real Mexican. The document was signed by the latter. There was a risk that U.S. border authorities could compare the signature of the intelligence officer with the signature of the Mexican and thereby detect counterfeits. It was known, however, that Americans never conducted this kind of document check. Up to that time, many Mexicans had crossed the border with such documents and never had their signature been compared with the signature on the document. In addition, two months earlier, another illegal intelligence officer from the same residency traveled from Mexico to New York using the same document and returned without complications.

“Spaniard” happily crossed the border and headed by bus to his destination. However, in Texas, police had instituted document checks at one of the bus stations. “Spaniard” began to get nervous as one of the policemen noticed and asked him to provide a signature. Noticing the difference in signatures, the policeman detained him to clarify his identity.

“Spaniard,” seeing that further insistence on the veracity of his signature on the document would be fruitless, declared that the document did not really belong to him

but to one of his friends. He used it because he had lost his own documents and it took too long to get new ones. He didn't have a job and he had decided to go to the United States using someone else's documents to find a job.

The policeman, however, noticed that "Spaniard" had a non-Mexican accent. Therefore, he began asking questions about Mexican life, traditions, and customs, etc.

Among other things, when asked about the coat of arms of Mexico, "Spaniard" replied this it was a "hawk sitting on a cactus." Then came the second question: what is the name of the cactus on which the hawk is sitting. The intelligence officer did not know this little detail. He could not give the right answer and was thus compromised. Admittedly, the cost was low, because "Spaniard" then introduced himself as a Portuguese trying to go to the United States in search of adventure and a little profit. "Spaniard" was searched, but nothing suspicious was found with him.

Because similar accidents are common in the United States, after the search he was only forcibly expelled from the United States.

However, he was unable to complete his task.

b. Documentation.

This involves providing an illegal intelligence officer with personal documents that establish and confirm the officer's intelligence legend and allow him to legalize his residence in a foreign country. Therefore, the documents should be such that local authorities consider them to be authentic and real. Some aspects of the legend may remain undocumented; however, they must be impossible to check.

Depending on the legend and its documentation, the intelligence officer can play the role of a citizen of his country of residence, of a foreigner, of a stateless person, or of a naturalized citizen. Personal documents and the developed legend should fully coincide, that is, there should be no divergence between them. The legend and documents are two interrelated elements of one and the same operational enterprise.

Documents can be divided into initial, basic, and supporting, depending on the role they play in the intelligence officer's legalization.

1. Initial documents.

These give the illegal the right to obtain citizenship in the capitalist country of concern to us, and they are the starting point for further documents. Initial documents are: birth or baptism certificate, naturalization certificate, an old passport of the person whose identity the illegal is assuming, or passports of his parents, etc. Initial documents are used as a basis for obtaining

basic documents, therefore it is desirable that they are authentic, original, or based on details in the original files held in the relevant records.

2. Basic documents.

These confirm the identity of the owner, certify his citizenship, and give him the right to enter, remain in, and exit the country of concern to us.

Such documents can be: passport, ID card, military ID card, loyalty certificate, etc.

3. Supporting documents.

They serve as a supplement to the basic documents, because they confirm individual aspects of the legend. Such supporting documents include:

- school graduation certificates, medical certificates, correspondence with relatives and friends, various certificates from local authorities, notary papers, etc.
- documents regarding the owner's profession: student ID, certificate from a place of work, certificate for opening a trade or craft business, commercial correspondence, etc.,
- documents regarding the owner's financial situation,
- check books, bank letters, letters of credit, documents regarding possession of property, etc.

It should be noted that the classification of documents for initial, basic and supporting is very arbitrary, because in practice it is often the case that one and the same document - depending on the circumstances and conditions in which its owner find himself - may play a different role. For example, a supporting document can often be a replacement in the absence of a basic one, etc.

Depending on their origin, personal documents can be divided into original, semi-fictitious and fictitious.

1. Original documents.

These are issued by competent state institutions and which the intelligence officer receives by legal means. They can also be obtained by an agent or from a person whom the officer will be doubling: for example, the person whom the officer will replace and who will follow him using his documents.

2. Semi-fictitious documents.

These are prepared by the Center on the basis of original documents: photo replacement or insertion of new pages into a passport created in accordance with the intelligence office's legend, etc.

3. Fictitious documents.

The Center prepares these completely on the basis of foreign document templates.

Essential documents necessary for an illegal intelligence officer are usually obtained through reliable and proven agents. They can also be bought from all sorts of brokers, but this path is very insecure and risky and therefore our intelligence service rarely uses it.

c. Cover.

Cover is a component of the legalization process of an illegal intelligence officer. It presents any type of professional activity that the intelligence officer uses to mask his actual source of livelihood and the intelligence work he conducts.

The cover of an illegal intelligence officer should be such that it avoids making him stand out from the general population of a given capitalist country and does not draw public attention to him, much less the attention of police or a counterintelligence service.

If the intelligence officer does not officially occupy himself with something, he may attract suspicion as a person with no specific occupation or who has doubtful sources of income.

1. Requirements: illegal intelligence officer cover.

Cover should meet the following basic requirements to ensure operational security:

a. A plausible and natural justification of the source of income.

The intelligence officer receives funds from the Center to plan and conduct intelligence operations, as well as for personal needs. However, for the public and for local authorities, an ostensible official source must be created. The source of income should be plausible and not raise any questions.

If the cover is skillfully created, it could cover expenses related to residing in a foreign country and, if necessary, expenses related to traveling abroad.

Of course, the latter option is most convenient because it completely removes any possible suspicion about the existence of an additional income source in the case of foreign travel.

b. Cover should correspond to the nature of work and intelligence tasks.

If, as a result of his intelligence activities, an intelligence officer often has to go to another country, or take long trips within the country of residence, or leave the house frequently, the cover should naturally justify his lifestyle.

A worker, tailor, hairdresser, or poor student cannot travel too often or travel abroad because they would not have sufficient funds for it.

For an artist, journalist, businessman, etc. this kind of travel is natural and will not cause suspicion.

For example, if the officer will use photography, a cover should be created that would ensure possession of photographic equipment, acquisition of chemicals, taking orders for photography jobs, etc.

c. Cover should leave the illegal sufficient time to conduct intelligence work.

Work time for the intelligence officer should be relatively minimal so that it does not interfere with the performance of intelligence tasks.

d. Cover should be organized on legal grounds.

If it is a business enterprise, cover should be registered in accordance with applicable local regulations, and the very purpose for the establishment should be justified by the existing economic conditions in the given country.

e. Cover should correspond to the officer's age.

For example, it would not be natural for a person who is 40 years old according to his passport to begin his education. To make this plausible, one would have to come up with a number of complex circumstances and thus complicate the legend, that is, to do what should be avoided in practice.

f. When organizing cover, it is necessary to observe the principle that the personnel cover apparatus (such as an established company) that is unrelated to the illegal apparatus (intelligence) should have absolutely no contact with intelligence work.

For example, if an illegal intelligence officer is the owner or co-owner of a business or factory, he should not use employees under his business responsibility to perform intelligence tasks or draw them into cooperation or recruitment. Failure to adhere to this rule can lead to exposure.

2. Types of cover.

We will consider some possible types of cover.

a. Trade and small business.

This group of covers includes such professions as car mechanic, locksmith, watchmaker, photographer, tailor, owner of a small repair workshop (bicycles, electrical accessories, sewing machines, etc.), owner of a small commercial enterprise, owner or employee of a gas station, taxi owner, etc.

These types of covers justify small sources of income and give the illegal opportunity to use his time freely for intelligence activities. These professions do not attract the attention of local authorities and are most accessible from the point of view of training a skilled intelligence officer. The very establishment of such a workshop does not require large investment and complicated documents, and in addition, do not waste a lot of time.

All this gives reason to expect that these types of covers are suitable for illegal intelligence officers. Their shortcoming is that an illegal cannot, as a result of his social position, interact in the social circles that represent the greatest operational interest for us.

b. Business activities.

Large-scale business is a convenient cover especially when its task is to cover intelligence activities that go beyond the borders of one country.

Under these conditions, the most convenient may be commercial activities related to export and import.

However, it should be borne in mind that large-scale business activities require too much time for an illegal operator. Business often depends on the domestic market conditions and foreign markets, and in addition, requires excellent professional training.

Therefore, when organizing this type of cover, it is better if the intelligence officer is not the business owner but a partner. In practice, however, it is more difficult to organize such a cover: the candidate as a partner must have positive recommendations and can be checked, and sometimes it is necessary to use an agent, etc. Obviously, there is also an increased risk of the intelligence officer being exposed.

c. Large industrial enterprise.

Establishing an industrial or industrial-commercial enterprise can be a solid cover. The owner of a plant, factory, or a respectable shareholder of an industrial-commercial company may have some cover and will not draw local counterintelligence attention.

Due to high financial cost and great difficulties involved with organizing such a cover—for example, the legalization of capital—our intelligence service can choose such a solution only in isolated cases.

d. Freelancers.

Freelancers are a convenient kind of cover. These include artist-painters, musicians, sculptors, journalists, doctors, etc. The difficulties here are education and, for example, the medical profession makes legalization very difficult because in addition to practical information, the officer must have appropriate documents supporting a medical education.

The positive side of these professions that serves as a cover, is that the individuals' earnings are not thoroughly controlled by local authorities, which is important for the legalization of operational funds. In addition, they do not require finances and give the illegal a lot of free time required for intelligence work.

When choosing this type of cover, however, one should take into account some practical difficulties that may arise in establishing of the officer in his profession: the existence of various associations, clubs, the need for recommendations, etc.

e. Education.

This type of cover can be successfully used by our officer. It is known that a significant number of foreigners from many countries of the world study at universities in the United States, England, France, Italy and other capitalist countries.

Such a cover can be successfully used by an officer aged 20 - 30 who resides for a long time in a foreign country as a university student.

Education as cover gives the officer the opportunity to lead a relatively free lifestyle, leave a lot of free time, create favorable conditions for interacting with a wide range of people, visiting public places, etc.

f. Other types of cover.

The intelligence officer can also use other types of activities for cover if they do not raise the suspicion of local authorities and the surroundings. For example, it would be very beneficial if the officer started working directly in the facility of interest to us, in an institution having contact with it, or in its close vicinity. In individual cases, such a possibility may arise because some countries employ foreigners to a large extent (e.g. many Italians, Greeks, etc., work in the FRG).

Considering the question of developing the cover, a few words should be said about the family of the illegal intelligence officer. Marriage and family are of great importance to the intelligence officer.

Life and work as cover for an officer is intertwined with his intelligence operations. Therefore, the intelligence officer's personal and daily life should not hinder his operations. If a wife is a faithful helper, both in personal life and in intelligence operations, it is easier to work, and residing in a foreign country illegally becomes more tolerable and causes less nervous exhaustion.

Based on this assumption, it is desirable that an illegal intelligence officer's wife should also be a citizen of our country, be a patriot devoted to her homeland, and have the personal qualities necessary for intelligence work. She should be operationally trained to the extent that it is planned that she will be employed.

The presence of a family creates a more permanent position in society for the officer. He draws less attention from people around him. Therefore, it is advisable, if possible, to register a marriage before the illegal operation and to send an officer abroad with his wife.

If the wife's departure cannot be legalized and properly documented with the officer's, then her arrival can be arranged as a "bride" and then the formalities of their "marriage" can be arranged.

It is also permissible for an illegal intelligence officer to travel abroad not only with a wife but also with young children. Children can only help give the intelligence officer the appearance of a stable, reliable, and domesticated person. However, the age of the children cannot exceed 2-3 years. Children at this age cannot yet understand their parents' real situation. Young children will quickly learn to speak a foreign language and will be an additional reinforcement of the parents' legend.

Older children should not be sent with the officer because it is difficult to teach them how to behave clandestinely or keep them unaware.

At times the Center allows a marriage to a foreigner, even to a citizen of the country in which the officer is conducting intelligence operations. This is acceptable if such marriage ensures the acquisition of citizenship in the country, facilitates the development of cover, assists with penetrating the facility of interest to us, or helps to carry out other important intelligence tasks.

The possibility should be considered that a wealthy family of the fiancée can thoroughly check the officer and gather information about him before the wedding. Private detectives are sometimes employed for this purpose.

For example, one illegal employee, to improve his legalization, proposed to the daughter of the owner of the guesthouse where he was staying. The guesthouse was very profitable. By marrying the owner's daughter, the intelligence officer would receive a portion of the guesthouse as a dowry and would automatically become a partner in the enterprise.

One day the officer approached a maid cleaning his room and asked, "How is the the guesthouse business going." The maid replied, "Business is going well. But it will be even better when you take charge, because in any business, a man is a better manager than a woman."

Further, the maid confessed that she was aware of the owner's daughter's impending wedding to the officer, and that the owner's wife had written to her relative who lives in the same town where the officer had come from asking him to check on of the fiancé. In addition, the maid informed the illegal that the owner's wife had employed a private detective to check into him.

In light of all of that, the intelligence officer who had initially intended to deepen his cover was forced to hastily change his place of residence, because the portion of his legend that related to his origin could not withstand detailed examination.

The question of marriage to a foreigner should be approached very carefully. Marriage could prove to be very useful mainly in facilitating legalization in the country. But later, the wife may complicate the officer's life and operational work. Therefore, the expediency of such a marriage must be considered in relation to the possibility of recruiting the future wife to cooperate with the intelligence service.

VI. CENTER COMMUNICATION WITH ILLEGAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS.

In the work of intelligence, communication plays a particularly important role. Without communication, the residency's work will be zero, as the information that is acquired cannot be forwarded to the Center.

Only if there is reliable and uninterrupted communication can illegal intelligence cells work efficiently and transfer the acquired information to the Center in a timely manner.

Center communication with illegal intelligence personnel is completely different than with "legal" residents. It is implemented with the help of illegal channels organized independently by intelligence residencies or with the help of the Center. The capabilities of "legal" residencies to mediate between illegal intelligence cells and the Center are used in exceptional cases and only with the consent of the intelligence leadership. The fewer these types of emergency situations, the better for the operation.

Radio is the primary means of communication with the Center. Radio as a means of communication fully meets all the requirements that intelligence faces: operational security, safety, reliability, continuity, and especially operability.

Radio communication can be bidirectional or unidirectional. Unidirectional radio communication is often used, especially in the initial period after establishing the operation.

With unidirectional radio communication, the intelligence residency uses a regular radio to receive the Center's tasks in the form of encrypted radiograms transmitted by Morse code or audio. On the other hand, the residency provides information and intelligence to the Center via dead drops (lockers), couriers, or by post using secret writing and microphotography.

Unidirectional radio communication, when compared with bidirectional, has the advantage that the opponent's radio counterintelligence cannot geolocate the receiving radio point. In contrast, the broadcasting station can be easily detected in the ether and then geolocated. That is why broadcasting stations are used by intelligence facilities only in special cases. When using the radio, it is necessary to move the operational location and take other precautions.

Couriers play an important role in communication between intelligence residencies and the Center. With their help, documentary information and large-sized materials, such as operational technical equipment, samples, formulas, charts, drawings, etc., can be transferred,

Sometimes, in addition to personal communication with couriers, intelligence officers maintain indirect or impersonal communication with them. To this end, transfer points are organized that make communication more secure and clandestine.

Dead drops (compartments) are widely used in communication with couriers. This is one of the most common ways of impersonal communication. Safe houses are also used for the personal contacts between intelligence officers and couriers from the Center.

Personal contact between the Center staff and illegal intelligence officers is widely used in communication between intelligence residencies and the Center.

Headquarters staff occasionally travel abroad illegally. Illegal intelligence officers also use various clandestine means to travel to the Headquarters to resolve the most important issues that require personal discussion with managers.

Sometimes the intelligence service can establish special residencies, whose task is to organize reliable and secure communication routes between the Center and illegal intelligence cells abroad.

In intelligence work, there is often a need to organize communication between illegal residencies and "legal" residents. We do this in the following cases:

- When Headquarters instructions cannot be entrusted to agents and must be delivered in person,
- When intelligence residencies send extremely important documents, scientific and technical materials, and plans,
- When an illegal residency or another illegal intelligence facility obtains extremely important information that must be transferred to the Center immediately in order to take immediate action; for example, information about preparations for a provocation against our citizens or official establishments abroad, plans for an armed attack on any socialist country, intent to betray or defect, etc.

Communication between "legal" and illegal intelligence cells is carried out mainly through dead drops. Only in extraordinary cases and with the consent of the Center can a personal meeting between an illegal intelligence officer and an employee of a "legal" residency be arranged.

Communication through dead drops and personal meetings should be prepared very carefully to completely eliminate the risk of compromise. This condition is a mandatory requirement in arranging communication between "legal" and illegal residencies. Therefore, operationally experienced employees are designated to maintain contact with illegal officers.

The "legal" residency may also be required to transmit to the Center information obtained from an illegal intelligence officer of a residency located in the same or a neighboring country. Such information or conventional signals may be forwarded to "legal" residency using various radio broadcasts, normal code through official mail, announcements in the local press, etc.

Communication channels for illegal intelligence residencies with the Center often consist of not one, but many links using different types of communication. For example, to organize a communication channel from any country on the American continent to a European socialist country, radio communication must be mixed with other forms of communication, such as couriers or using international mail. To transmit Information by radio from New York to one of the European People's Democracies, a powerful radio transmitter is required, which may not always be available in illegal conditions because of the complications of operational security.

In this case, it is advisable to install an intermediate radio station, such as at a point on the Atlantic coast of Europe. It will receive messages from New York and forward them via radio, mail, telegraph, couriers, etc.

These are the primary means and methods used by intelligence to organize communication channels between the Center and illegal intelligence found in capitalist countries.

VII. ORGANIZATION AND SCOPE OF WORK OF ILLEGAL INTELLIGENCE RESIDENCIES.

The work of intelligence residencies consists of obtaining intelligence information and performing other tasks commissioned by the Center. To this end, intelligence residencies:

- Recruit or assume communication responsibilities with a reliable agent network that is strongly connected with us,
- Work with agent networks to manage and train them and educate up,
- Secure permanent communication—with agents and with the Center—which can operate in both peacetime and wartime,
- Develop and transmit acquired intelligence information to the Center in a timely manner (on time),
- Organize clandestine storage of classified materials, operational technical equipment, financial resources, etc.

The scope of intelligence residencies' official duties is determined in accordance with:

- the tasks imposed on them,
- the conditions of the intelligence situation in the country,
- with the legalization situation of illegal intelligence officers.

There should be a strict division of operational duties between employees of an intelligence residency. The division is made by the resident, taking into account the personal characteristics of each employee, his professional advantages, and experience in practical operational work. The division of duties is organized in such a way that one intelligence officer can replace another if necessary.

Great attention should be paid to the distribution of agents among intelligence officers. At the same time, the agent's personal characteristics, the importance of the target on which he is working, his job position, as well as his experience in operational matters, operational capabilities derived from cover, and the officer's education and personal characteristics should all be taken into account.

An example of the division of duties in an illegal residency is as follows:

- resident - manages all employees, conducts organizational matters, recruits and directs the work of the most valuable agents,

- one - two operational employees - maintains liaison with agents and deals with recruitment,
- operational technician – a specialist in the field of operational tradecraft (microphotography, secret writing, etc.) performs all work in this specialty,
- radio operator - his duties include maintaining radio communication.

To avoid compromises, liaisons and couriers are not included in operational work

Each employee of the intelligence residency is assigned a specific task, a specific development target to be penetrated is assigned, and the path and purpose are precisely defined.

Intelligence residencies and their employees should not be assigned unattainable tasks. The Center should properly take into account the residency's realistic intelligence capabilities when assigning tasks.

The proper integration of young, inexperienced intelligence officers into practical intelligence work is of great importance. These employees should not be assigned immediate operational tasks. They should be gradually integrated into work and their tasks increased as they gain operational experience.

Intelligence conducted from illegal positions has its peculiarities. Here are some specific properties of this work.

1. Work with agent networks.

The basic principle of intelligence officers' work with agent networks is that each agent knows the officer only by a fictitious given name and surname. Under no circumstances should he know of the intelligence officer's actual or legend personal data or place of residence and place of work. This rule, dictated by reasons of clandestinity and the security of intelligence officers operating illegally abroad, should be strictly observed.

Exceptions to this rule can only occur in cases where the agent is recruited from among the intelligence officer's personal contacts, he previously visited the intelligence officer at home or at work, or he has maintained and continues to maintain social contact with him.

However, the officer should know everything about the agent he works with: full personal data, workplace, environment in which he lives, interests, character traits, etc.

Only trusted agents who raise no suspicions or doubts should be put in communication with the intelligence residency. There should be no factors in these agents' past or present lives and activities of that could draw the attention of local counterintelligence or police and cause them to be discovered. From this perspective, it is necessary to analyze all information regarding the candidate before putting them in communication with illegal residencies abroad. At the same

time, pay attention to various events, contacts, and family ties of the agent, etc., which may give the opponent grounds for suspicion.

2. Recruitment work.

The peculiarity of recruitment work carried out from illegal positions is primarily that the intelligence agent resides in a foreign country as a local citizen or a citizen of another capitalist country and not as a Polish citizen.

Therefore, illegal officers recruit agents most often using a foreign flag. Such recruitment is not made on behalf of our country or Polish intelligence, but on behalf of a capitalist state, its institutions, or organizations.

Recruitment under a foreign flag does not necessarily mean recruitment on behalf of state intelligence service. The officer can also act on behalf of a party or political organization, a private company, news agency, industrial union, religious organization, and even in a private capacity, such as a journalist, political activist, etc.

We conduct recruitment under a foreign flag when we have information indicating that the recruitment target will not cooperate with our intelligence service for some reason. In that case, the intelligence residency's task is to identify the right organization with which the recruitment target would agree to cooperate.

When effecting a recruitment, an intelligence officer who is illegally abroad rarely acts as a citizen or representative of Polish intelligence. This is only permissible if a suitable foreign flag cannot be found and when the officer is certain that the recruitment candidate is not being deceptive and will accept the offer of cooperation.

In this regard, most recruitment candidates are ideologically aligned with us. While continuing to work with an agent recruited under a foreign flag, we try to gradually and carefully introduce him under our flag, because only then is it possible to fully exploit each agent's intelligence capabilities.

3. Processing and storage of intelligence material.

In the work of intelligence from an illegal position, the processing and storage of intelligence materials received from an agent and the storage of operational, technical, and financial resources is particularly distinct.

The working conditions of illegal residency and other illegal intelligence cells are completely different from the working conditions of "legal" residency. A "legal" residency has specially adapted rooms in the buildings of the embassy, consulate, mission or other official representative of the Polish People's Republic, which have safes and special secure conditions for storing classified materials. These rooms are under constant protection.

There are no such conditions in intelligence establishments that do not use legal cover. That is why every intelligence officer arranges for himself a secure place in which he stores classified materials, documents, operational equipment, and money.

Such a cache is usually a dead drop, which should be well arranged and masked so that it cannot be detected even during a search. The cache should be located not far from the officer's place of residence or directly in his apartment if he occupies a separate apartment or an entire house.

This saves time and simplifies the removal and hiding of intelligence material. It also facilitates the storage and use of operational equipment. The storage location should be arranged in such a way that the safety of the materials and resources contained in it can be guaranteed.

Caches are not usually found, but are built by the officer himself (sometimes by the Center) and are properly arranged, camouflaged in objects that are naturally found in normal places and do not arouse suspicion. In addition, individual materials should be stored in special containers, for example, in hiding places so secure that a person who does not know how to open the locking mechanism would destroy the hidden material.

The intelligence material received from an agent is properly processed before being sent to the Center. The material should contain the necessary comments, notes, source and credibility assessment. The most secret, important portions, such as names, addresses, and other messages that could lead to compromise, should be encoded.

The intelligence material is generally prepared by the officer himself. If possible, a specially trained agent can also partially process the material.

The processing of intelligence materials and preparation of mail for the Center is usually done in a clandestine location, where the necessary technical equipment (cameras, containers, etc.) are kept. The private apartment where the intelligence officer lives should be "clean," which means that there should no objects there that would expose him to compromise.

It is understandable that, by penetrating deeper and in more detail into the specifics of operations from an illegal position, it is possible to list and discuss many more specific aspects than those indicated and briefly characterized. However, this does not seem necessary or advisable because the details are primarily of interest to those who are directly trained for this work.

VIII. COORDINATION OF WORK OF "LEGAL" RESIDENCIES WITH ILLEGAL INTELLIGENCE RESIDENCIES.

In intelligence activity there are fields of operational work and individual questions that are quite often implemented in close cooperation of "legal" and illegal residencies.

Of course, the joint operation of "legal" and illegal intelligence cells is coordinated by the Center.

In the current circumstances, the number of instances of intelligence operations managed as joint efforts of both the "legal" and illegal intelligence apparatus is increasing. This is explained by the fact that international relations are becoming more tense and the intelligence situation in most capitalist countries is deteriorating—first and foremost in the United States, England, the FRG, etc.—creating great difficulties in the work of "legal" residents and significantly limiting their intelligence activities.

For example, in many capitalist countries:

- Officials from a number of institutions of interest to our intelligence are forbidden from contact with citizens of the PRL and other socialist countries,
- Restrictions have been introduced for employees of official representations of our country moving around the enemy's territory,
- extensive spymania propaganda is being conducted,
- provocations are often employed against our citizens who come here for business or private reasons.

The cooperation of "legal" and illegal intelligence cells should primarily concern the organization of reliable and secure agent communication.

In our intelligence operational work, there have been instances when illegal intelligence residencies or individual illegal intelligence officers were subordinate to "legal" residents and effectively maintained contact with valuable and trusted agents. It has also occurred that valuable agents handled by legal residencies were transferred to illegal intelligence officers working directly under the Center.

Another important aspect of intelligence work in which the coordinated activities of both divisions can be planned is to establish the necessary conditions for transferring agents to illegal residencies or to special illegal intelligence officers in the event that the activities of "legal" residencies are suspended, such as due to the rapid deterioration of the intelligence situation, the severance of diplomatic relations, etc.

This work should be carried out in a preparatory, mobilizing manner, but without haste and with all the principles of operational security necessary for the transfer and takeover of agents. This preparation can be done without personal contact between “legal” residencies and illegal intelligence officers. The “legal” residency prepares and sends to the Center all necessary details regarding the transfer of its agent to be handled by illegal residency, and the Center informs the illegal residency.

A no less important aspect of intelligence work in which the efforts of the “legal” and illegal intelligence apparatus should be coordinated is to develop important targets of the opponent are of concern to us, to get to know the people employed there, and to recruit them.

Due to the intensifying police and counterintelligence regime, in many capitalist countries, it is becoming increasingly difficult, and sometimes impossible, to effectively protect agent networks and contacts of personnel in “legal” residents from being discovered. This applies especially to agents and contacts working in important facilities, such as those related to the production of nuclear energy, rockets, missiles, thermonuclear weapons, etc., because these people are under close and constant observation of the enemy's counterintelligence service.

Therefore, to meet people working in important opponent's facilities faster and more comprehensively, it is necessary to make more extensive use of illegal intelligence officers and to more frequently coordinate the operations of both divisions—legal and illegal. For example, an operational employee of a “legal” residency receives recruitment instructions, and an illegal intelligence officer conducts the development and recruitment of that person.

It is often the other way around:

In one West European country, an illegal intelligence officer, during his legalization, settled with his wife in a house where a single, young woman lived. She worked as the personal secretary of a high-ranking military specialist on one of NATO's military staffs. Extremely important military materials passed through this woman's hands. In addition, she often accompanied her boss on inspection trips to various military facilities. The intelligence officer and his wife made friends quite quickly. In a relatively short time, they both got to know her well. For operational reasons, however, it was not advisable for the illegal officer operating abroad to recruit this woman.

Therefore, he limited himself to development and informed the Center on what basis and how recruitment could be made from the position of “legal” intelligence.

Combining operational “legal” and illegal intelligence calls is also expedient,

- when searching for a lost agent and establishing communication,
- in handling individual intelligence tasks,

- when training agents in impersonal communications,
- when checking particularly important intelligence information, for example on the way of so-called visual intelligence, findings, etc.

It follows from the above that having illegal intelligence facilities abroad and the skillful combination of “legal” and illegal forms of intelligence operations in close coordination with the Center allows our intelligence to:

- be more flexible and capable of performing the entire range of tasks assigned to it,
- quickly adapt its apparatus to changes in the international and internal situation of the country in which the intelligence is conducted.

In addition, managing so-called active intelligence measures—stimulation, disinformation, counter propaganda, etc.—from illegal positions deprives the opponent of the ability to discredit our state and its official representations.

However, it should be remembered that cooperation and coordination of intelligence work in both divisions requires heightened vigilance, strict operational security, and iron discipline of the entire composition of all intelligence cells.

Our intelligence personnel should constantly remember and not forget in the onslaught of everyday work that creative combining and coordinating of the operations of “legal” and illegal apparatus yields significant operational effects.

====X====X====X====

Ending the review of forms and methods of intelligence work carried out from illegal positions, it is necessary to emphasize once again its advantages and great possibilities that allow the proper and correct conduct of the responsibilities set before our apparatus regardless of the existing conditions.

This is possible if we attach great importance to the constant strengthening of existing illegal intelligence facilities and the organization of new ones based on the correct rules regarding the forms and methods of this work.